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Abstract 
“Policy Pathways to Health in the Russian Federation” was the name given to a 
project implemented in 2002-04 by IIASA in collaboration with the Institute for Socio-
economic Studies of Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences.  The core activity 
of the project was organizing a workshop, held at IIASA in September 2003, at which 
international and national researchers and policy makers shared information and 
insights.  Through workshop papers and discussions, sources of the poor health situation 
in Russia ranging from bad health behaviors to inadequate health care financing were 
discussed and analyzed.  The focus throughout was on possible policy responses. 
This IIASA Interim Report presents the Proceedings of the Workshop, followed 
by the workshop program and list of participants given as Annexes 1 and 2.  The 
presentations published here are condensed versions of project papers available at the 
workshop web site http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RMS/TACIS03/?sb=19.  
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Policy Pathways to Health in the Russian Federation 
Edited by 
Landis MacKellar 
Elena Andriouchina 
David Horlacher 
1.  Introduction 
The goal of the IIASA-Russian Academy of Sciences project “Policy Pathways 
to Health in the Russian Federation” was to improve the long-term health of the Russian 
population through a better understanding of the causes of current high levels of 
mortality and morbidity in the Russian Federation and the policies and means to address 
them. 
The central activity of the project was holding an international workshop of the 
same title at IIASA in Laxenburg, Austria, on 19-21 September, 2003.  The immediate 
goal of this workshop was to present preliminary work on various health issues and to 
explore a research agenda with the following objectives: 
1) Identify adverse health behaviors responsible for excess deaths and morbidity 
and current policies aimed at controlling them (examples include alcohol abuse, 
road accidents, high risk sexual behaviors, poor diet, stress and so on). 
2) Consider the wider impacts of excess morbidity and mortality on the Russian 
economy (e.g., lost output, lower productivity) and also the impacts on current 
health care reforms and financing. 
3) Consider how policies to reduce adverse health behaviors can be made to work 
more effectively by reviewing their impact, scope and consistency, and 
identifying alternative and complementary policy pathways. 
4) Bring together the main stakeholders involved in policy design and delivery, to 
understand their individual contributions, how they interact and contribute 
directly or indirectly to the overall policy aim (e.g., a reduction in infectious 
diseases, road deaths, or homicide). 
 The workshop was aimed at three main groups: researchers working directly in the 
area including, but not limited to, economists, sociologists, and medical demographers in 
the public health community; policy advisors in Ministries; and political decision makers.   
Target groups were selected based on three criteria:  those having (1) a strategic 
overview of the issues; (2) a research track record in relevant areas of policy; and (3) 
technical expertise in economics, medical demography and health financing.  
This IIASA Interim Report presents the Proceedings of the Workshop, followed 
by the workshop program and list of participants given as Annexes 1 and 2.  The 
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presentations published here are condensed versions of project papers available at the 
workshop web site http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RMS/TACIS03/?sb=19.  A few 
presentations, available as PowerPoint presentations but not as papers, are to be found 
on the web, but not in this Report. 
 Among the objectives described above, significant progress was made regarding 
Objectives (1), (3), and (4); less so regarding Objective (2).  The reason for this is that it 
became clear during the round of expert interviews that little work has been done in this 
area apart from HIV/AIDS.  The lack of work in part reflects scarcity of data and 
disagreements on costing procedures to be applied.  Further, the lack of capacity to 
carry out multi-disciplinary studies, reflected in the low number of economists with 
some training in health, health care specialists with some training in economics, etc., 
also plays a role.  Under these circumstances, it appeared wiser to concentrate on 
documenting causes of poor health and policy responses.  
 The project also pursued a number of subsidiary objectives: 
• Raising the awareness in the policy community of the diversity of policy 
interventions that can affect health, and the need for better co-ordination, 
measurement and evaluation.  Given the researchers and policy practitioners 
who participated and the range of health problems explored, there is little 
question that awareness was raised regarding the diversity of policy responses.  
Discussions ranged from the control of alcohol to epidemiological screening and 
surveillance; from accident prevention to broad measures to reduce corruption 
and the feelings of powerlessness that it engenders; from health care finance to 
measures to promote mother and child health, etc.  A theme that emerged 
repeatedly during the workshop was the lack of agreement on basic data, 
sometimes revealed in fundamental disagreements between participants.  The 
data theme came through perhaps most clearly in presentations on alcohol (Dr. 
Aleksander Nemtsov), HIV/AIDS (Dr. Vanessa Fuller), crime (Dr. Yuri 
Andrienko), suicide (Dr. Ilkka Makinen), and the health of homeless persons 
(Dr. Svitlana Stephenson).  These data discussions were especially useful in 
light of the participation of a high-level Goskomstat official (PowerPoint 
presentation by Dr. Serguey Sourinov) as well as the Ministry of Health official 
responsible for all health statistics (PowerPoint presentations by Dr. Katerina 
Kakorina).   Such dialogue between researchers and high-level officials 
responsible for data is rare in Russia. 
• Obtaining external as well as internal perspectives on the success of similar 
policies both in Russia and internationally, building where possible on best 
practice.  A number of presentations stressed international best practice and 
comparative international experiences.  An especially salient finding 
(presentation by Dr. Leslie Mayhew) was that life-style variables, not the public-
private split in health care spending, are the most important factors 
distinguishing good from bad international health performance.  This suggests 
that almost any type of health system can be made to work adequately if it is 
well administered on the basis of adequate information flows, but it can deliver 
results no better than life style constraints permit.  The presentation on smoking 
(Dr. David Rotman) presented unique international comparative data from the 
CIS countries on smoking.  It highlighted, among other things, the increase in 
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smoking among women and the role of aggressive marketing techniques 
employed by international tobacco companies.  Many other presentations 
contained substantial portions describing best international practice, e.g., harm-
reduction programs for HIV/AIDS control. 
• Identifying and sharing common techniques and analytical models developed in 
different disciplines but applying to the same generic set of issues.  Through the 
workshop, participants were exposed to a range of methodological approaches 
from different disciplines to shared problems, for example, sociological, 
economic and epidemiological perspectives on suicide, crime and alcohol.  The 
public health orientation of most workshop participants (a number of whom 
were medical doctors) was balanced by the presence of a number of economists, 
including a leading expert on the economic aspects of health care financing and 
provision in Russia (Dr. Sergei Shishkin). 
• Contributing to discussions on health reform in the relevant areas of public 
health and health care delivery including prioritization and financing issues.  The 
reform of health care financing was dealt with extensively through Dr. 
Shishkin’s participation.  Broader issues of prioritization were the theme of 
presentations by Dr Kakorina of the Ministry of Health, who presented Ministry 
plans and priorities, and Dr. Judith Shapiro, a leading expert on the political 
economy of health care in Russia.  The key point made by Dr. Shapiro is that 
even cost-effective interventions require up-front investments and may therefore 
not be undertaken in an atmosphere of economic crisis.  Those measures most 
likely to be implemented successfully under adverse circumstances are ones 
(like Universal Salt Iodization taken by Dr. Shapiro as an example) where an 
overwhelming multitude of factors, in addition to cost effectiveness, are positive 
and no significant interest groups are opposed.  
A Russian-language synthesis (approximately 20 journal pages) of the research 
presented at the workshop is forthcoming in the journal Narodonaselenie (Population) 
published by the Institute Socio-Economicheskich Problem of Narodonaselenia 
Rossiiskoy Akademii Nauk (Institute for Socio-Economic Population Studies of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences). 
Workshop participants, as well as experts in Russia who contributed to 
workshop preparation but were unable to attend, now comprise a network of researchers 
and Government officials capable of identifying and pursuing further work.  One of the 
goals of making workshop papers available in shortened and consistent form in this 
IIASA Interim Report is to give participants and others standardized background 
material, including the latest references and data, for use when they prepare proposals 
for further work.   
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2.  Welcoming 
Welcoming remarks 
Landis MacKellar 
IIASA, Laxenburg 
“Millions condemned to die as health policies fail,” writes Reuters in a news 
release from yesterday.  The news release summarizes a report issued by several blue-
blood international NGOs.  In case you couldn’t guess, the report is timed to precede the 
annual World Bank / IMF autumn meeting. 
Whether you agree with World Bank approach to health or not, the news release 
reminds us that the stakes in health are significant.  While technical progress is creating 
new means of achieving better health, cost constraints and the bad health behaviors – 
persisting in the North, emerging in the South -- are limiting progress.  Between rich 
and poor countries and between the rich and the poor within countries (especially within 
poor countries), important gaps in health have appeared.   
These health gaps are that rarest of birds: something new under the sun.  So far 
as historical and even paleo-demographers can tell, in the pre-modern era people across 
the world died at pretty much the same age and of pretty much the same sorts of things.  
Cromwell, some of you know, succeeded in catching malaria in Ireland, and he died of 
it.  And within countries, before the modern era, rich and poor in New York City, in 
London, in Tokyo, or in Moscow died at more or less at the same rate from the same 
things – for example, in turn-of-the-century Philadelphia, the infant mortality rate of 
physician’s children was about the same as that for the population at large, which 
suggests that money, class, and access to medical care was of limited effect.   Another 
way of convincing yourself of this is to go poke around the Hapsburg burial vault 
downtown and see how young they died.  
Nothing could be further from the situation today.  At the global level, we are 
becoming a two-speed health world and, within individual countries, two-speed health 
societies.   As technology advances – and, as my physician friends tell me, especially as 
the fruits of the human genome project become available – the divergent tendency will 
only become stronger. 
There is something else that is new under the sun.  For the first time ever, people 
in all but the poorest countries are more or less choosing the time of their death ... or at 
least pulling it forward or pushing it back greatly.   Their choice is made by the decision 
whether to smoke, how much to drink, what sort of diet to consume, whether to take 
illicit drugs and whether to limit their sexual activities to the low-risk category.  And, 
not surprisingly, those at the top of the social scale, whose life is altogether pleasant, are 
choosing a healthier portfolio of habits than those at the bottom.  Or, some on the left 
would say, the poor really don’t have that much choice at all.  
We can only break off a small piece of the global health puzzle in the next few 
days, but it is an important one: health deterioration in a major world power whose 
health system used to work not terribly well, but not abysmally either, and what to do 
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about it.   We are here to trade ideas, to present papers that are in many cases first drafts, 
and to bounce ideas off each other.  Howard Raiffa, the first Director of IIASA, once 
said that this was the only institute in the world where you could be listened to seriously 
when you didn’t know the first thing about the subject at hand.  Let’s keep up that 
tradition of enthusiastic informal dialogue.  Great ideas and major activities are 
sometimes born out of such chaos. 
The idea for this workshop was born two years ago over lunch at the 
Laxenburger Hof at which, among others, Les Mayhew, David Horlacher, and Elena 
Andriouchina were present.  The idea of doing work on Russian health was proposed.   
This in turn led to a proposal to the European Commission TACIS Seminars and 
Conferences program, whose representative regrettably cannot be present today and to 
the Austrian Federal Ministry for Education, Science and Culture.  The funding of these 
agencies, as well as the support of the Russian Committee for Systems Analysis, 
IIASA’s Russian national member organization, has made this workshop possible.  
Susie Riley and the staff of the IIASA Office of Sponsored Research made a strong 
contribution to this effort.   
In putting the workshop together, we turned to our old IIASA partner the 
Institute for Socio-economic Studies of Population, represented here today by 
Academician Rimshevskaya.  I would also like to pay special thanks to the Independent 
Institute for Social Policy in Moscow, which greatly facilitated our work there.  Finally, 
in the acknowledgements department, we do not have favorite participants, but I must 
say that Judith Shapiro was exceptionally helpful in informing our work. 
In closing, I need not advertise Vienna to this group, but I would like to inform 
participants that Saturday is the famous lange nacht die museen during which all of the 
museums are open all night for the price of entering one.   I hope our activities, 
intellectual and social, will not be so strenuous as to preclude a late night for some of 
you in the museums and gasthäuser of Vienna. 
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Welcoming remarks 
Natalia Rimashevskaya 
Institute for Socio-economic Problems of Population, Moscow 
The need for a program to improve Russian health 
The purpose of the present workshop is to sum up results of the work carried out 
by most participants in different directions, with the aim of formulating and 
substantiating a system-wide program for development of policies to improve 
population health in the Russian Federation. 
First, what is health?  When defining individual and public health, it would be 
reasonable to proceed from the formula given by the World Health Organization:  
“Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity”1.  Health status reflects the ability of a human 
individual or a human population (country, region, district) to adapt to changes in living 
conditions affecting the organism; actually it is an accumulated capacity that can either 
grow or decrease.  The state of health estimated by indicators of mortality, morbidity, 
and disability, gives but a relative notion of the existing situation (dead versus alive, 
sick versus well, disabled versus able), characterizing rather the ill health of the 
population.  Clearly it is important for us to assess the health of the population as well. 
There is no doubt about the urgency of implementing a program to improve 
Russian population health.  Despite the large amount of research that has been done -- 
and I mean not only purely medical or pharmacological studies aimed at investigating 
disease etiology, also but socio-economic research carried out within the context of 
public health -- the health of the Russian citizens is deteriorating.  It grieves us all.  And 
reform of the health care as a branch of the social sphere is making no headway; it is 
“one step forward, and two steps back.” 
My main propositions for a project aiming to draft such a program are based on 
a series of case studies in the field of health, which we started to carry out as far as in 
the 70s. and deserve very careful consideration.  Among these studies were the 
following: 
• A quasi-longitudinal survey of the individual health potential of population 
within the frames of the Taganrog studies over the period of 1980-2000, i.e., 
during the last 20 years of the past century. 
• Socio-economic monitoring of children’s health from the moment of birth in the 
regime of real time (Vologda oblast, the cities of Vologda, Cherepovets, Kirilov, 
Veliky Ustyug, Vozhega), started in 1994 (the first birth cohort). 
• A series of studies in the field of reproductive health. 
                                                 
1 World Health Organization: <www who.int/asout who/cn/definition.hml>  
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• Various studies concerning the issues of health care system, including the 
problems of health insurance, maltreatment, etc. 
What tasks do these (and other) studies suggest need to be carried out in order to design 
a health program for Russia? 
Task 1: Define and measure health at the population and individual levels. 
The first task is to define and measure the state of population health on the scale 
of a country, separate regions, groups of population.  There are official statistics from 
Goskomstat and the Ministry of Health Care, and there is no reason to distrust them.  
But we should also take into consideration a number of important aspects.  For example, 
mortality statistics and the life expectancy indicators derived from them seem to be the 
most reliable health indicators.  The fact of death is just that, a fact – it either exists or 
not.  However, and first, there is at least some under-reporting of deaths.  Sometimes 
deaths are not registered, and some persons classified as “missing” are in fact dead.  
And there is over-reporting of deaths as well, as some actually dead persons are 
officially documented as living.  Second, and more importantly, full understanding 
requires knowledge not just of the fact of death, but of the type of death.  It is very 
important to know, if death resulted from accumulated insults to the body (chronic ill 
health); or if it resulted from a sudden illness condition affecting a person who was 
previously healthy; or if it resulted from external causes (trauma, poisoning, homicide, 
etc.). 
 Almost the same may be said about the statistics of morbidity and the 
relationship between illness and health: with one and the same disease (statistically) the 
health status of the diseased persons may be quite different.  Moreover, it is very 
important to know whether the disease is chronic and has a history, or it is just 
diagnosed for the first time. A diseased person may suffer from one-two-three diseases. 
This characterizes various levels of health/ill health.  
 With the account of such peculiarities of the statistics, it is possible (and 
necessary) to elaborate an indicator of health / ill health on a population scale, which 
can be more reliable.  But alongside the indicators of health / ill health of a population 
character, there are indicators of individual health potential relating to the person. 
Our institute carried out a series of studies in this field not only in Taganrog, but 
also in Moscow and St. Petersburg (1997), rural areas of  Saratov and Pskov oblasts 
(1997),  Vologda and Tver oblasts and Krasnodar kray (1993-1997). Our researchers 
carefully elaborated a complex methodological approach with the use of objective and 
subjective assessments which became foundation of an integrated index (within a five-
score scale).  
Task 2: investigate health dynamics and separate causes of health from causes 
of separate diseases 
The second task for this project would be two-fold: to define a vector of health 
indicator dynamics on the macro- and micro-levels and to identify the factors affecting 
health as distinctive from the factors causing separate diseases. 
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Our research showed, that over the last decades the individual health of Russians 
has been constantly declining; this refers to the country as a whole and to separate 
regions under investigation, as well as to separate groups of population.  This also 
concerns the dynamics of health indicators over individuals’ life cycle.  Within two 
decades the average value of individual health declined by 12% (Taganrog); the share of 
positive health self-assessments halved, and the share of population with low health 
potential increased by 1.5 times. 
Besides, investigations at the micro-level showed that: a) women have a lower  
individual health potential than men (by about 10%), although their life expectancy is 
higher; b) every succeeding generation has a lower health potential than the preceding 
one; c) within the life cycle, decline in the heath status begins just from the moment of 
birth. 
The largest losses in health are registered among children and teenagers. Health 
problems are shifting from the elderly groups of population to the groups of children 
and youth.  This is virtually against nature and biology, according to which a person 
should lose health gradually in the course of growing in age.  From the point of 
biological development of an individual, health losses should begin only at the age of 
35. 
It is worth noting, that the differentiation of individual health potential 
depending on individuals’ economic welfare (between the top and bottom decile 
groups) is growing.  Thus, in 1981 the difference in health index between the top and 
bottom deciles was 0.7 points, and by 1998 it doubled and made 1.4 points.  
As to the factors determining health level, it should be stressed first of all, that 
according to WHO estimates, health depends one half on the conditions, quality and 
mode of life; one fifth on environment, one fifth on genetic factors, and only one tenth 
on health care services.  Of course, this is a general outline, and probably the specific 
figures for Russia will be somewhat different.  International experts note that the 
increased mortality in Russia observed over the last decade is mostly connected with 
circulatory diseases and “external causes” (accidents, homicides, suicides).  Growth in 
rates of death from these two groups of mortality causes has some common factors. The 
key factor among those causing exacerbation of cardiovascular diseases and arterial 
hypertension is acute “psychological stress”, which arises in cases, when people have to 
adapt to unexpected circumstances, being unprepared to them by previous experience. 
Some studies have found out a direct correlation between stress and cardiovascular 
diseases.  Psychological stress also has a clear relationship to mortality from external 
causes.  Moreover, in order to ease the tension, people subjected to stress can abuse 
alcohol, take drugs, and even smoke more, raising the risk of death from cardiovascular 
diseases (all three behaviors) and external causes (the first two behaviors). 
What about the half of health that depends on living conditions and quality of 
life?  In our research we tried to decipher this to reveal the main causes of health 
deterioration, and ranged them by significance.  Our research results show that the most 
significant factor determining individual health is “the character of work, ” including 
the level of hardship, unhealthiness and intensity of work; the rationality of workplace 
organization, and social climate within the workplace.  Also significant was “quality of 
nutrition”; this dependence shows itself most apparently among children under 14 of 
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age.  Of special significance is alcohol abuse and alcoholism, which facilitate 
development of somatic and mental diseases. 
Task 3: Identify the main problems with health care provision, particularly those 
connected with marketization of the social sphere. 
Is it necessary to marketize the health care branch?  How should we do it, if 
necessary?  Over what time frame? Evidently, restructuring of the health care system 
will take quite a long time; it is impossible to carry out such a transformation from 
today to tomorrow.  Therefore, special “bridge” arrangements should be put in place for 
the period of transformation; linking initial positions with the desired ones and enabling 
the most effective, painless transition for the population.  The nature of the transition 
bridge will depend on where we are and where we want to go in terms of health care. 
To this end, it is first necessary to break down health care into separate elements, 
such as prophylaxis, polyclinic (outpatient) and hospital health services, diagnostics, 
and special services (reproductive, gerontological, child , occupational, etc.).  Next, it is 
necessary to determine the relationship between the main financing channels: free of 
charge services and state guarantees at the expense of the state budget, insurance as the 
main form of funding (“basic program’), and paid services on a voluntary basis, relating 
to diagnostics, planned hospitalization, and “exclusive” health care services.  Finally 
new technologies and new organization approaches to raise the efficiency of medical 
services are necessary. 
Task 4: Determine health care priorities and the efficient volume and structure 
of funding. 
The fourth task of the project is to determine priorities in the development of 
health care as a branch, as well as the volume and structure of funding best suited to 
efficiency.  Sub-tasks include determining what diseases need  priority attention now, 
what groups of population need attention, and what research institutions and studies are 
coming to the forefront . 
Closing thoughts 
In closing, it is necessary to stress two things.  First, the four tasks designated 
for a project to develop a Russian health program should be certainly supplemented by 
other ones, and all of them would need to be discussed prior to the final formulation of 
the project.  Second, the program requires a systems approach; the more so, as the 
workshop is held at the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.  And the first 
precondition for a systems approach is to set clear limits to our “interference” into social 
life.  
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3.  Workshop Proceedings  
The following condensed versions of workshop papers were prepared by Landis 
MacKellar and David Horlacher.  
Original papers are posted on line at  
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RMS/TACIS03/?sb=19 
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Issues Overview 
Landis MacKellar 
IIASA, Laxenburg 
Stylized facts about health and long-run development 
While this note, and workshop, focus on Russia, it is important to place Russia’s 
current health situation in a long-run perspective.  Five important stylized facts emerge 
from the large econometric literature regarding health and long-run economic 
development. 
1.  In international cross-section, there is an inverse correlation between per 
capita income and major health indicators such as infant mortality, maternal mortality, 
and life expectancy.  In a nutshell, “Wealthier is healthier.”  To give an example of this, 
Figure 1 plots the natural log of maternal mortality rate (MMR, per 100,000 live births) 
against the natural log of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and draws a trend 
line.2  Maternal mortality is a more robust health index than infant mortality and, while 
it is not so comprehensive as life expectancy at birth, it is arguably more easily 
interpretable.  The estimated elasticity of –0.86 should not be taken too seriously, for 
there reasons. 
• The income figures used are not the so-called “purchasing power parity” (PPP) 
figures that provide the most accurate picture of comparative international 
incomes.3 
• Simple correlations overstate causal links when there is bi-directional causality 
(i.e., if health makes wealth in addition to wealth making health).  In this case, 
then the trend lines drawn in Figures 1 and 2 will be too steep.   
• We make no attempt to control for “third factors,” which might cause both 
higher income and better health, such as literacy.  In other words, the inverse 
relationships in Figures 1 and 2 may be, in part, artifacts of other, unexplored 
causal relationships. 
Studies correcting for these three problems, however, verify that there is a true causal 
link between higher income and better health (as well as in the opposite direction).   
Where does Russia stand in the scheme of things?  Russian GDP per capita in 
the mid-1990s, at about $2,000 (log equal to 7.6) corresponded to a MMR of about 80.  
                                                 
2 Data used to plot Figures 1–3 are from various issues of the World Bank’s World Development 
Report and correspond to the mid-1990s. 
3 When local-currency GDP is translated into U.S. dollars for international comparison 
purposes, the exchange rates used reflect only the relative prices of traded goods.  It is known 
that in poor countries, nontradable goods such as housing are relatively cheap. Observations at 
the very left of Figure 1, in other words, would slide to the right if this error were corrected.  
The reason we use non-PPP data is that for many economies (especially transition countries) 
PPP GDP estimates are unavailable for the mid-1990s. 
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Since the actual observed rate was only a little over 50, the Russian health system 
appears to have performed fairly well on this measure.  Note the wide scatter of points 
for countries in the middle of the diagram: very poor countries all have high rates of 
maternal mortality and very rich countries low ones, but as far as this specific index of 
health goes, countries in the middle like Russia, different policy approaches and 
resource allocations can make a real difference. 
 
. 
Figure 1: Maternal Mortality Rate vs GDP per capita, 
ca. 1995
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2.  The share of health spending in GDP increases with GDP per capita  (see 
Figure 2), i.e. health spending grows faster than income.  At the low end of the 
development scale, health expenditure shares of 3 percent are common, as opposed to 7 
percent or more at the high end.  Part of this is due to the fact that populations in 
developed countries are older than those in developing ones and per capita medical 
expenditure is highest for the aged.   Even controlling for age composition, however, the 
share of national income devoted to heath care still increases with national income. 
In Russia, total health expenditure averaged between 5% and 6% of GDP during 
the second half of the 1990s.  With GDP per capita of $2,000 the trend line in Figure 2 
would predict health spending equal to 5% of GDP, just a bit lower than was observed 
in Russia.   
While the budget share of health may rise with income at the macroeconomic 
level, the reverse is the case for households.  One of the perennial issues in health policy 
is that the share of income spent on health is high for the poor, and especially high for 
the elderly poor.  
3.  The wealthier the country, the higher the share of total health spending 
represented by the public sector (see Figure 3).  In poor countries, almost all health 
spending is out-of-pocket, which has disturbing consequences.  First, poor people may 
not be able to afford basic health care that would greatly improve their health at low 
cost. Second, disease episodes can precipitate an irreversible decline from near-poverty 
to poverty.  However, a number of researchers have found that, once GDP per capita is 
accounted for, there is no strong systematic relationship between public health spending 
and better health outcomes.  This is not surprising given the very wide scatter of points 
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in Figure 3 – i.e. the wide range of policy choices made by countries at all levels of 
development – as compared to the tighter scatter of points in Figure 1 (and in Figure 4 
below).  The growing role of the public sector as countries develop, in other words, is 
not the force driving improved health outcomes.  Some of the failure to find a 
significant relationship between public health spending and health outcomes may reflect 
a failure to take distributional details into account.  For example, say that public health 
expenditure benefiting poor people results in sharply improved health for the group 
concerned, but public health expenditure benefiting the rich does not.  Then, if the most 
observed expenditure is skewed toward the rich, aggregate data will reveal no 
relationship between total expenditure and average health. 
 
Figure 2: Health Spending Relative to GDP (%) vs 
GDP per capita, ca. 1995
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Figure 3: Public relative to Total Health Spending 
(%) vs GDP per capita, ca. 1995
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The trend line in Figure 3 would predict that in Russia of the mid-1990s, the 
public sector would account for 62% of total health expenditure.  In reality, between 
1995 and 2000 the public share declined from 81.5% to 72.5%.   Even with shrinkage of 
the public health share, then, Russia remains a country where government is very active 
in the health field.  One way of looking at the current health transition in Russia and 
other formerly Communist countries is that public sector involvement in health, which 
was higher than usual given the level of economic development, is coming back into 
line with economic fundamentals.  However, as mentioned above, the wide scatter of 
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points indicates that countries at the same level of development make different choices 
about the public-private split. 
 4.  The “fit” between health care expenditure and good health is much closer at 
the top end of the income scale than at the bottom.  The World Health Organzation’s 
“health life expectancy” (HALE) measure, plotted against per capita GDP in Figure 4 
(based on data from the 2002 WHO World Health Report), is an index of overall health 
performance.  Some of the wide scatter at the lower end of the income scale is due to 
AIDS (especially due to relatively well-off Southern African countries who spend 
substantial sums on health but nonetheless have very low life expectancy on account of 
AIDS).  However, but even taking this into account, there is still more variation around 
the trend line at the left than at the right of the diagram.  This suggests that, in many 
low- and middle-income countries, there is considerable scope for improving health by 
improving policy, not spending more money.  This observation gives grounds for 
optimism. 
 
Figure 4: Healthy Life Expectancy vs. per capita 
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Russian per capita health expenditure was PPP$ 405 in 2000.  This would 
correspond to a HALE of about 58.  In fact, it was 56.6, not far below what one would 
expect.  In summary, Russia has about the healthy life expectancy that would be 
expected in a country at its income level, total health expenditure roughly where one 
would expect it, but a public sector share much higher than other countries of 
comparable income levels (although there is considerable variation). 
5.  Inequality, as well as absolute income, affects health.  The U.S., at the far 
right of Figure 4, is a perennial outlier in health outcomes.  How can a country spend so 
much and yet enjoy a level of health apparently no better than some countries spending 
half as much?  There is evidence from U.S. and European studies that distribution of 
income has a health impact independent of level of income.  Four hypotheses have been 
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advanced to explain the strong correlation within countries between socio-economic 
status and health: 
• The absolute income hypothesis, holds that persons with higher incomes enjoy 
better health as a result. 
• The third-factor hypothesis: People who have high discount rates will invest 
neither in good health nor in economic projects with a long time horizon (going 
to university, for example).  Hence the correlation between income and health is 
reflecting a third factor, time preference, which is causing both.  
• The pure income inequality hypothesis, posits that stresses associated with 
greater inequality cause bad health for both rich and poor.  Consider a 2-person 
society in which one person has an income of $50,000 and the second an income 
of $20,000.  If the less well-off individual’s salary were reduced to $19,000, 
according to the pure income inequality model, the health of both the better off 
and worse off individuals would be impaired because of greater inequality (and, 
assuming that the absolute income hypothesis is also valid, the poorer person 
would also suffer due to income decline).  
• The relative deprivation hypothesis, holds that the health of poor persons is 
adversely affected by their low standing relative to the wealthy.  So, in the 
example above, a third effect would operate, as well.  The health of the less 
fortunate member of society would deteriorate for three reasons: (i) he suffers an 
absolute income decline, (ii) there is more inequality in the community, and 
hence more stress and worse health for both rich and poor and (iii) he is worse 
off relative to his peer, leading to resentment, a loss of self-esteem, and worse 
health as a result.  While the inequality effect would reduce the health of both 
rich and poor, the relative deprivation effect would reduce the health of the poor 
person alone.  The important aspect of the relative deprivation hypothesis is that, 
even if most members of society have long since passed the level of income at 
which the absolute income effect is a strong factor, income and health can still 
be strongly linked. 
There is very strong evidence of relative deprivation effects in U.S. data.  In a 
finding important for Russia, much of the link appears to be is mediated through risk 
behaviors: relative deprivation is strongly correlated with smoking, obesity, and failure 
to use seatbelts, i.e. that persons who feel deprived are more likely to adopt risky 
behaviors.  It is possible that a significant amount of the health deterioration that took 
place during transition, especially the early phases, was the result of stress associated 
with rising inequality. 
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Figure 5: Male population survival curves for Russia and Japan based on WHO life 
tables and mortality data. The diagram shows which causes of death account for the 
better survival rates of Japanese men. At younger ages, the main causes of excess 
mortality are accidents, infectious diseases, and homicide and suicide; at older ages, 
circulatory diseases make up most of the difference. 
Decomposing international differences in mortality: Russia vs. Japan 
In order to understand better the nature of elevated mortality in Russia, Les 
Mayhew of IIASA and the Department of Actuarial Science at City University, London, 
used WHO life tables and mortality data to illustrate how male mortality by cause 
would need to decline at different ages if Russian males were to achieve the same 
probability of survival as Japanese males.  Figure 5 tracks the survival of two 
hypothetical cohorts of 100,000 males, one Russian, one Japanese.  Consider the section 
AB for persons aged 70.  In Japan, about 75,000 out of the starting population of 
100,000 would have survived to this age (Point A).  In Russia, the equivalent number 
would be only a little more than 30,000.  The difference is due to the cumulative 
mortality of the causes of death shown.  At age 70, circulatory diseases account for most 
of the difference.  At age 50, by contrast, it is accidents, homicide, suicide and 
infectious diseases that are mostly responsible for the lower survival chances of Russian 
males. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of years of potential life lost (YPLL) from major causes of death 
for Japanese and Russian males and females (constructed from WHO data sources). 
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 Another approach is to compare actual mortality experience with a hypothetical 
situation in which everyone survives to some reference age, say 100 years.  A cohort of 
100,000 every member of which lived to 100 would experience 10 million person years 
of life.  In Figure 6a (males) and 6b (females) we illustrate how different causes of 
death reduce these years of potential life in Russia and Japan.  The longer a bar, the 
greater the impact of the cause of death.  For example, Russian males, circulatory 
diseases reduce this potential maximum by about 16 percent, as opposed to only 8 
percent in Japan.  Accidents, homicide and suicide combined are second only to 
circulatory diseases as a decrement.  For every cause of death except malignant 
neoplasms and respiratory diseases, Russian males lose more years of potential life than 
their Japanese counterparts.  The reason is that these causes of death (particularly the 
second) are characteristic of the elderly, and many Russian males have died before they 
enter the risk bracket.  For females, the chart shows that almost all of the greater loss of 
potential life years in Russia as compared to Japan is due to circulatory diseases. 
Deteriorating health indicators 
Social indicators in Russia have improved since the low-points of the mid-
1990s.  However, health indicators have not responded as favorably as hoped for.  
Between 1992 and 2000, life expectancy for Russian males dropped from 62 to 59 
years, female from 73.75 to 72.2.  The differential -- a 3-year decline for males versus a 
1.5-year decline for females indicates -- that, as widely known, health consequences of 
transition have been more serious for males than females.  The crude death rate of the 
working age population (16-60 for males, 16-55 for females) rose from 488 per 100,000 
in 1990 to 611 per 100,000 in 1998.  A quarter of all deaths occur during working age, 
underscoring the huge loss of potential economic output due to low levels of health.   
Micro-level data clearly indicate the deterioration in Russian health is a long-
term, structural trend.  Dr. I.V. Korchova of the Institute for Socio-economic Studies of 
Population of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been studying households in 
Taganrog over nearly twenty years.  Over the period 1981-1998, the prevalence of 
chronic disease practically doubled from 35 to 60% and the proportion of persons 
reporting themselves to be in excellent health fell by 50%.  Similar studies in Moscow 
present similar results; village-level studies in various regions are also available.  
Research by Dr. Olga Kislitcina of the same institute has shown how, in Taganrog, 
social deprivation, poverty, unemployment, and similar pathologies are associated with 
poor health.   
The deterioration has been especially pronounced in the “external causes,” i.e. 
accidents, suicide (Figure 7), and homicide (Figure 8).   All presumably reflect a 
complex set of phenomena: greater social disorganization, decline in social capital, 
unemployment, increased alcohol consumption, stress, etc.  Note that the increase in 
homicide affected women as well as men, suggesting that the increase is not entirely 
due to the increase in criminal activity (or the growing violence of established criminal 
enterprises).  The increase in suicide rates, by contrast, affected only men, suggesting 
that women were more resistant to the problems cited above.   
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Figure 7: Suicide mortality, Russia 1980 and 1995, 
selected countries 1995 (per 100,000)
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Deterioration has also been noted for common causes of death which would 
appear to be less closely linked to factors such as those listed above.  An example is 
chronic bronchitis, a typical cause of death at advanced ages (Figures 9 and 10).  
Between 1980 and 1995, males experienced significant increases in bronchitis mortality 
at every age over 35.  For males aged 55-64, the increase was two and one-half times, 
an enormous jump.  Women experienced increases in the 45-54, 55-64, and 65-74 age 
groups (albeit less than half the increases experienced by males), but actually 
experienced an improvement at age 75 and above.  What do these changes reflect: 
worse living conditions, weakened immune systems, less effective treatment?  Why do 
these affect men more than women?  
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Figure 9: Male chronic bronchitis mortality rates, 
by age,1980 and 1995 (per 100,000)
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Figure 10: Female chronic bronchitis mortality 
rates, 1980 and 1995, by age (per 100,000)
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Why the poor health performance?  I: problems in health care delivery and 
finance 
The pre-transition Soviet health system in the region was far from ideal.  
Problems included the following: 
• A monolithic organization headed by Ministry of Health, state ownership of 
health facilities, and universal access to care, free at the point of delivery, but 
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with poor management and only a limited understanding of efficiency (for 
example, unnecessary patient hospital admissions and excessive lengths of stay). 
• Central planning leading to an emphasis on outputs (days of hospital care 
delivered, number of procedures implemented, etc.) regardless of their medical 
cost effectiveness.  Accordingly, patient throughput was, and remains, low 
compared with western countries, with no apparent extra health benefit.  
• Excessive number of medical personnel, several times higher than those in 
OECD countries on a per capita basis. 
In short, the Russian Federation inherited a Soviet health system that was 
characterized by too many specialists and not enough family practitioners, too many 
hospital beds and not enough outpatient facilities, both of which led to major 
inefficiencies in care.  Screening and prophylactic health care was strong, but health 
promotion was almost non-existent.  Preventive health care in Soviet system was based 
on the concept of control, a legacy that has not entirely been discarded. 
Despite the poor quality of health institutions, in rural areas access was good.  
Perhaps most importantly, from the standpoint of understanding current problems, the 
fundamental promise of the socialist state—that any patient would receive treatment for 
any malady free of charge—was met.  The post-transition reality is that elites who can 
pay still obtain good care; however, the average citizen still has little choice, faces long 
waiting times and out-of-pocket payments.  
The main source of difficulty for the health sector is that GDP fell precipitously 
during the 1990s, severely eroding the available financial base.  As opposed to the 
OECD average of about three-quarters, in 1990 virtually all health spending was 
financed by the public sector. Despite the fact that, as a “non-productive” sector, health 
was well back in the budget queue, basic commitments were made.  With the collapse in 
government revenue, the health sector experienced sharp reductions in available 
budgetary resources, thus leaving policymakers trying to support abundant physical 
infrastructures, in terms of hospitals, and clinics, with insufficient resources.  With 
public resources dwindling, private health care spending grew, between 1995 and 2000, 
from 18.5% to 27.5% of total health care spending (see Table 1).   
 
Table 1: Total, private, and out-of-pocket health expenditure, 1995 and 2000 
 1995 2000 
 Total  
(% of GDP) 
Pvt  
(% of GDP) 
Pvt (% of 
total) 
Out-of-pocket 
(% of total) 
Total  
(% of GDP) 
Pvt  
(% of GDP) 
Pvt (% of 
total) 
Out-of-pocket 
(% of total) 
RU 5.5 1 18.5 15.2 5.3 1.5 27.5 23.4 
US 13.3 7.3 54.7 15.1 13 7.2 55.7 15.3 
UK 7 1.1 20.1 10.9 7.3 1.4 21.4 10.6 
GE 10.6 2.5 23.3 10.0 10.6 1.6 24.9 10.6 
SW 8.1 1.2 14.8 14.8 8.4 1.9 22.7 22.2 
Source: WHO, World Health Report 2002 
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Policy responses: what can be done? 
 General.  Policy dialogue in health is often marked by a search for the “best” 
health care system.  There is, in objective terms, no such thing.  Any approach to health 
can be made to deliver a reasonable standard of care work given good administration 
and management and adequate funds.  The problem is that both are typically in 
insufficient supply. 
 Health care policy is beset by problems of moral hazard, on the one hand, and 
adverse selection, on the other.  The latter, which is especially characteristic of 
“privatized” health systems, is easily explained:  insurance companies do not wish to 
insure the very people who apply for insurance, namely those who know that their state 
of health is poor.  Unless insurers are forced to accept all comers (and they are 
remarkably facile at coming up with ways to avoid such dictates), some persons will be 
left with no coverage.  The typical response to adverse selection in social insurance is to 
mandate coverage, often to the extent of imposing a mandatory public program.  To 
give a concrete example, in the U.S., private long-term care insurance contracts are 
increasingly popular.  Since insurance companies know that those who apply will be 
those who have reasons to believe that they will live a long time, premium rates are 
extremely high.  In effect, these are insurance schemes for the prosperous.  In Germany, 
by contrast, a public mandatory long-term care insurance scheme has been instituted.   
 Moral hazard -- changes in behavior cause by the existence of a contract -- is a 
richer theme, because examples of it are in every corner of the health policy debate.  
Approaches which guarantee free treatment on demand (the Soviet approach) do 
nothing to encourage patients to produce health themselves, whether by better behaviors 
or by taking an aspirin and going to bed for a day or two before consulting a physician.   
Fee-for-service approaches encourage doctors to over-treat because a third party 
(whether a private insurer or the government) will pick up the bill.  When treatment 
costs are tightly controlled but drugs are purchased privately, physicians over-prescribe 
and set up an apothecary in their clinic.  HIV testing can increase the spread of AIDS in 
two ways because those who test negative will find it easier to convince partners (who 
may be HIV-positive) to have unprotected sex and those who test HIV-positive and are 
non-altruistic will have no further motive to take precautions. 
 Roughly speaking, “private” health systems suffer from adverse selection, 
leading to inequities, while “public” health systems suffer from moral hazard, leading to 
cost-inefficiency.  Many have used the analogy of steering a course through the Scylla 
and Charybdis of these two problems.  But the situation is even more complicated 
because there are strong and ideologically loaded cross-currents.  There is the problem 
of need – “Impossible to define but impossible to do without,” Brian Abel-Smith called 
it.  Where does “need” for health service end and normal consumption begin?  Are 
access and equity problems health system problems or poverty problems?  Using the 
health system approaches to address poverty problems is likely to prove costly and 
ineffective. 
Russia.  Health reform in Russia is proceeding along two fronts simultaneously: 
• Mobilize additional revenues to finance the existing health system.  The gap 
between targets and available resources remains unresolved.  The Ministry of 
Health Care develops programmes and targets, but the Ministry of Economic 
Development, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Ministry of 
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Finance typically reduce the resources available.  Insufficient financing too often 
translates into poor program results.  A good example is the network of Ministry 
of Health Care centers for health promotion and prevention, which are meant to 
diminish the incidence of non-communicable diseases but suffer from 
inadequate funding. 
• Undertake structural reforms to convert the current health system into a 
sustainable one.  Current reforms aim to substitute primary health care and 
general practitioner consultations for inpatient care, but the pace of change is 
slow.  Rationalizing the health care supply side means shedding personnel, re-
training those who remain, shutting down redundant facilities, etc.  It is 
institutionally and socially difficult.  Ministry of Health Care coordination at the 
local level is also often lacking. 
Reform of health care financing has not proceeded smoothly.  In the early 1990s, 
the effort to mobilize resources took the form of switching from unreliable general 
budget financing to earmarked compulsory health insurance.  The main aims were to 
bring more money into health care as well as devolve responsibility for setting of 
budgets.  Insurance reforms have, however, failed to address deep-seated problems:  
• There is excessive complexity with up to five different ways of paying for 
services.  In consequence, administration is overburdened and financial control 
poor.  
• Salaries for medical personnel and salaries are too low, which perpetuates illegal 
practices and payments. 
• Enterprises operating close to bankruptcy refuse to pay their share of health 
payroll taxes.  Local governments, perceiving that the health sector is now 
funded from other sources, have in some cases suspended their own budgetary 
support for health. 
• The “federalism” of the system is largely illusory because local governments 
continue to rely on the center for medical supplies and salaries. 
• Policymakers have been unable to extricate themselves from the unrealistic 
promise of Soviet medicine: on-demand treatment for any medical problem with 
no out-of-pocket payment. 
The failure to put effective health insurance in place has translated into a rising 
role of out-of-pocket (i.e., uninsured) expenditure (see Table 1 above).  This, combined 
with declines in household income, has given rise to growing inequities in access to 
health care.  Persons lacking financial means fail to obtain needed treatment, sometimes 
with the result that when they do enter the health system, they are very sick indeed.  The 
Ministry of Economic Development is now leading discussions about modernization of 
the insurance system, however, for the foreseeable future, out-of-pocket payments will 
remain a central means of financing health care. 
Health policymaking leaves much to be desired.  Russia has a Ministry of Health 
Care, not a Ministry of Health, and ipso facto a health care policy, not a health policy.  
Health too often gets lost in gaps between the ministries; to take one example, alcohol is 
considered an economic problem (under the purview of the Ministry of Economic 
Development and the Ministry of Finance) but its health consequences are nowhere 
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consistently taken into account.  This results in anomalies such as the curious fact that in 
the Russian Federation beer is considered a non-alcoholic beverage.  Absent inter-
sectoral collaboration, the effectiveness of programs such as those mentioned above is 
typically low.  Because they are non-transparent, expenses and results cannot be easily 
compared.  There are problems of cooperation, not just horizontally (between 
Ministries, for example), but vertically, as well, as the Ministry of Health Care does not 
have complete control over lower levels.  The organization of social services is still new 
in Russia, and targeting issues abound.  There has been a focus on street children, for 
example, with an explosion in the availability of services; however, street children are 
an easy target population compared to children in families under stress. 
Why the poor health performance?  II: lifestyle issues 
The ramshackle nature of much of health care system and poor access must also 
be viewed alongside exceptionally unfavorable lifestyle habits: excessive drinking, 
smoking, rapid increase in the number of injecting drug users (IDUs), prevalence of 
unsafe sex leading to STI- and HIV transmission, failure to use safety belts, etc.  One of 
the motivating themes for this workshop is that, while health care delivery and finance 
are important, the best performing health care delivery system in the world, abundantly 
financed, would fail to deliver first-class health outcomes in Russia if lifestyles do not 
improve. 
Alcohol4.  The toll of alcohol abuse in Russia has long been appreciated, thanks 
in no small part due to the research of Dr. Alexander Nemtsov, whose work is presented 
elsewhere in this report.  At the beginning of the 1990s there was a dramatic increase in 
the quantity of alcohol consumed by the adult male population, while alcohol consumed 
by the female population and teenagers increased little.  The Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey 1999 showed clearly that compared to 1992, alcohol consumption in 
August 1993 among adult males was 60% higher, at about 18 litres per year.  Alcohol 
consumption in December 1994 among females and teenagers was 20% higher than in 
1992.  Alcohol consumption has declined significantly since the mid-1990s for all 
groups of the population.  However, adult male drinkers consumed more, at the end of 
the 1990s, than they did in 1992 (37.2 grams per day in 1998 as opposed to 28.6 grams 
per day in 1992.  Between 1990 and 1998 there was an increase in the incidence of 
alcoholic psychosis from 17.5 to 52.9 cases per 100,000 population. 
 Alcohol consumption is highly skewed.  In a typical population, some 10% of 
the adult population accounts for 50% of alcohol consumption, and the situation in 
Russia may be yet more pronounced.  The relationship between alcohol intake and 
health is a U: moderate drinkers have slightly lower mortality than abstainers, but heavy 
drinkers have much higher mortality than moderate drinkers. Heavy drinkers have 
mortality rates two to six times that of the general population, with lifespan 6 to 18 
years shorter; however, some of this is due to smoking, poor nutrition, external causes, 
etc.  The benefits of moderate alcohol consumption include lower rates of 
(approximately 20% lower at approximately 30 grams per day) cardiovascular 
morbidity.  The relationship between alcohol and wages is the opposite: moderate 
                                                 
4 Figures cited in this section are taken from material presented by Dr. Nemtsov at the 
Workshop. 
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drinkers have higher wages than either abstainers or heavy drinkers.  The negative 
impact on wages appears to be largely long-term in nature; that is, it takes many years 
of heavy drinking before it reveals itself. 
In the U.S., the National Institute of Criminal Justice Statistics estimates that in 
1995, 40% of all violent crime victimization and 67% of all domestic violence were 
alcohol-related; 40% of all violent offenders arrested report having used alcohol just 
before the offence.  Alcohol might lead to criminal behavior in several ways: it might 
lead the drinker to commit crime in order to obtain alcohol, it might reduce inhibition 
and cloud judgment, or the act of drinking take place in environments where crime is 
common for reasons independent of alcohol. 
Smoking5.  Smoking is highly prevalent in Russia, with approximately 60 % of 
the adult males, 11% of the adult females and 15.2% of the teenagers smoking. The 
percentage of teenagers smoking increased from 16.8% in September 1992 to a peak of 
20.1% in December 1994 and has then been decreasing. The number of cigarettes 
smoked per day by teenage smokers has steadily declined from a peak average of 8.9 in 
August 1993 to a low current level of 6.7 in November 1998.  Between 1987 and 1999 
the proportion of male smokers in the age group of 30-39 increased from 51 percent to 
71 percent. 
 The evidence for a causal link between tobacco use and disease and death is 
irrefutable.  Smokers’ risk of lung cancer is 20-25 times greater than that of non-
smokers and about a 3-fold risk of having a heart attack than lifelong non-smokers.  
Because of the time lags, increases or decreases in the prevalence of smoking take many 
years to translate into changes in mortality and morbidity.  The prevalence of smokers 
among adult males peaked in the early 1960s in developed countries (for example, at 
42% in the U.S.) and has steadily declined since (to 25% at present in the U.S.).  
However, smoking has risen among women and is still growing in the developing 
world. 
Policy responses: What can be done? 
There are at least three problems in dealing with “sin” behaviors such as 
smoking and drinking.  One is that, since a basic goal of economic policy making is to 
bring private and social costs into balance, these costs have to be estimated.  Issues 
include 
• Whether to include costs borne by the user or cover only “external” costs (i.e., 
should a cirrhosis patient’s own-medical expenditure be counted or not?).  Cost-
of-illness studies tend to include both, but conventional welfare economics is 
based on the premise that government policy should focus only on the second. 
• Achieving comprehensiveness without double-counting costs (eg, lost wages 
plus lost economic output). 
• Monetizing non-monetary costs 
• Attribution problems (e.g., how much crime should be attributed to alcohol, etc.) 
                                                 
5 Figures cited in this section are taken from work presented by Dr. David Rotman at the 
Workshop. 
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• Choice of benchmark (world of zero tobacco use?)  
• In the case of alcohol, non-abusive behavior generates no external costs at all, 
yet policy instruments typically affect abusive and non-abusive users equally. 
• In the case of tobacco, how to deal with environmental tobacco smoke. 
• In both cases, but especially in the case of tobacco, the issue of how to deal with 
savings in the pension and health systems when users die young, and relatively 
cheaply. 
The latter two effects, in particular, can be huge.  Estimates of the efficient tax 
(i.e., the one that brings total public costs of smoking to bear on the purchaser of a pack 
of cigarettes) range widely, for example, in the U.S. from $0.15 to $5.00.  In Canada, it 
was estimated that direct health-related costs of smoking in the mid-1980s were C$ 669 
million, but avoided future health care costs were C$ 462 million.  When taxes paid by 
smokers (who finance government health programs whose benefits accrue 
disproportionately to long-lived non-smokers) were added in, as well as savings to the 
pension system when smokers die young, smokers were estimated, on balance, to 
slightly subsidize non-smokers.  Yet, public health advocates protested, in no other area 
of policy is a death treated as a benefit! 
The second problem, especially acute in the area of alcohol (and illicit drugs) is 
how to bring policy measure to bear on those responsible for most of the costs.  Take 
the case of raising alcohol prices as a means of reducing drunk driving.  Taxing alcohol 
taxes drinkers who do not drink to excess as well as those who do; moreover, it sends 
no signal to those who do drive after drinking to drive more safely.  A more effective 
instrument is stricter enforcement of drunk-driving laws, with penalties steeply 
escalating for repeat offenders.  In the more general case of using alcohol taxes to 
promote general health, most of the costs are caused by very heavy drinkers (moderate 
drinking has a significant health benefit) – yet all evidence shows that the heaviest 
drinkers are the least responsive to price increases.   
Yet some robust results have been found.  Experience in countries such as 
Canada demonstrate that, even with the resulting development of a black market, large 
increases in cigarette taxes generate both significant declines in smoking and significant 
increases in total revenue.  While the evidence on tobacco advertising restrictions is 
inconclusive, econometric studies have concluded that mass media campaigns educating 
smokers of the health consequences of their habit have significantly reduced smoking.  
Regulations limiting smoking in the workplace and public places have also significantly 
reduced cigarette consumption.  U.S. studies have estimated that workplace bans 
reduced overall smoking prevalence by 5 percentage points and average daily 
consumption among smokers by 10 percent. Some evidence indicates that bans on 
smoking in public places have been more effective than bans on smoking in private 
workplaces.  
The third general problem is that traditional policies regarding tobacco and 
excessive alcohol use (as well as use of illicit drugs) are mostly posited, one way or 
another, on the assumption that substance use and addiction are rational decisions.   
Raising prices, imposing nuisance costs, informing teenagers of the dangers of smoking 
and drinking, putting drug users in jail, etc. all have their roots in traditional 
microeconomic modeling of consumption decisions.  These models, in turn, are based 
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on assumptions such as “normal” discounting, foresight, etc.  But much evidence from 
psychology suggests that individuals do not always discount “normally”; that in fact, 
they discount near-term choices heavily but choices which will be made in the future 
hardly at all.  The “hyperbolic discounter,” asked if he will drink heavily next Friday, 
says he will not because he is thinking of the hangover that will follow on Saturday.  
But this Friday, i.e. today, he will drink heavily, because he has discounted tomorrow’s 
hangover.  And he knows that when next Friday rolls around, the good intentions he 
expresses now will be forgotten, so what’s the good of trying to quit?  This is not too far 
removed from Thomas Schelling’s schizophrenic model of smoking in which a long-
term self and a short-term self are in perpetual conflict, with the short-term self usually 
winning.  
If there is merit in these psychologically-grounded models of addiction (indeed, 
of a range of risk choices), then the required policy instruments may not be the 
traditional taxes and penalties.  Commitment devices – contracts and practices which 
bind the addict to a decision to quit – and support networks would be the required tools. 
Conclusion 
This broad overview points to three main conclusions: 
• Russia is entering into health care system reform at a stage of development 
where policy choices can make a real difference. 
• There is no “one size fits all” approach to health systems design, and Russian 
policy makers should be wary of off-the-shelf approaches. 
• Poor health behaviours such as alcohol abuse and smoking major problems in 
Russia.  While there is some understanding of robust policy responses, there are 
also problems: how to estimate costs, how to bring these to bear on those 
responsible, and what sort of model of bad behaviour to use when designing 
policy responses.  
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Russian Mortality Fluctuations since 1980 
David A. Leon  
European Centre on Health of Societies in Transition 
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine 
Introduction  
In March 2001 my colleagues and I published a paper in the Lancet (Shkolnikov 
et al. 2001) summarizing the fluctuations in mortality that had occurred in Russia 
between 1991 and 1998.  Our main interest was in looking at whether the causes of 
death that had increased so rapidly in the period 1991-94 were also the ones that 
declined in the subsequent period up to 1998, when life expectancy at birth showed a 
steady improvement.  In general they were. While we were aware that the 1999 data 
showed increases in mortality from a broad range of causes, none of us anticipated that 
mortality would continue to increase up until the present time.  However, this is what 
has happened.  As can be seen in Figure 1 life expectancy at birth in males and females 
has fallen each year from 1998 to 2002.  In 2002 for males it was 58.5 years and for 
females 72.0 (Evgueny Andreev, personal communication).  Provisional estimates based 
on mortality in the first part of 2003 suggest that life expectancy has fallen further 
(Evgueny Andreev, personal communication).  
The increase in mortality rates that followed the financial collapse in August 
1998 was perhaps to be anticipated. However, it was thought that this would be a 
transient effect, particularly as from 1999 onwards the macro-economic indicators (such 
as GDP per capita) showed evidence of steady improvement. This was in sharp contrast 
to the years 1991-94, in which the enormous upheavals and changes brought about by 
the collapse of the Soviet Union were accompanied by worsening of the macroeconomic 
situation. The extended decline in life expectancy since 1998 cannot therefore be simply 
explained by reference to macro-economic indicators.  
This paper provides a summary of key aspects of what is currently known about 
the mortality fluctuations in Russia since the mid-1970s. It then considers some of the 
issues about the biology of disease processes that may help us understand some features 
of the complex Russian mortality dynamics, paying particular attention to the proximal 
role of alcohol. Finally, it suggests that some features of the mortality fluctuations could 
be best explained by hypothesizing the existence of a sub-group of the Russian 
population who have a set of social, psychological and biological vulnerabilities that 
make them particularly sensitive to major shocks and upheavals such as the collapse of 
communism and the 1998 financial crisis. If this is the case, this has important 
implications for social policy both in terms of protecting the vulnerable as well as taking 
steps to ameliorate the social process that appears to be continually generating this 
vulnerable sub-group.  
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Figure 1.  Russian life expectancy at birth 1970-2000.  Source: Health for All database 
and Goskomstat (2001) and Evgueny Andreev (2002). 
Life-expectancy at birth since 1970  
There are a number of well known but important features of life expectancy in 
Russia since 1970: 
• The level of life expectancy at birth in Russia has been the lowest or among the 
lowest of any industrialized country since 1970. Moreover, the gap between 
Russia and Western European countries has generally grown, as these without 
exception have increased their life-expectancy year–on-year since 1950 (see 
Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Life expectancy at birth (years) in Russia and the EU, 1970-2001.  
Source: WHO HFA. 
Note: M+F combined 
• Although until the end of the 1990s Russian life-expectancy showed similar 
fluctuations to many other parts of the former Soviet union (especially the Baltic 
states; see Figure 3), life expectancy in Russia has been the lowest of the former 
Eastern block countries. Detailed international comparisons of Russian mortality 
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with other countries have been reported elsewhere (Meslé and Hertrich 1997, 
Shkolnikov et al. 1998). 
 
Figure 3.  Life expectancy at birth (years) in Russia and the EU, 1970-2001.  
Source: WHO HFA. 
Note: M+F combined. 
 
• One of the most notable features of Russian life expectancy in the past 3 decades 
has been the very substantial difference between males and females (Figure 4).  
In most Western countries the difference has been around 6 years and has shown 
a tendency to decline.  In Russia since 1970 it has generally been 10 years or 
more, reaching over 13 years in the years 1994 and 1995 and again in 2000 and 
2001. This is very strong evidence that there are crucial aspects of the excess 
male mortality in Russia that cannot be attributable to general environmental 
factors – which would be expected to equally influence both sexes.  
 
Figure 4.  Sex differences (F minus M) in life expectancy at birth (years), 1970-
2001.  Source WHO HFA. 
 
Despite the fact that there are large differences in life expectancy at birth 
between males, in terms of mortality rates, the proportional changes over time have 
been very similar in men and women (Leon et al. 1997).
 
 
Extensive analyses have been conducted that have identified which age-groups 
have contributed most to the fluctuations in Russian life expectancy described above 
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(Shkolnikov et al. 1998).  These have shown that it is rises and falls of mortality among 
men and women of working age that are central to this phenomenon. Contrary to what is 
often assumed, it is not the classically “vulnerable” groups of people at the extremes of 
the age distribution (the young and the old) who have contributed to these fluctuations 
in life-expectancy (see Figure 5). In fact, as illustrated in Figure 5, mortality rates at age 
0-14 have generally been declining since 1980, with the exception of a small increase in 
the early 1990s. In old age rates have tended to stagnate, although again there was a 
suggestion of a small scale increase in the early 1990s.  
 
Figure 5.  Mortality at working ages in Russia drives fluctuations in life-expectancy.  
Source: WHO HFA. 
Note: M+F combined. 
Influential events  
The fluctuations in mortality at working ages seen in men and women have been 
repeatedly linked to a number of key events. The Brezhnev Soviet-era was characterized 
by stagnation in female life expectancy and small-scale declines and recoveries in male 
life expectancy at birth. The first large-scale fluctuation coincided with the introduction 
in 1985 of the anti-alcohol campaign. The effects of this campaign on the supply and 
consumption of alcohol have been analyzed and discussed in depth elsewhere (Nemtsov 
2000 and 2002).  Among researchers there seems to be a consensus that there is a real 
causal link between declining mortality and the direct effects of the anti-alcohol 
campaign (Nemtsov 2002, Shkolnikov and Nemtsov 1997).  Following the abrupt 
decline in mortality in 1985-86, the subsequent reversal and slow increase in mortality 
from 1988 onwards has been attributed to alcohol becoming an increasingly irrelevant 
issue for the Soviet state and with an increase in home production. 
The catastrophic increase in mortality of the early 1990s started in 1991/92 and 
coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is less consensus, however, 
among researchers about the causal factors underlying this unprecedented decline in life 
expectancy in the early 1990s.  Between 1991 and 1994 there was a 6 year decline 
among males.  Andreev (2002) has reviewed and discussed the different views on what 
underlay this decline.  One view is that the increase in mortality in the early 1990s was 
an inevitable adjustment following the “artificial” suppression of mortality that occurred 
due to the anti-alcohol campaign.  Another view is that it represents a return to the 
longer term trends evident since the mid-1960s.  Both of these perspectives conceive of 
the 1990s decline in life expectancy as involving an almost homeostatic demographic 
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mechanism.  The third class of explanation for the sharp decline in life expectancy in 
1991-94 is that it is a direct consequence of social and economic “stress” that arose as a 
consequence of the transition. This explanation has found particular favor among those 
in medicine and public health. 
The most recent mortality reversal, occurring in 1998-99, coincided as already 
discussed with the collapse of the Russian financial system in August 1998. There are 
only a few papers that have considered the causal mechanisms involved. 
  
Little work 
has been done to see how far the decline in 1998-2002 has parallels with and can be 
explained in the same terms as the 1991-94 decline in life expectancy.  
The recent paper by (2002) includes a very important set of figures that show the 
numbers of deaths by month over the period 1983-2001.  This is reproduced on the 
following page as Figure 6.6
 
  What is evident is that there was a sustained fall in the 
number of deaths among men after May 1985, the month in which the anti-alcohol 
campaign was introduced.  Among males this was sufficient to remove any indication of 
an excess in the winter of 1985/86 and to blunt the corresponding excess for females. 
Thus there is a close temporal linkage between the onset of the anti-alcohol campaign 
and reduced mortality.  Formally the Soviet Union was abolished at midnight on 31 
December 1991.  Again there is a striking and consistent increasing trend in the number 
of male deaths from February 1992 to a peak in May 1994.  There is also an increase in 
female deaths over this period compared to the equivalent months in the preceding 
years. There thus appears to be a close and clear temporal link between the increase in 
the number of deaths with the formal end of the USSR, at least for males.  Finally, there 
is the event of the financial collapse in August 1998.  There is a suggestion of an 
increasing number of male deaths from this point, although the picture for females is 
less clear. The temporal evidence here is consistent with an almost immediate effect on 
the number of deaths following the August 1998 crisis, although it is weaker than for 
the other two periods considered.  
Overall Figure 6 does support (for males in particular) the notion that changes in 
mortality are linked to specific events. For the anti-alcohol campaign – this was an 
actual reduction in availability and consumption of alcohol.7  For the 1991-94 and 1998-
2001 upturns in mortality these appear to have started within a month or so of dramatic 
societal-level events. What mechanisms could explain this ? In order to try and answer 
this question we need to look at how different mortality rates from causes of death have 
fluctuated. 
 
                                                 
6 In interpreting Figure 6 it should be remembered that this is total deaths at all ages. This may 
account for the greater apparent seasonality of female deaths, which on average are going to be 
comprised of deaths occurring at an older age where winter excesses of influenza and other viral 
infections may be particularly important. Comparing the absolute numbers of deaths in each sex 
can also give no indication of differences in mortality rates because of substantial differences in 
the size and age composition of the underlying population at risk. 
7 Further analyses of these monthly mortality data that removed underlying patterns of 
seasonality from the data would be very valuable.  
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Figure 6: Number of deaths by calendar month in Russia 1983-2001.  Source : EM 
Andreev, Did the economic crisis cause the mortality fluctuations in Russia in the 
1990s? Figure 3. IUSSP XXIV General Population Conference, 2002. Reproduced with 
the author’s permission. 
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Mortality fluctuations differ by cause of death  
A large number of analyses of mortality trends by cause of death8 in Russia have 
been published in the literature (Leon et al. 1997, Meslé et al. 1992, Meslé and 
Shkolnikov 1995, Shkolnikov et al. 1995, Shkolnikov et al. 2001).  A very important 
and highly informative observation is that total mortality from cancer, although an 
important contributor to overall death rates and life expectancy, has shown almost none 
of the sharp and acute changes that have characterized most other causes of death since 
the mid-1980s (Figure 7).  The fact that cancer does not show any real fluctuations over 
the entire period provides very strong evidence that the variations seen for other causes 
and life expectancy as a whole are unlikely to be due to bias in the estimation of the 
population at risk (Leon et al. 1997). The insensitivity of cancer mortality to the large-
scale changes in many aspects of life over the past 25 years in Russia is consistent with 
our current understanding of the biology of cancer and the “latent periods” that exist 
between exposure to a carcinogen and the diagnosis of a malignancy. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Mortality from cancer in Russia is insensitive to changes 1980-2001 (men 
aged 25-64 years).  Source: WHO HFA 
 
Overall Figure 6 does support (for males in particular) the notion that changes in 
mortality are linked to specific events. For the anti-alcohol campaign – this was an 
actual reduction in availability and consumption of alcohol.9  For the 1991-94 and 1998-
2001 upturns in mortality these appear to have started within a month or so of dramatic 
societal-level events. What mechanisms could explain this ? In order to try and answer 
this question we need to look at how different mortality rates from causes of death have 
fluctuated. 
As can be seen from Figure 8 all of the major categories of cause of death (other 
than cancer) do show broadly parallel fluctuations in rates in the period 1980-2001 in 
                                                 
8 A considerable amount of work has been done by the team of Mesle, Shkolnikov, Vallin and 
others on the validity of cause-specific mortality rates for the period up to the end of the 1990s 
in Russia. However, the adoption of ICD-10 in Russia in 1999 appears to have generated some 
problems in comparability that have yet to be fully resolved. 
9 Further analyses of these monthly mortality data that removed underlying patterns of 
seasonality from the data would be very valuable.  
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men and women. As these figures have rates plotted on a log scale, one can directly the 
proportional changes in mortality for each cause group can be easily compared. The 
largest fluctuations are shown for external causes (injuries, poisonings and violence). 
When analyzed in more detail, particularly large fluctuations are seen for acute alcohol 
poisoning.  
 
Figure 8A.  Mortality by cause in Russian men aged 25-64, 1980-2001.  Source: WHO 
HFA. 
 
 
Figure 8B.  Mortality by cause in Russian women aged 25-64, 1980-2001.  Source 
WHO HFA. 
Note: Rates for infectious diseases not shown as these are <10/100,000. 
 
A summary of the extent of fluctuations in some of some key specific causes 
during the 1990s is provided in Table 1 for men and women aged 15-74 years.  
Although the absolute mortality rates for the causes shown are much larger for men than 
women, the two sexes show similar proportional changes as judged by the mortality rate 
ratios. Mortality rates for acute alcohol poisoning showed the largest proportional 
increases for men and women in both the period 1998 to 2001 and 1991 to 1994.  
Cirrhosis of the liver also showed substantial increases in both these periods, although 
they were appreciably larger in 1991 to 1994. Although smaller in relative terms, both 
periods also saw increases in mortality from ischaemic heart disease.  
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Table 1 – Age-standardized mortality rates per 100,000 and mortality rate ratios for selected causes and years 1991-2001 by sex, Russia, 
ages 15-74.  Source : Vladimir Shkolnikov (personal communication) 
 
Men      Women      
Cause of death  
Age-standardized Mortality 
rates per 100,000  
 
Mortality rate ratios  
  Age-standardized Mortality 
rates per 100,000  
 
Mortality rate ratios  
  
      2001/  1994/  2001/  2001/       2001/  1994/  2001/  2001/  
 1991  1994  1998   2001  1998  1991  1991  1994  1991  1994 1998   2001  1998  1991  1991  1994  
Tuberculosis  
21.0  37.0  37.2   46.9  1.26 1.76 2.24  1.27 2.2  3.5 4.1   5.8  1.40 1.63  2.69  1.65  
Ischaemic heart 
disease  
339.9  513.0  393.8   474.4  1.20 1.51 1.40  0.92 121.7  173.6 136.8   157.0  1.15 1.43  1.29  0.90  
Cerebrovascular 
disease  
177.8  250.1  221.5   258.5  1.17 1.41 1.45  1.03 115.0  149.4 136.1   148.1  1.09 1.30  1.29  0.99  
Cirrhosis of 
liver  
16.4  32.3  24.1   34.5  1.43 1.97 2.11  1.07 7.3  15.1 11.2   17.6  1.57 2.09  2.43  1.16  
Motor vehicle 
accidents  
50.4  44.7  36.1   50.6  1.40 0.89 1.00  1.13 11.5  11.2 10.7   14.3  1.33 0.97  1.24  1.28  
Acute alcohol 
poisoning  
26.0  81.1  38.3   59.4  1.55 3.11 2.28  0.73 5.7  21.3 9.6   15.6  1.63 3.73  2.74  0.73  
Suicide  
56.9  94.1  76.7   86.0  1.12 1.65 1.51  0.91 11.5  14.6 11.9   12.1  1.02 1.27  1.05  0.83  
Homicide  
30.6  64.3  43.9   56.5  1.29 2.10 1.85  0.88 8.0  16.9 12.1   15.4  1.27 2.13  1.93  0.91  
Undetermined 
violent death  
27.6  73.0  57.3   60.5  1.06 2.65 2.19  0.83 5.9  15.9 12.5   12.4  0.99 2.71  2.11  0.78  
All causes  
1424.6  2123.7  1671.5   1991.6  1.19 1.49 1.40  0.94 571.6  770.9 638.8   720.3  1.13 1.35  1.26  0.93  
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Overall in fact, there is a similarity in the cause-specific pattern of increases seen 
in the two periods of increasing overall mortality. The exception to this in Table 1 is 
mortality from motor vehicle accidents. In the earlier period (1991-94) there was a 
decline, probably driven by a reduction in traffic volume. However, in the later period 
(1998-2001) there was an increase, probably driven by an increase in traffic volume.  
For all causes shown in Table 1 rates are higher in 2001 than they were in 1991. 
This is particularly marked for acute alcohol poisoning, cirrhosis of the liver and 
tuberculosis. Tuberculosis mortality in fact showed a strong trend of increase 
throughout the period from 1991, while most other causes showed marked declines in 
the period 1994-98. This reflects particular features of a resurgent problem of 
tuberculosis linked to a complex set of factors discussed elsewhere (Shilova 2001). 
Table 1 also shows a comparison of rates in 2001 and 1994. Most causes of 
death shown have lower rates in 2001. The exceptions are tuberculosis, motor vehicle 
accidents and to a smaller degree cirrhosis of the liver.  
In summary, previous work has shown strong similarities between the causes 
that declined as a result of the anti-alcohol campaign in the mid-1980s and those that 
increased and declined again in the period up until 1998. The above analysis suggests 
that the cause-specific pattern of increase in the period 1998-2001 is the same as 
previously observed. There are two exceptions to this: tuberculosis and motor vehicle 
accident deaths – which are explicable in terms of new epidemiological features that 
emerged in the 1990s. 
Alcohol, time lags and biology  
As already discussed above, the changes in mortality rates in Russia since the 
mid-1980s have been very abrupt and appear to have occurred within a very short 
period of what are believed to be the precipitating events (i.e. the start of the anti-
alcohol campaign, the end of the USSR and the financial collapse of August 1998). For 
some causes of death this very short time lag is readily understandable in biological 
terms, as in the case of acute alcohol poisoning. Individuals who drink too much alcohol 
in one session can die of fatal levels of blood ethanol even if they have not had a 
previous history of alcohol abuse. 
This is illustrated in Figure 9 where there is a close linkage between alcohol 
consumption and acute alcohol poisoning mortality rates.  As has already been noted, 
cirrhosis of the liver has shown very marked fluctuations in mortality since the mid-
1980s. In Figure 10 it is evident, however, that the fluctuations in mortality from this 
cause follow 1-year behind those for acute alcohol poisoning. 
If we consider mortality rates from acute alcohol poisoning as a proxy for 
population alcohol consumption, how can we explain these sharp fluctuations occurring 
so rapidly? Death from cirrhosis of the liver generally occurs only among people who 
have drunk heavily over a period of 10 or even 20 years. In this sense it is a disease with 
a long latent period. The answer is straightforward. Abrupt cessation of alcohol 
consumption in an individual with a very damaged liver can halt any further acute 
deterioration – and thus avoid death. However, if this person resumes drinking heavily 
again in the future the damage to their liver will resume, and for some this will only 
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have to be relatively minor for them to become critically ill and die. This “conveyor-
belt” effect has been discussed by others (Norrstron and Skog 2001). 
 
Figure 9.  Acute alcohol poisoning mortality, men aged 30-59. 
 
 
Figure 10.  One-year lag in liver cirrhosis mortality, men aged 30-59. 
 
The role of alcohol consumption as a driver of mortality fluctuations in the 
major single cause of death in Russia – ischaemic heart disease – has been very 
contentious (Bobak and Marmot 1999, McKee et al. 2001).  This is in part because the 
evidence from epidemiological studies in the West suggests that ischaemic heart disease 
risk declines as alcohol consumption rises. However, as reviewed previously (McKee 
and Britton 1998), there are a number of mechanisms that could link binge or heavy, 
episodic drinking to death from “ischaemic heart disease”. These include the 
precipitation of cardiac arrythmias linked to damage to the heart muscle, which may 
mean that some of the deaths under this category in Russia have a different underlying 
pathology to what is commonly seen in the West. .Moreover, recent evidence from 
epidemiological studies in Finland (Kauhanan et al. 1997), Novosibirsk (Malyutina et 
al. 2002) and Udmurtia (Shkolnikov et al. 2001) suggests that mortality from 
“ischameic heart disease” is raised in binge drinkers.  
Perhaps the most persuasive indirect evidence for an acute link between alcohol 
consumption and mortality from “ischaemic heart disease” is presented in Figure 11. 
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This shows that there is an almost identical temporal pattern in fluctuations in mortality 
from IHD as seen for acute alcohol poisoning, in contrast to liver cirrhosis which shows 
a one-year lag (Figure 10).  It is a major research priority to further our understanding of 
what may explain this, including the possibility that some of the sudden “IHD” deaths 
may in fact be due to acute alcohol poisoning. 
 
Figure 11.  "Ischaemic heart disease" and acute alcohol poisoning mortality in Russia. 
Vulnerabilities and vulnerable groups  
Socio-economic differences in mortality, measured by education in particular, 
have been shown to exist in Russia (Shkolnikov et al. 2001, Shkolnikov et al. 1998). A 
recent analysis of two cohorts from St Petersburg suggests that increased mortality that 
occurred in the early 1990s was concentrated among people with lower educational 
levels (Plovinski et al. 2003).  Analyses of geographical variation have suggested that 
the biggest declines in life expectancy in the early 1990s occurred in large metropolitan 
centers such as Moscow and St Petersburg, perhaps due to the greater pace of social and 
economic change in such places Walberg et al. 1998).
 
 
These findings indicate that the impact of the changes in Russian society since 
the mid-1980s have not affected all people equally. While this has been assumed to be 
the case by many people working in this research area, there have been no successful 
attempts to define what characterizes those individuals whose health status has been 
particularly sensitive to the social and economic disruptions in the past 20 years.  
Within the economic literature some progress has been made on a related issue. 
A recent paper has looked at vulnerability to economic loss (reduction in consumption) 
of households around the time of the 1998 financial collapse (Gerry and Li. 2002).  
Using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Study (RLMS), Gerry and Li 
found that “those most vulnerable during the crisis were less educated individuals living 
in urban areas, in households containing greater numbers of pensioners.” These findings 
parallel what has already been noted in the epidemiological literature about increases in 
mortality in the 1990s being particularly large among those with less education and 
those living in the large metropolitan centers. In addition, they found that “increases in 
home production and help from relatives acted to decrease vulnerability.” The paper 
goes on to suggest that people and households also varied according to their capacities 
to recover from the crisis : “Following the crisis, amongst the least vulnerable were, 
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better educated individuals, resident in urban areas, able to increase home production, 
and in receipt of improved pensions.”  
The importance of this paper is that it lays out a systematic framework for 
considering individual and household vulnerabilities to various shocks and crises. There 
is the initial risk or insult, the capacities of the individual or household to mobilize 
available resources (even if these are very limited – poverty is not the same as 
vulnerability) and then the outcome which in economic terms in the paper were changes 
in consumption, but in health terms would be changes in health status and death.  
Extending these ideas further into the health arena, it is obvious that the nature 
of individual vulnerability to declines in health or death shares many of the distal 
components studied by Gerry and Li. However, in addition there are psychological and 
biological components that need to be considered. It would seem plausible, for example, 
that the economic vulnerability and resilience described by them would inform and be 
influenced by psychological vulnerability – which is indeed implicit in the notion that 
people vary in their capacities to mobilize what resources they do have or could call on 
(for example in the form of pensions or state benefits). 
In terms of the ultimate outcome of interest here (death) people will vary 
according to their cumulative health status at the point the crisis impacts. Thus in the 
case of someone whose liver has been damaged by a long history heavy drinking, they 
are going to be more vulnerable to death from liver cirrhosis by small increases in 
alcohol consumption in response to the crisis than someone who does not have this 
background.  
Alcohol abuse fits in very well to a model of vulnerability. Heavy drinking itself 
has adverse consequences on some factors that may confer resilience: friendship and 
family relations can be damaged, people may have problems holding down a job, 
capacities will be reduced to do things such as cultivate an allotment for growing your 
own food and psychological robustness in other respects will be damaged. This creates 
the well-known downward spiral of life circumstances. Alcohol, therefore, not only can 
be the ultimate (proximate) cause of death but prior to this can result in behavioral 
change that reduces resilience and makes an individual more vulnerable to adverse 
effects of economic and social shocks.  
The social and economic “shocks” of 1991 and 1998 can therefore be 
hypothesized as having fatal effects on people who were already very vulnerable for a 
host of related reasons, economic, social, psychological and biological many of which 
will be interrelated. This emphasis on a vulnerable sub-group of the Russian population 
is in contrast to explanations that implicitly at least assume uniform effects. While there 
is no doubt that the effects of the shocks will have been noted by most people, their 
capacities to deal with their effects is what has varied.  
There are several other issues that need mentioning. Firstly, the strength of the 
“shock” experienced by people will however vary, particularly by geography, with the 
populations of the metropolitan centers experiencing the largest and most acute effects. 
There is then the key issue of what is the nature of the recovery from shock. There is 
often reference to adaptation to the new circumstances as characterizing the mid-1990s, 
when people had come to terms with their new circumstances. What would this mean, 
however, for the vulnerable sub-group ? It could be that men, for example, whose 
drinking increased markedly had somehow managed to remain within a family that 
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provided a framework for them slowly rehabilitating themselves. This process would 
clearly take time. Finally, there is the important question of the mechanisms that result 
in people moving into this vulnerable sub-group. In particular, how are younger adults 
recruited ?  All of these issues require further thought and study.  
Research priorities  
Individual-level epidemiological evidence on the exact role of alcohol as a 
proximal, ultimate cause of death (regardless of medically certified cause) is an 
important priority, particularly the problem of “ischaemic heart disease”. Further work, 
bringing together epidemiologists, economists and sociologists to explore the ideas of 
vulnerability out lined above is also a priority.  
Policy implications  
It is clear that even greater efforts need to be made to develop policies aimed at 
reducing alcohol abuse in Russia. Evidence from other countries, in particular Finland 
and Sweden, suggests that this will require an integrated package of policy 
interventions, including taxation of alcohol sales, restricting opportunities to purchase 
alcohol, both in terms of numbers of outlets and their opening times, increasing 
awareness among the public, health professionals and the hospitality and retail sectors 
of the harm caused by excessive alcohol consumption, strengthening prevention and 
treatment services building on the network of general practitioners and specialized 
clinics, and support for non-governmental organizations concerned with the harmful 
consequences of alcohol. At the same time, it is essential to understand that alcohol is 
deeply embedded in the Russian society and its abuse is fuelled by a complex of socio-
psychological and socio-cultural factors that reflect both the totalitarian past and 
contemporary socio-economic challenges.  
The idea that the mortality fluctuations are mainly the result of problems in a 
vulnerable sub-section of the Russian population, if correct, highlights the need to 
develop social policies that seek to provide increased support to vulnerable individuals 
and families. Clearly improvements in the state of the economy at large is a prerequisite 
for this although on its own it will not be sufficient. Particular attention should be given 
to identifying interventions that reduce recruitment to this vulnerable group, particularly 
among young people. 
References cited 
Andreev E.M. 2002. Vozmozhnye prichiny kolebaniy prodolzhitel'nosti zhizni v Rossii 
v 90-ye gody. (The possible reasons for fluctuations of life expectancy in Russia 
in the 1990s). Voprosy statistiki.(Questions of statistics) 11:3-15.  
Bobak M. and M. Marmot 1999.  Alcohol and mortality in Russia: is it different than 
elsewhere? Ann.Epidemiol 9:335-8.  
Gerry, C. J. and Li, C. A. Vulnerability to welfare change during economic shocks : 
evidence from the 1998 Russian crisis. Economic Discussion Paper No 541 . 
2002. Department of Economics, University of Essex.  
 42
Kauhanen J., G.A. Kaplan, D.E. Goldberg, and J.T. Salonen 1997.  Beer binging and 
mortality : results from the Kuopio ischaemic heart disease risk factor study, a 
prospective population based study. Br.Med.J. 315:846-51.  
Leon D.A., L. Chenet L, V.M. Shkolnikov, S. Zakharov, J. Shapiro, G. Rakhmanova et 
al. 1997.   Huge variation in Russian mortality rates 1984-94: artefact, alcohol, 
or what? Lancet 350:-8. 
Malyutina S., M. Bobak, S. Kurilovitch, V. Gafarov, G. Simonova, Y. Nikitin et al. 
2002.  Relation between heavy and binge drinking and all-cause and 
cardiovascular mortality in Novosibirsk, Russia: a prospective cohort study. 
Lancet 360:1448-54. 
McKee M. and .A. Britton 1998. The positive relationship between alcohol and heart 
disease in eastern Europe: potential physiological mechanisms. J.R.Soc.Med 
1998;91:402-7. 
McKee M., V. Shkolnikov, and D.A. Leon 2001. Alcohol is implicated in the 
fluctuations in cardiovascular disease in Russia since the 1980s. Ann.Epidemiol 
11:1-6.  
Meslé F. and V. Hertrich 1997.  Mortality trends in Europe ; the widening gap between 
East and West. International Population Conference Proceedings, pp 479-508. 
Beijing: IUSSP.  
Meslé F, V. Shkolnikov, and J. Vallin 1992.  Mortality by cause in the USSR in 1970-
1987 : the reconstruction of time series. European Journal of Population 8:281-
308.  
Meslé F. and V. Shkolnikov 1995.  La mortalité en Russie : une crise sanitaire en deux 
temps. Revue d'études comparitives Est-Ouest 4:9-24.  
Nemtsov A.V. 2000. Estimates of total alcohol consumption in Russia, 1980-1994. 
Drug Alcohol Depend.58:133-42. 
Nemtsov A.V. 2002. Alcohol-related human losses in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Addiction 97:1413-25. 
Norstrom T. and O.J. Skog 2001.  Alcohol and mortality: methodological and analytical 
issues in aggregate analyses. Addiction 96 Suppl 1:S5-17.  
Plavinski, S.L; S.I. Plavinskaya, and A.N. Klimov 2003.  Social factors and increase in 
mortality in Russia in the 1990s: prospective cohort study. Br.Med.J.326:1240-
2.  
Shilova M.V. 2001.  Specific features of the spread of tuberculosis in Russia at the end 
of the 20th century. Ann.N.Y.Acad.Sci. 2001;953:124-32.  
Shkolnikov V, M. McKee M, and D.A. Leon 2001. Changes in life expectancy in 
Russia in the mid-1990s. Lancet 357:917-21. 
Shkolnikov V.M., A.G. Cornia AG, D.A. Leon, and F. Meslé 1998. Causes of the 
Russian mortality crisis : Evidence and interpretations. World Development: 
26:1995-2011. 
Shkolnikov V.M. and A. Nemtsov 1997. The anti-alcohol campaign and variations in 
Russian mortality. In Bobadilla J-L, Costello C, Mitchell F, eds. Premature 
 43
Death in the New Independent States, pp 239-61. Washington: National 
Academy Press. 
Shkolnikov V., F. Meslé, J. Vallin 1995.  La crise sanitaire en Russie. I. Tendances 
récentes de l'espérance de vie et des causes de décès de 1970 à 1993 [Health 
crisis in Russia. I. Recent trends in life expectancy and causes of death from 
1970 to 1993]. Population 50:907-44.  
Shkolnikov V., F. Meslé F, and D.A. Leon 2001.  Premature cardiovascular mortality in 
Russia in the light of population- and individual-level evidence. In Weidner G, 
Kopp SM, Kristenson M, eds. Heart disease : Environment, Stress and Gender. 
Nato Science Series, Series I : Life and Behavioral Sciences. Vol 327, NATO. 
Shkolnikov, V.; D.A. Leon, S. Adamets, E. Andreev, and A. Deev 1998. Educational 
level and adult mortality in Russia : an analysis of routine data 1979 to 1994. 
Soc Sci Med 47:357-69.  
Walberg, P.; M. McKee, V. Shkolnikov, L. Chenet L,and D.A. Leon 1998. Economic 
change, crime, and mortality crisis in Russia : regional analysis. Br.Med.J. 
317:312-8. 
 44
Health Care Provision and Financing  
Sergey Shishkin 
Independent Institute for Social Policy, Moscow 
Health care organization 
Russia is abundantly endowed with health infrastructure (see Table 1).  In 2001, 
there were 10,600 hospital settings with a total of 1,653,000 beds and 21,300 outpatient 
facilities capable of serving 3,548,000 outpatients per shift. Russia’s health care system 
employed over 3,5 million individuals, including 678,000 physicians and 1,544,000 
mid-level health professionals.  Outpatient care in Russia is predominantly provided at 
polyclinics that encompass physicians of various specialties. Transition to general 
physician (GP) practices has been declared as a policy priority task. GPs will be 
expected to replace traditional community polyclinic-based internists. However, not 
much progress has been achieved so far. According to the country’s Ministry of Health 
(MoH), only 5,300 GPs have been trained, and less than half of them (2,300) actually 
practice as such.  
Organizational/administrative and economic aspects  
Russia’s health care sector has public (state-owned) and private health care 
systems. The former is subdivided into federal, regional and municipal levels.   The 
Federal level encompasses health institutions subordinated to Russia’s MoH or other 
federal ministries and agencies. In 2000, the country had 3,556 such facilities not 
counting those owned by military and law-enforcement agencies. The federal heath care 
system also includes State Sanitary-Epidemiological Surveillance institutions (2,296 in 
2000). Federal institutions account for 15 and 6 percent of all Russia’s inpatient and 
outpatient facilities, respectively, and employ 10 percent of all of the nation’s health 
professionals. Most MoH institutions provide tertiary health services to the general 
population. Health care institutions subordinated to other federal agencies provide serve 
specified population categories, i.e. such agencies’ employees and their family 
members. However, federal agency-controlled facilities have started to provide health 
care to any resident, irrespective of his/her occupation or place of residence, on a fee-
for-service basis.  
Most non-federal health care facilities belong to Russia’s regions or 
municipalities.  Private health care was launched in the 1990s through creation of new 
non-governmental institutions, but private hospitals and outpatient facilities account for 
only 0.8 and 8 percent of the total number of respective institutions in 2000. 
Privatization of state-owned federal, regional and municipal health care facilities is 
prohibited by law.  
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Table 1.  Main Health and Health Care Indicators in Russia  
 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 
Number of hospitals (000) 12,5 12,8 12,1 10,7 10,6 
Hospital beds per 1,000 residents 13,5 13,8 12,6 11,6 11,5 
Number of outpatient facilities (000) 19,4 21,5 21,1 21,3 21,3 
Number of physicians of all 
specialties, total  
620,7 667,3 653,7 680,2 677,8 
Number of physicians of all 
specialties per 10,000 residents  
43,2 45,0 44,5 47,2 47,3 
Number of mid-level medical 
professionals, total 
1756,7 1844,0 1628,4 1563,6 1544,4 
Number of mid-level medical 
professionals, per 10,000 residents 
122,4 124,5 110,0 108,4 107,8 
Visits to physicians/doctors per 
resident per year 
11,1 9,5 9,1 9,5 9,5 
Number of hospital admissions per 
100,000 residents per year 
24,4 22,8 21,2 22,0 22,4 
Source: Health Care in the Russian Federation; Statistical magazine. Moscow: 
Goskomstat/Russia, 1995; Russian Statistical Annual. Statistical compilation; Moscow: 
Goskomstat/Russia, 1999, pp. 213, 216;: Health Care in the Russian Federation; Statistical 
magazine. Moscow: Goskomstat/Russia, 2001, pp. 202, 207, 234, 284, 290, 292.  
Government guarantees regarding accessibility of health care  
The Russian Constitution establishes each citizen’s right to obtain free-of-charge 
health services at public health care facilities. Since 1998, a Program of Government 
Guarantees Regarding Provision of Health Care Services to the Population of the 
Russian Federation is adopted annually by Government. The program guarantees 
provision of the Soviet-era package of services.  The program provides for reduction of 
cost-ineffective hospital beds and necessitates transition of a certain portion of inpatient 
cases to outpatient settings (e.g. to day hospitals at traditional hospitals and polyclinics).  
Health care financing 
Russia has a mixed general tax revenue / health insurance – based health care 
financing system. Public health care funding comes from the federal, regional and 
municipal budgets, as well as from payments for mandatory health insurance (MHI) 
coverage of employed citizens made by corporations and self-employed citizens in 
accordance with relevant Russian tax legislation.  
The distribution of public health care expenditure by financing source in 2002 is 
shown in Figure 1. Most public health care finance comes from regional and 
municipal/local tax revenue budgets. In 2002, they accounted for 67 percent of the 
overall public health expenditure. The share of the federal budget and employers’ 
mandatory health insurance payments for working residents was 10 and 23 percent of 
the overall public health expenditure, respectively.   
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The share of public health care expenditure in GDP has fluctuated significantly 
over the last few years (see Table 2), but this reflects the effects of inflation.  Public 
health expenditure in real terms – calculated using GDP deflators - is more informative 
(Figure 2). Real public health spending has grown since 2000, by 17 percent in 2002.  
Public health care spending unevenly distributed across Russian regions. While 
the average per capita health care funding in Russia was 1,464 rubles ($50) per resident 
per year in 2001, the indicator ranged from 469 rubles ($16) in Republic of Ingushetia 
to 6,542 rubles ($224) in Hanty-Mancy Autonomous Territory.  
 
Figure 1.  Public Health Care Expenditure by source of funding in 2002. 
Federal Budget 
9%
Consolidated 
regional budgets 
(excluding 
employers' MHI 
payments)
55%
MHI payments 
for non-working 
residents from 
regional budgets 
12%
Employers' MHI 
opayments 
24%
 
Table 2.  Public health care expenditure as a percentage of Russia’s GDP 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Total 2.4 2.5 3.7 3.9 3.4 3.2 4.1 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.8 3.2 
General tax revenue 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 2.8 2.6 3.3 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.4 
Corporations’ MHI payments 
for employees 
- - 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Source: Calculations based on data provided by Goskomstat/Russia 
 
The accessibility of free-of-charge government-financed health care decreased 
dramatically during the 1990s as a result of the general economic crisis. According to 
optimistic estimates, public health care expenditure (from all public budgets and MHI) 
has decreased by at least 32 percent in real terms since the early 1990s (see Figure 2). 
However, government guarantees regarding free health benefit package have never been 
revised and, as a result, remain valid only on paper.  For several years, the share of 
public health care expenditure in GDP has not exceeded 3.2 percent. Countries with a 
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comparable level of public health spending guarantee provision of only basic services 
such as infectious disease control. 
 
Figure 2.  Real Public Health Care Expenditure (1991 = 100%) 
 
* Sum total of public tax-based budgets’ allocations to HC and physical culture and employers’ 
MHI payments for working residents. 
Source: Calculations based on data provided by Goskomstat/Russia with the use of GDP 
deflators published at the end of respective years (1992 – 17,2; 1993 – 10,2; 1994 – 4,1; 1995 – 
2,8; 1996 – 1,4; 1997 - 1,2; 1998 – 1,1; 1999- 1,6; 2000 – 1,4; 2001 – 1,2; 2002 – 1,2). 
 
Such a long-standing mismatch between government commitments and the 
nation’s actual financial capabilities has a negative impact of the health care system as a 
whole: the scale of disease prevention activities has become insufficient; access to 
quality health care is low; more and more health services are being provided on a fee-
for-service basis, and informal patients’ payments for services have become 
commonplace.  
The health care finance statistics given above refer only to spending financed by 
the public sector and mandatory health insurance.  Total health care expenses in Russia 
also include payments for drugs purchased at retail pharmacies, services provided 
legally by health care institutions on a fee-for-service basis (so-called “chargeable 
services”), services financed by voluntary private health insurance, and informal 
payments to providers for services that are supposed to be provided free of charge.  The 
amount paid by individuals and corporations for voluntary private health insurance, as 
well as expenditure on chargeable health services, have been growing rapidly (see Table 
3).  As a result, the public : private health expenditure ratio decreased from 83:17 in 
1995 to 60:40 in 2001. The share of chargeable health services in the overall amount  
grew from 1.7% in 1993 up to 4.8% in 2002.  This impressive trend can hardly be 
explained only by growing demand for health services on the part of high-income 
population groups; clearly poor households are increasingly paying for medical services 
out of pocket. 
 48
Table 3.  Public and private HC expenditure (billion rubles, in 2000 prices) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2001 
Public health care 
expenditure 
302.1 277.0 204.5 206.7 235.1 189.1 190.7 203.0 207.3 238.0 
Payments for voluntary 
health insurance 
2.1 3.7 4.2 5.6 7.2 6.3 8.8 12.8 19.4 na 
Payments for 
chargeable health 
services  
3.9 5.5 10.2 14.3 19.7 18.9 24.2 27.5 30.9 32.1 
Payments for drugs  na 28.4 40.6 45.8 68.2 43.5 60.2 70.1 92.3 na 
Source: calculations based on data obtained from: Russian Statistical Annual, 2000; Moscow: 
Goskomstat/Russia, 2001; Russian Statistical Annual, 2002.; Moscow: Goskomstat/Russia, 
2002  
Table 4.  The share of patients who pay for health care services, according to different 
surveys, percent 
Name of survey or 
organization 
Place and year 
of survey 
Outpatient 
services 
Diagnosti
c services 
Dental 
care 
Inpatient 
services 
Russian Academy of 
Sciences’ Institute of 
Social and Economic 
Problems of 
Populationand Legal 
Sciences (ISEPP) 
Taganrog, 1998 22   60 
Kemerovo State 
University 
Kemerovo, 1998 18-38 45 84 51 
National Center for Public 
Opinion Studies (VCIOM) 
National sample, 
1999 
4-20 44 80 34-37 
Russian Health Care 
Foundation 
Novgorod 
region, 2000 
24   46 
INDEM Foundation National sample, 
1999-2001 
34    
Russia Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey 
National sample, 
2001 
10 21  15 
Independent Institute for 
Social Policy 
2 regions, 2002 30  65 50 
Sources: Kulibakin I.B., “Urban health care systems”: public survey findings. Kemerovo State 
University. Sociology Center. Kemerovo, 1998; Morozova Y.A., Ibragimova D., Krasilnikova 
M., Ovcharova L.: Russian residents’ payments for health and educational services. // Public 
opinion monitoring: economic and social changes, 2000, # 2(46), p. 38; Satarov G.: Diagnosis 
of the Russian corruption: sociological analysis (Report summary). Moscow, INDEM 
Foundation, 2002. Sidorina T.Y., Sergeyev N.V.: State social policy and Russians’ health. 
Comments to the household health expenditure survey// “Russian World”, #2, 2001; 
www.cpc.unc.sdu/rlms/. 
 
According to official data on the structure of household spending for final 
consumption (Goskomstat 200, pp. 34-38), the share of household revenues spent for 
health care is increasing. In 1994, the share of health services and that of medical 
devices and personal hygiene items in the overall amount of household expenses was 
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0.4% and 2.5%, respectively. In 2000, these values increased to 0.9% and 3.5%, 
respectively. However, there is a substantial difference between households with high 
and low incomes. Comparison of the two extreme income deciles shows that the poorest 
households have to spend a larger proportion of their incomes for drugs than the 
wealthiest families (4.1% vs. 3% in 2000). However, the wealthy spend a much higher 
share of their income for health services, than the poorest residents (1.8% vs. 0.2%). 
Officially reported data does not include informal (‘under-the-table’) payments 
made by patients directly to health professionals. However, a range of surveys indicate 
that out-of-pocket payments for health care, including ‘shadow’ payments, are 
widespread (Table 4). 
Health care reform  
When MHI was introduced in the early 1990s, it was in the context of a health 
sector reform where insurance was expected to support or replace public health care 
funding, to enhance the system’s financial stability and to provide for a more effective 
and efficient use of available resources (Chemichovsky et al. 1996). However, the 
reform has never been accomplished and has lead to ambiguous results (Sheiman 1997, 
Shishkin 1999). 
Currently, all Russian citizens have MHI coverage.  MHI coverage for working 
residents is financed by their employers and that for non-working/unemployed 
individuals by regional and/or local authorities. In 1993, the employers’ MHI payment 
rate was fixed at 3.6% of gross wages.  In 2001, MHI premium payments became part 
of a unified payroll tax.  The MHI payment rate for non-working residents is not 
established by law and is set by regions and municipalities when they develop their 
annual budgets.  
The services covered by MHI are defined by Government in the Basic MHI 
Program, which became part of the Program of Government Guarantees Regarding 
Provision of Free-of Charge Health Care Services in 1998. The basic MHI program is 
used by Russian regions to develop their Territorial (regional) MHI programs. Funds 
accumulated within the federal MHI system have been used to finance health care 
provided under Territorial MHI programs since 1994.  
The MHI model established by Russian law is shown schematically in Figure 3.  
Health insurance is provided by competing firms that enter into contracts with 
employers (MHI coverage of employees) and authorities (MHI coverage of non-
working residents). Health insurance companies select health care institutions to provide 
services under the MHI program and pay for services provided to MHI policy holders.  
Territorial MHI Funds, new state institutions, were created in each Russian region to 
collect MHI payments. The Federal MHI Fund was established with its main task being 
to level out financial conditions for Territorial MHI funds.  Each Territorial MHI Fund 
provides funds to health insurance companies based on established capitation rates 
under contracts between health insurers and health care purchasers. When calculating 
financing rates, each Territorial MHI Fund must take into account age/sex differences of 
insured populations assigned to various insurance companies.   However, local offices 
of Territorial MHI Funds were allowed to act as also as MHI insurers in 1994.  Thus, 
Russia’s MHI system has two types of insurers: health insurance companies and 
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territorial MHI funds’ local offices. As a rule, the former are registered as non-
governmental for-profit organizations. 
 
Figure 3.  Russia’s Mandatory Health Insurance Model 
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The approach was expected to trigger competition among insurers for MHI 
purchasers (employers and local authorities), and competition among health care 
providers for MHI contracts. Competition among private insurers and health care 
providers was supposed to revitalize the country’s health care system and make it use its 
resources in a more cost-effective manner. However, such expectations turned out to be 
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based more on theoretical reasoning than a thorough analysis of the situation actually 
prevailing.  
As shown in Table 5 below, the number of MHI insurers grew until 1996, and 
then started decreasing as a result of both economic factors (small insurance companies 
could not cover their operating costs with MHI-generated revenues) and administrative 
decisions (in many Russian regions, health insurance companies have been excluded 
from the MHI system by regional authorities through prohibitive accreditation 
procedures).  In 2000, 39 Russian regions had health insurance companies only; 29 
regions had Territorial MHI Funds and their local affiliates only and; 22 regions had 
both. 
 
Table 5.  Mandatory health insurance actors (end of year) 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Territorial MHI Funds 86 86 88 88 89 90 90 90 91 
Territorial MHI Funds’ local 
affiliates, including 
1058 1103 1140 1108 1160 1170 1123 1129 982 
  those acting as health insurers   571 486 423 419 487 500 516 485 
  health insurance companies 164 439 536 538 461 415 387 362 361 
Source: Federal MHI Fund 
 
Implementation of the MHI system began in 1993-1994. However, the sequence 
or the pace of transition was never established by Russian legislation.  Implementation 
of the MHI system has been poorly controlled by federal authorities and depended 
solely of regional authorities’ attitudes. The system has never been implemented in full.  
In sum, replacement of the general tax-based health care financing with the MHI has 
begun, but has never been accomplished.  However, introduction of the MHI system, 
while incomplete, has had a positive stabilizing influence on health care financings.  
A major problem is that the amounts transferred by regional and local authorities 
for MHI coverage of non-working residents are insufficient. The share of MHI in 
overall public health funding was less than 33 percent prior to  2002 and reached only 
44 percent only in 2002 (see Figure 4).  This contrasts with the two thirds of health care 
financing that is supposed to come through MHI.  Health authorities and local bodies of 
power continue to finance both MHI funds and individual health care facilities directly.  
As a result, Russia has obtained an eclectic health care financing system that combines 
old-style (tax-based) and new insurance-based financing mechanisms.  
Two-channel funding of health care providers and multiple financing schemes 
used to pay for services provided under the basic MHI program have become a problem. 
Services provided to MHI policy holders must – in theory – be paid for from MHI funds 
only, but continue to be financed from MHI funds and through the old source (general 
tax revenue-based budget). According to federal recommendations, general tax revenues 
and MHI funds must be used to finance different expense articles (categories). In 
reality, however, the same health care provider’s expense category continue to be 
financed from both sources. 
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Figure 4.  Health care financing from public sources in 2002 (billion rubles) 
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Total required cost of the Government Guarantees (free health benefits) 
Program 
348.3 
Source: Calculations based on data provided by Ministry of Health, Goskomstat/Russia, Federal 
MHI Fund. 
 
The two different cannels of finance run under two different sets of rules. Under 
MHI, health care providers get reimbursed for services that they have actually provided 
to insurers. In contrast, money coming from the general tax revenue-based budgets to 
finance selected articles of health care providers’ recurrent budgets (maintenance costs 
mainly) do not depend on the actual amount or quality of services provided. This 
combination of the old (through general tax budgets) and new (via MHI) financing 
mechanisms impairs the positive effect of the latter and does not encourage health care 
providers to seek more cost-effective ways to spend incoming funds or to rationally 
move available funds back and forth between budget lines.  General tax-based finance 
does nothing to encourage health care providers to become more effective/efficient; to 
the contrary, it encourages old-fashioned loss-based approaches designed to keep 
money coming in. 
Options to reform the existing MHI system are being discussed. The President 
and Government have clearly expressed their wish to maintain and develop the MHI 
system.  
In August 2002, the Russian Federal Pension Fund came up with an initiative to 
become an actor in the MHI field. As a result, Government made a decision (March 
2003) to allow the Federal Pension Fund to co-finance MHI for non-working residents 
(pensioners/retired employees) on a pilot basis. The fund was allowed to use 1.5 billion 
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rubles from its own budget for that purpose. The pilot project has been launched in 15 
Russian regions.  
Institutional traps  
Russia’s health care system has a number of flaws which can only be eliminated 
through reforming the existing health care financing system. These include: 
- a long-standing mismatch between Government-guaranteed free-of-charge 
health benefits and available public financial resources; 
- incomplete implementation of the MHI system and an eclectic combination of 
budget- and MHI-based health care financing approaches; 
- insufficient coordination between and among health authorities and HC 
financiers;  
- ineffective/inefficient use of available resources; and 
- preservation of the loss-based approaches to health care provider management 
and operation.  
Not much progress has been achieved in resolving these problems. Health care 
financing reform of the 1990s (introduction of the MHI approach) has created certain 
institutional traps for the system itself. The de facto refusal to reconsider government 
guarantees with respect to health benefits and to adjust them to the availability of public 
funds has triggered the proliferation of chargeable services and illegal payments for 
health care.  Meanwhile, neither public nor private funds are spent effectively.  
The lack of clear-cut rules governing MHI payments for non-working residents 
by local and regional budgets has resulted in a imbalance between the basic MHI 
programs, on the one hand, and the financial resources available to the MHI system, on 
the other. Currently, there is not enough money to pay for services that MHI 
policyholders are entitled to. This has resulted in many ineffective and eclectic regional 
health care financing models. The situation may improve, if the federal budget starts to 
co-finance MHI for non-working/non-employed residents, or if appropriate political 
decisions are taken to make the regions provide adequate amounts for that purpose. The 
former is associated with high economic costs to the federal level, and the latter with 
high political costs.  
The conditions under which insurance companies were allowed to participate in 
the MHI business present another institutional trap. Existing regulations do not 
encourage competition among insurers and do not make them look for more 
effective/efficient ways to use the MHI money and resources available to the health care 
system. As a result, many insurers have become passive and, thus, unnecessary 
intermediaries between MHI funds and health care providers.  Formal contracting rules 
applying to health care purchasers, insurers and health care providers are – to a 
significant extent – combined with informal agreements and arrangements that preclude 
effective use of available MHI funds. In this situation, the administrative costs 
associated with developing  competition among insurers and turning them into effective 
participants of the MHI system become too high. 
As a result, existing public health care financing system in Russia has found 
itself in a state of a stable but ineffective institutional equilibrium. All of the agents 
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capable of organizing concerted actions (health authorities, MHI Funds, health insurers, 
physicians’ / doctors’ professional associations) are more interested in preserving the 
status quo than in changing the existing arrangements and institutions. Health care has 
never been a priority for Russian authorities, and they have never exerted serious 
pressure on the key interest groups to make them want to change the order of things. 
This, in the final analysis, is why Russia has failed to make any profound progress in 
resolving its main health care system problems.  
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The Public-Private Split in Health Care Systems 
Les Mayhew 
Cass Business School, City University, London, UK 
Introduction 
It is arguable how much blame for the catastrophic decline in health in the 
Russian Federation can be attributed on failures within the health care system, or the 
failure of the public health community and government to respond adequately. The 
answer is probably academic in any case, because of the size of the economic shock 
following the fall of communism, and inherent features in the Russian culture and 
lifestyles that, left unchecked and unregulated, produce high volumes of chronic 
lifestyle-related disease and low life expectancy. The problem has got worse simply 
because, following the transition, the system became overwhelmed, due to simultaneous 
increases in demand and a collapse in finances, leading to shortages of almost 
everything (Sheimann, 1991; Adeyi et al, 1997). 
Since the fall of communism, Russia has turned away from the centrally planned 
and operated heath care model and edged its way towards a more market based system 
based on social insurance principles (Chernichovsky etal, 1996; Barr and Field, 1996). 
However, inequalities in access to health care continue to be rife at all levels, and in 
most areas of the country. A frequently remarked deficiency is the lack of clarity about 
what is meant by ‘public health’. Public health plays a fundamental role in terms of 
promoting health, preventing disease and eradicating inequalities, but also in setting the 
context in which the health care system is planned and coordinated. As one Russian 
Ministry official recently said: “Russia has a Ministry of health care, not a Ministry of 
Health.” 
An effective public health system requires political close co-operation at all 
levels of government, including cross-ministerial working and co-ordination. Finland, 
which has certain similarities with Russia, has shown that it is possible to tackle some 
of these issues given the political will and determination. However, resolution of this 
question is not the principal subject of this paper, because it is health care and not public 
health that has been the most recent focus of health reforms. This in itself may be 
regarded as a signal of political priorities. 
Turning our attention to health care, it is generally accepted that the primary aim 
of government is to create the financial and physical capacity to deliver free or 
affordable health care services, depending on need and other factors. In coming years, 
Russia will need to restructure and re-invest in its entire health care infrastructure. The 
problem is how to navigate a pathway from where it is now to where it needs to be in 
the future, efficiently and effectively. The difficulty is that there is no ‘off-the-shelf’ 
model that can be borrowed from outside and simply translated into Russia.  Even if 
there were there would immense difficulties in dismantling the existing system and 
creating a new one. 
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This note considers the key lessons from modern health care systems with 
examples drawn from comparable countries and economies. It draws heavily on 
research undertaken by IIASA’s Social Security Reform (SSR) Project in countries such 
as the US, China, Japan and the UK – each of which provide distinctive organizational 
models of health care. It considers the relevance of elements in each system to the 
Russian case through the incentives that are created, relating to infrastructural questions 
and administrative processes. 
The analysis is partial, concentrating on key features rather than the subtle 
differences between individual systems, which are many and detailed. In the second part 
of the paper we provide a brief analysis of the extent to which each type of system 
provides ‘value for money’ based on a simple economic model relating financial inputs 
to health outputs. This in itself is a value-loaded question since it depends on which 
particular feature of a health care system one wishes to emphasize. Since the key 
concern of the Russian Federation is the collapse in healthy life expectancy (HLE), it 
seems natural to use that as our outcome measure.  
The paper begins with a simple classification of health care systems in their pure 
form, whilst recognizing that most country systems are hybrids of several types to a 
greater of lesser degree. It compares how features compare with one another and the 
logic of why some elements go together, and certain strengths and weaknesses that are 
mediated through the underlying philosophy of the system in each case. The second part 
of the paper turns to a comparison of outputs based on the model, in which HLE is 
compared with the level and composition of health care finance – whether public or 
private. 
Categorizing health care systems 
All health systems share certain features.  One is that physicians are generally 
powerful players in influencing and shaping health care services. Another common 
feature, regardless of system, is the dependence of all health care systems on the global 
market for pharmaceuticals and much medical equipment. The hugely expensive 
research commitment and time spans needed to bring new pharmaceutical products to 
market inevitably mean that the industry is concentrated among a small number of large 
international corporations. This requires that all health care systems, whether in Russia, 
the UK or China, require some means of controlling their drug expenditures, and the 
costs born by the individual and the system.    
Another shared feature is that all health care systems increasingly struggle with 
the issue of looking after the elderly – who are the major consumers of health care 
today, especially in more developed countries. It is of some interest that nearly all health 
care systems seem to be drawing back from providing open-ended free personal and 
nursing care. Rather they are seeking in different ways to strike a balance of 
responsibilities and, therefore cost, between the individual, and the state.  
The solutions range from making individuals entirely responsible for their own 
long-term care, with support provided only to those with limited resources, to the 
introduction of another tier of insurance as in Japan and Germany. However, for Russia 
the long-term care market is self-limiting to a degree because of the much lower life 
expectancy although it is something that can be expected to develop with time.  
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Putting these common features to one side, one way to refine this classification of health 
care systems is on the basis of whether they are publicly or privately financed and 
publicly or privately operated. The four-way classification that this produces provides a 
convenient and insightful way of distinguishing between the systems and how they 
operate. It is also a way to concentrate debates about which type of system is in some 
sense ‘best’.  
Within each type there are several key features, which characterise each system. 
These are based on the levels of market exposure, the strategic management of priorities 
and level of responsibility ranging from the individual to the state, financial freedoms 
with regard to investment, and finally the degree of accountability and autonomy 
(WHO, 2000). These issues run through all the models discussed either explicitly or 
implicitly.  
Table 1 provides a more detailed exemplification of the four-way classification 
we wish to develop along with the key distinguishing features. The principal sources of 
finance, either public or private, are shown in the rows of the matrix, and the 
responsibility for service delivery, either public or private, is shown in the columns. 
Each variant is now considered in turn starting with the ‘public-public’ model.   
Public-public: An example of this type of system is the classic hierarchical centrally 
planned tax funded systems that typify former communist countries like Russia, and 
‘National Health Systems’ in countries such as the UK. It its pure form, this model has 
several well-known strengths but also a number of key weaknesses. The strengths are 
that access is related to health needs and not on the ability to pay so that inequalities 
based on age, gender or income are not a material factor in who gets treatment. Such 
systems have relatively small administrative costs, provide good value up to a point, and 
can be planned and regulated on rational lines. 
The weaknesses of such systems is the implicit rationing, based on waiting lists 
and queues, and the sometimes poor quality of services because of historically low 
levels of investment and poor maintenance. Patients may be denied direct access to 
specialists of their choice, and have to pay privately to circumvent these restrictions. 
However, there are several variants to this basic model, which are being implemented in 
countries such as the UK that could give such systems a new lease of life. 
Typically such variants are based on the principle of separating service providers 
from service commissioners (public ‘purchasers’) in which the commissioners contract 
with providers to provide services in defined volumes, at agreed levels of quality and 
service. Services may be restricted to a degree to only those that are approved or where 
there is a clear justification for their supply – although some would argue that this is an 
advantage.  The commissioners are therefore effectively public agents representing the 
‘an internal market’, in which prices are mutually agreed between commissioner and 
provider.  
A drawback with this approach is that competition between providers is still 
restricted through lack of patient choice. In the event of a financial crisis the public 
purse is still liable to take ultimate responsibility so it is a functioning market only up to 
a point.  New variants are now being developed which will give providers more 
flexibility and local accountability to be allowed to compete on a level playing field 
with private sector competitors. For Russia, the relinquishing of the wholly centralized 
system probably precludes a return to a more sophisticated version of the public-public 
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model, although a return cannot be ruled out if the experiment with the social insurance 
model fails. 
 
Table 1: Four-way classification of health care systems and typical characteristics 
Service provider  
Public Private 
p
u
b
li
c 
Hierarchical organization: 
 
- government regulated 
- financed through tax 
revenues 
- bureaucratic hierarchy 
- assets publicly owned  
- state employed physicians 
- free at point of use 
- subsidized prescription 
payments 
- no safety net required 
 
Hybrid public hierarchy / private 
sector: 
- government regulated 
- mandatory employer based 
social insurance 
- publicly regulated collection 
systems 
- main assets publicly owned 
- significant private sector 
- physicians privately employed 
or independent contractors 
- co-payments for treatment and 
medication 
- mandatory long term care 
insurance 
- public safety net 
 
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l 
 p
ro
v
is
io
n
 
p
ri
va
te
 
Hierarchical organization: 
- government regulated 
- financed through private 
insurance and fees for 
service 
- publicly owned assets 
- separate payment  for 
medication 
- optional publicly provided 
long term care arrangements 
- public safety net 
 
 
Privately owned and operated: 
- government regulated 
- corporate planning systems 
- financed through private 
insurance and fees for service 
- assets privately owned 
- physicians privately employed 
or independent contractors 
- separate payment for 
medication 
- no safety net 
 
 
 
 
Public-private: Typifying this kind of model are the social insurance based systems of 
Germany, Japan and certain other countries and is a model that Russia is currently 
implementing. In this example, the health care system is mostly owned and regulated 
within the public sector, although medical personnel are not necessarily public sector 
employees and have more freedoms to supplement their income through private practice 
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than under the previous model. Social insurance is generally mandatory and publicly 
regulated, although the collection systems can be privately administered through 
privately owned insurance companies, which offer private insurance ‘top-ups’. A 
feature of this system is the co-payments that are levied on medical interventions and 
which are billed to the patient. 
The strengths of this system are the clearer relationships between provision and 
cost, so that patients are encouraged to moderate their demands and ‘shop around’. A 
further advantage is that it has the capacity to diversify its sources of funding and 
therefore income through the provision of private insurance.  Patients tend to have more 
choice in terms of physician and place of treatment, which arguably leads to an internal 
market of sorts and possibly a diminution of physician and bureaucratic ‘power’. Finally 
the public provider can intervene and plan so retaining a degree of control over future 
plans and investment.  
The main weakness of this model is the restricted coverage of the system. Social 
insurance is usually levied on employees and their families, which means that special 
arrangements are needed for people who are outside the system because they are 
unemployed or otherwise incapacitated. The administrative costs are also higher 
because collection and accounting systems need to be more sophisticated and 
responsive.  
In 1993, Russia passed the health insurance law, which opened the way for the 
establishment of an insurance-based health care system to relieve the chronic shortage 
of funding by injecting new sources of finance. This has proved to be a massive task 
because of the difficulty of setting up complex and robust administrative systems for 
financial management and other purposes, often working against entrenched interests 
(Titchenko, 1995; Twigg, 1999) . The resources available to the system are less than 
ideal and further reforms will undoubtedly be necessary. It is not possible to pass 
judgement on Russia’s decision to follow this path since it is probable that the 
alternatives would not have fared any better in the wake of the power struggles and 
chaos of the early years of post Soviet rule.  
Private/private: The most well known exponent of this system is the US. In this system 
providers can be either in the private or public sector. Medical facilities can be part of a 
larger corporation or publicly owned by the municipality or a charitable trust. In either 
case patients must pay for care unless their income drops below a specified level in 
which case they receive public support. The key difference with the social insurance 
model is that medical insurance is not a mandatory part of employment, whilst the 
benefits of medical insurance are more heavily circumscribed in terms of procedures 
and time-limited in terms of benefits. The US system is certainly expensive, accounting 
for over twice the proportion of GDP compared with the international average. 
Paradoxically, it is also the model adopted by developing countries, where public 
finance is limited and overall funding is well below  where it should be (Cichon and 
Gillion, 1993). 
The strengths of the US system are that it generates a lot of resources that can be 
deployed in medical research which results in the US being pre-eminent in many fields 
of medical research and the quality of care for those who can afford it can be very high. 
There are, on the other hand, considerable weaknesses. Because health insurance is not 
mandatory the system is vulnerable to adverse selection tendencies, which raise the cost 
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of insurance. There are significant inequalities in coverage between those who receive 
employer benefits or pay directly and those who can’t afford to pay or for whom the 
insurance has run out. The administrative systems to support private health care are 
considerable and substantially add to costs, whilst the insurance system encourages 
patients to over consume and physicians to over-provide.  
The US recognizes these problems and has evolved various means of 
overcoming them without actually dismantling the fundamentally private nature of the 
system. For low-earners, there is the  “Medicaid” system, and for older people there is 
“Medicare,” which provides certain free health care benefits to older people. To keep 
costs down, the US has also pioneered the concept of Health Maintenance Organisations 
in which provision and insurance are combined to lesson incentives to over-consume or 
over-provide. For some years, it has also used a system of standard costs for different 
interventions to reduce the temptation to charge exorbitant rates for specific 
interventions.  
Private-public This method organization is probably the most unusual of the four types 
and there are relatively few examples on which to base judgments or compare 
experiences. The best example is China, which has pursued a development path in 
which limited private sector reforms have been encouraged within an overall framework 
of state control. The origins of these reforms lie in the dismantling of the old state 
enterprises and with them employer-based health care and pension systems. Unlike 
Russia, the transition in China has been more controlled and thorough, with alternative 
arrangements being introduced selectively and at a measured pace.  
In addition, China persists with the distinction between the rural and urban 
health systems, which are significantly different.  In allowing the rural public health 
system to disintegrate, the Chinese government has effectively reneged on its 
commitment to provide state medical care to rural Chinese.  In Russia, while there is 
certainly less than meets the eye to the state guarantee of universal access to free 
medical care, no such drastic backtracking on policy commitments has taken place. 
As far as Chinese urban health care reforms are concerned, the hospitals and 
assets are still controlled by the state whilst physicians and other medical personnel 
remain public employees. The patient, by contrast, has essentially two options: enrol in 
one of public or private health insurance systems that are springing up or pay out of 
pocket. The collection systems are still relatively crude, with insurance contributions 
made through personal visits to local offices, whilst public hospitals handle quite 
substantial amounts of cash that are handed over by the patient after a visit is completed.  
These are transitional issues and the main limitation of the current system is that 
the insurance benefits are capped in any one year, and individuals exceeding their limits 
must pay the additional costs. Because the urban population is relatively young and 
healthy, the cash inflows from insurance contributions exceed pay-outs and so the 
system remains solvent at the moment. This will not always be the case however. 
Health care financing and outputs 
Modern medical practice is reasonably standardized and one would expect 
treatments provided publicly or privately to have about the same health impact.  The 
means of finance, however, may be expected to significantly affect what treatments are 
 61
provided and who receives them.  In this section, we ask whether health outcomes vary 
systematically, not only with the overall level of funding, but with the public-private 
mix of health care expenditure.   
One way to analyze the performance of different health care systems is to 
compare the average healthy life expectancy in each country with per capita 
expenditure. Healthy life expectancy may be defined as the average years of life lived in 
a healthy state. It is less than average life expectancy at birth, usually by a factor of 9-10 
years depending on the country and its level of development (Mayhew, 2003). If we 
were to plot a graph based on HLE against the per capita level of health expenditure, we 
would obtain the curve shown in Figure 1, which is based on data published by the 
World Health Organisation for the year 2000 for 191 countries. It shows that HLE 
grows rapidly up to income levels of say $1000 per head, after which HLE gains taper 
off.  
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Figure 1: Healthy life expectancy (HLE) as a function of health care spending per 
capita: fitted curve based 192 countries (log HLE = 3.313+0.124x, where x is spending 
per capita: R2 = 0.64). Individual countries highlighted from left to right are China, 
Russia, UK, Japan and US.  
 
Highlighted in the graph are the actual positions of the five countries, which 
have been discussed in the previous sections, each which different health care systems. 
They are, from left to right on the graph, China, Russia, UK, Japan, and US.  Countries 
that are above the line are attaining a higher level of HLE for their relative spending on 
health care than countries below the line. The differences between the countries are 
clearly expenditure-related, but are they also related to their methods of financing? If 
there is a relationship between the public-private mix what can one conclude about the 
relative merits of one system versus another?  
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We therefore re-ran the above model separating out public and private spending 
using a simple production type function in which the independent variables are private 
and public spending per capita. The equation fitted was 
ln (healthy life expectancy) = α +  ȕ ln (public health expenditure per capita ) +  
     + Ȗ ln (private health expenditure per capita ) 
This yielded coefficients for public spending of 0.0822 and 0.0376 for private spending 
(R2= 0.64,α = 3.42). Thus, as our first inference we note that improvements to HLE 
from public spending on health care on average occur at over twice the rate compared 
with private spending.  
In Figure 2, we present a way of interpreting residuals, i.e. the errors between 
expected HLE calculated using the fitted equation and observed HLE.  On the 
horizontal axis is public expenditure and on the vertical axis private expenditure.  A 
family of curves, of which we illustrate three, shows combinations of public and private 
expenditure, which will result in various levels of HLE.  Curves lying to the right and 
higher above the origin represent higher levels of HLE.  Note that these curves may be 
drawn on the basis of our parameter estimates by varying HLE and calculating the 
combinations of public and private spending that are consistent with it.   
A “budget line” such as PQ represents combinations of public and private 
spending that sum to the same total, in this case $400.  Assuming that there is only $400 
to be spent, the highest HLE may be obtained by dividing it between public and private 
at the point of tangency A, corresponding to $275 in public spending and $125 in 
private spending (a ratio of 2.2 to 1; all points corresponding to this ratio are illustrated 
as a ray from the origin).  We refer to this split as corresponding to “optimal allocative 
efficiency” because it results in the highest possible HLE given the overall $400 
constraint.   In the example given, actual observed HLE is 57.5 years (point C) and, with 
improved allocation, this could be raised to 58 years (point A).  Actual HLE, in this 
example, is assumed to be 60 years. 
It turns out that the gap between expected HLE and actual HLE can be much 
greater than the gap between expected HLE and allocatively efficient HLE. We describe 
a country below its expected HLE, given its level of health spending, as having a ‘life 
style or public health deficit’. Countries that fall most frequently in this category are 
often developing countries especially those afflicted by AIDS, where the existing health 
care system have proved to be more or less powerless against this epidemic. Actual 
HLE in our example is well above the expected level. This suggests that this country has 
attained what might be described as a ‘life style or public health dividend’ because its 
HLE is above where it should be based on the average of all countries in the model. 
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Figure 2: Healthy life expectancy as a function of public and private expenditure for a 
hypothetical country and its relationship to healthy life expectancy. 
 
Table 2: Comparison of health life expectancy with public and private health care 
expenditure in countries with differently structures health care systems. 
 Actual HLE 
(years) 
Expected HLE 
(years) 
HLE based on 
optimal 
allocative 
efficiency 
(years) 
Actual 
public 
spend/capita 
($) 
Actual 
private 
spend/capita 
($) 
Ratio of 
public to 
private 
spend 
China 62.8 52.37 53.70 75.0 130.0 0.58 
Japan 73.5 70.45 70.59 1540.9 468.1 3.29 
Russia 56.6 58.24 58.27 293.6 111.4 2.64 
UK 69.2 69.18 69.55 1436.9 337.1 4.26 
US 67.4 76.64 77.75 1993.1 2505.9 0.80 
 
Table 2 shows results for the countries discussed in previous paragraphs, which 
were taken to be representative of the health care systems operating different financial 
arrangements. Expected HLE (Column 2) is as predicted by the equation just given.  
“HLE based on optimal allocative efficiency” (Column 3) is the highest HLE that could 
be obtained by re-allocating expenditure between public and private, keeping the total 
the same and according to the family of curves that we have estimated.  The following 
are some key points arising: ? China spends least on health care based on these data. Actual HLE is 62.8 years 
compared with 52.37 expected HLE. At 10.43 years China has the largest healthy 
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life style dividend among this group (although this author has some concerns about 
the quality of Chinese data).  A more allocatively efficient system of financing 
would only achieve 53.70 years of HLE by comparison. ? Japan is the second biggest spender on health care in this group and has the highest 
HLE. Actual HLE is 3.05 years higher than expected HLE based on its level of 
spending, so there is also a positive HLE life style dividend in the Japanese case. A 
more allocatively efficient spending mix, however, would only add 0.14 years to 
expected HLE. ? The level of spending in Russia is below all the other countries except China. Actual 
HLE is the lowest among this whole group of countries, and lower than the expected 
HLE by a margin of 1.64 years, suggesting a lifestyle deficit using previous 
terminology. A more allocatively efficient system of financing would only 
contribute 0.03  years to the expected HLE.   ? Actual HLE in the UK is 69.2 years compared with a similar expected value based 
on international comparisons. Its allocatively efficient level of HLE is 0.37 years 
above the expected level, so that the UK could perform slightly better with a more 
privately weighted public-private mix. ? The US spends far more than any other country on health care, but its actual HLE is 
only 67.4 years compared with an expected HLE of 76.64 years based on its level of 
expenditure. This represents a lifestyle deficit of  9.24 years. US spending on health 
care is proportionately more skewed towards private expenditure than the other 
countries with the exception of China. If the US were allocatively more efficient 
HLE would rise by 1.11 years. 
Conclusion 
In this note, we presented a 2x2 matrix scheme for characterizing health care 
systems by whether provision and financing of health care was public or private.  This 
scheme allowed us to describe approaches to health care in countries as diverse as the 
US, UK, Japan, China, and Russia.   
A great deal of attention has been devoted to finding the optimal public-private 
mix in health care finance.  We found that, after controlling for the level of overall 
funding, deviations from expected healthy life expectancy were due not to misallocation 
of spending, but to what we lumped together as “life style and public health” variables.  
In the Russian context, this suggests that health care reformers, while not ignoring 
questions of finance (or for that matter, provision) should urgently tackle contextual 
problems such as unhealthy life style.   
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Recently, it was shown that in the past few decades Russia’s alcoholic death toll 
was 500,000 to 750,000 per annum (Nemtsov 2001). The purpose of the following 
inquiry is to determine how these losses are spread across the country’s territory. 
 At present (2002), Russia has 89 administrative entities, divided into seven 
federal okrugs. Owing to incomplete data, we were unable to look at how matters stand 
in three units – the Altai Republic, Ingushetiya, and Chechnya. All autonomous regions 
were also excluded, being parts of oblasts. Hence, we surveyed 77 regions. 
 Alcohol mortality was studied region by region from 1990 on, because the State 
Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation deems it necessary (or possible) to 
preserve regional mortality data for only the ten years preceding the current decade. As 
a result, highly important 1980-89 data are unavailable.  Average indicators for Russia, 
however, are available for this decade. 
 The mortality data, both all-Russia and regional, were obtained from the State 
Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation, and data on alcohol psychoses 
incidence from the Narcological Centre of the RF Health Ministry.  These data are 
characterized by a number of weaknesses and gaps.   
To begin with, not all types of alcoholic pathology figure in the official causes 
of death classification. As a result, many types of alcoholic mortality are lost in larger 
mortality classes and therefore out of reach of analysis. 
The second trait of Russian official statistics is that alcoholic mortality is often 
disguised by non-alcohol related diagnoses. This was re-affirmed at the beginning of the 
Gorbachev anti-alcohol campaign, when indicators of nearly all types of mortality, 
including cardiovascular, declined in step with the decline of alcohol consumption (see 
Figures 1-4)).  All of these mortality classes include indirect alcohol-related deaths 
(alcoholic pathology being an aggravating factor) or direct alcohol-related deaths which 
have been falsified (e.g., alcohol poisoning). 
 Regional statistics on deaths from alcohol poisoning, usually employed as the 
main indicator of the severity of alcohol problems, are especially inaccurate: among 
alcohol-related mortality this had the greatest variability from region to region (see 
Figure 5), and the regional indicators were asymmetrically distributed owing to the 
large number of regions with very low numbers of occurrence.   
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Figure 1. Total (1), violent (2), and cardiovascular (3) mortality and alcohol 
psychosis morbidity (4) per 100.000 population. The dashed line marks the period 
for which regional data are available.  
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Figure 2. Mortality rates per 100,000 population from suicide (1), alcohol poisoning  
(2), and homicide (3).  The dashed line marks the period for which regional data are 
available. 
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Figure 3. Mortality rates per 100,000 population from total cirrhosis (1), pancreatitis 
(2), and alcohol cirrhosis (3).  The dashed line marks the period for which regional 
data are available.  
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Figure 4. Changes of the alcohol depended variables: "residual" violent  mortality (1; 
without suicides, homicides and alcohol poisonings) and "residual" total  mortality (2; 
without all named in figures 1,2,3,4) per 100.000.  The dashed line marks the period of 
regional research mortality.  
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There is another specific feature of the alcohol poisoning statistics: in more than 
half the regions they do not tally with alcohol psychosis incidence either in levels or 
trends over time.  In a large number of regions the relation of psychoses to poisonings 
increased as poisoning mortality decreased (see Figure 6). This is contrary to the nature 
of the two phenomena: all psychosis patients and the majority of those who died of 
alcohol poisoning are alcoholics. In other words, both groups are mostly recruited from 
one and the sub-population, which presupposes a relative stability of the proportion and 
correlation of these types of afflictions and mortality. Such a correlation was recorded in 
44 out of 77 oblasts. In the remaining 33 oblasts there was no correlation, while the 
relation of psychosis to poisonings fluctuated from 0.02 (Republic of Adygey, 1993) to 
64,6 (Jewish Autonomous Okrug; 1996). 
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Figure5.  Variability of alcohol-dependent variables. On the y-axis is the coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation/mean*100) expressed in percent. The columns represent 
average variations of regional parameters, the strokes give confidential intervals.  
 
 The relation of psychoses and poisonings were subjected to a special analysis 
(not reported here) that enabled us to estimate that the real ratio of psychoses to 
poisonings is 1.89:1.0 and the range of variation if from 1.29 to 2.47. Using this ratio to 
correct under-reporting of alcohol poisonings (i.e., multiplying reported alcohol 
psychoses by 1.89 to estimate the actual rate of alcohol poisoning mortality), we 
estimated that the actual number of lethal alcohol poisonings in the country is 65 
percent higher than the number reported in official statistics (55,473 in 1994 and 41,091 
in 2001).  A more realistic estimate of deaths from alcohol poisoning in these two years 
would be 91,500 and 67,600 deaths or 62.4 and 47.0 per 100,000 population, 
respectively.   It is arguable that this estimate, too, is somewhat underestimated due to 
under-registration of psychoses.  As evidence of this, in a number of neighboring 
regions, a two-fold incidence difference was recorded. It is beyond question, however, 
that alcoholic psychoses are on the whole recorded considerably better than alcoholic 
poisoning mortality. 
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Figure 6.  Correlation of alcohol poisoning mortality (x-axis) with the relation of 
alcohol psychoses  to alcohol poisonings (y-axis).  
 
 The main source of error when registering alcohol-related deaths derives from 
the very first levels, namely the Bureau of Forensic Medicine, where diagnoses are 
distorted to avoid the undesirable moral, ethical, and social consequences that the truth 
may entail for relatives of the deceased. 
 Our correction of the number of alcohol poisoning deaths was but the first step 
in estimating total alcohol-related mortality in the Russia regions.  The contribution of 
alcohol to causes of death less directly related to the act of consuming alcohol needed to 
be estimated.   Owing to the absence of regional indicators of real alcohol consumption, 
this had to be done on the basis of the correlation of mean indicators of mortality and 
alcohol consumption for Russia as a whole. Based on linear regression, we estimated 
that the following percentages of deaths by cause were attributable to alcohol: alcohol 
poisoning (100 percent), homicides (72.2 percent), liver cirrhosis (67.6 percent), 
pancreatitis (60.1 percent), suicides (42.1 percent), cardiovascular pathology (23.2 
percent), and all other causes (25.0 percent). This means, for example, that in Russia 
23.2 percent of cardiovascular deaths are related to alcohol abuse: either the 
cardiovascular pathology resulted from massive drinking or there was a deliberate or 
accidental substitution of a cardiovascular diagnosis for an alcoholic diagnosis.  
 After determining the share of deaths related to alcohol consumption, the 
indicators of each of the six remaining classes of mortality averaged over 12 years were 
multiplied by the respective share coefficients. Considering the fact that causes of 
deaths with a relatively low level of alcohol involvement (cardiovascular and all other 
causes) account for 84.3 percent of all deaths, while deaths more closely related to 
alcohol consumption (alcohol poisoning, deaths from cirrhosis and pancreatitis) 
comprise only 15.7 percent, alcohol-related mortality in these two groups was 
calculated separately.  This is also necessary because cardiovascular “other” deaths 
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depend on the age of the population, which is more elderly in the west of the country 
and younger in the east. 
 Our results indicate that across the regions of Russia, 30 to 46 percent of deaths 
are due either directly or indirectly to alcohol abuse, with a mean of 33.8 percent.  The 
method unfortunately does not allow us to separate the direct and indirect contributions 
of alcohol.  The basic conclusion is not, however, affected: many years of life are lost 
owing to alcoholic abuse.  
To put this in perspective, in the U.S. 5.0 percent of all deaths in the country in 
1989 were attributable to alcohol abuse (Stinson et al. 1993) and 4.4 percent in 1995 
(McGinnis and Foege 1999). These figures can be compared (see Figure 7) with those 
estimated for Western Europe by Ramstedt (2002).   
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Figure 7. Alcohol mortality in European countries in 1995 (share of alcohol mortality in 
total mortality above age 15 (percent) The solid squares are registered alcohol 
consumption, the lozenges are estimates of actual consumption.  The numbers are male 
life expectancy at birth 
 
The most ominous situation as concerns alcoholic mortality is in the Russian Far 
Eastern Federal District, and within that okrug in the Chukot Autonomous Okrug where 
46% of deaths are related to alcohol abuse.  Approximately the same high level of 
alcohol-related mortality was recorded in five of eleven oblasts of the Siberian Federal 
District.  Alcohol-related losses equaling those of the Far Eastern District were 
registered in just four oblasts of other federal okrugs: the Tyumen oblast in the Urals, 
Udmurtiya on the Povolzhskii District, and Murmansk oblast and Komi Republic in the 
North-West District.  To single out any of the remaining oblasts is unnecessary, because 
the differences in alcohol-related mortality in them fluctuates little -- from 36.7% 
(Kalmyk Republic) to 30.3% (Voronezh oblast). 
Nemtsov (2000) has presented estimates that prior to the beginning (1985) of the 
anti-alcohol campaign, regional consumption of alcohol ranged from 11 to 18 liters per 
capita per annum and at the end of the campaign, the range was 10 to 15 liters.  This 
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proportional stability suggests that the only way to improve the situation in the worst 
regions is to effect a major reduction in alcohol consumption across the entire country. 
Other calculations made during this inquiry show: 
• a change in alcohol consumption by one liter per capita per annum 
changes total mortality by 3.9 percent, 
• a change in alcohol consumption by 1% changes total mortality by 0.5 
percent, i.e., the elasticity is 0.5. 
Based on these estimates, even a modest, 5 to 10 percent decline in alcohol consumption 
will reduce deaths by 100,000-200,000 each year.  A decrease of alcohol consumption 
in Russia would go far towards addressing the demographic crisis of a shrinking 
population.  
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Smoking  
David Rotman 
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Belarus State University, Minsk, Belarus 
Introduction 
In 1990, based on lung cancer mortality, it was estimated (Peto et al. 1994) that a 
35 year old man in the former Soviet Union (FSU), would have twice the risk (20%) of 
dying from tobacco-related causes before the age of 70 as a man in the European Union 
(EU; 10%).  In women the risks are much lower at 2% versus 1% but the ratio is the 
same ratio still applies. 56% of male cancer deaths and 40% of all deaths in region are 
attributed to tobacco compared with 47% and 35% respectively in the EU (ibid.).  
Moreover tobacco related mortality continues to increase in the FSU while stabilising or 
declining in the EU as a whole. It is perhaps no great surprise therefore that tobacco is 
thought to explain up to 50% of the east-west gap in life expectancy (WHO Regional 
Office for Europe 2003), which in 2000 (the latest year for which data are available) 
stood at 13.7 years in men, and to explain much of the gender gap in life expectancy 
which stands at 11.1 years in the former Soviet Union (FSU) compared with 6.2 years in 
western Europe (Bobak. 2003). 
Despite these deplorably high levels of tobacco-related mortality, relatively little 
is known about smoking prevalence in the region and data are sparse (Forey et al. 
2002). Virtually no recent or reliable data exist for the countries of central Asia 
(Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).  Although recent 
surveys have been conducted in Georgia they are limited to the capital Tbilisi, data from 
elsewhere in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan) are scarce and historical figures are 
inconsistent with later findings, leading authors to rely on anecdotal reports of smoking 
rates. 
Historical and more recent data, which come largely from Russia (McKee et al. 
1998), Ukraine (Gilmore et al. 2001a), Belarus (Gilmore et al. 2001b) and the Baltic 
States (Pudule et al. 1999) show, as might be expected given the mortality figures 
described above, that smoking rates in men are high at between 45% and 60%; rates are 
far lower in women and range from 1% and 20%. 
These issues underlie the need in the FSU for comparable and accurate data on 
smoking prevalence, which have been widely recognised as pre-requisites for the 
development of effective public health policies and programmes. The need for accurate 
and timely data is made more urgent in the FSU by the profound changes experienced in 
the region’s recent transition from a socialist to a market economy and more specifically 
by the transformation of its tobacco industry (Connoly 1996). Changes to the tobacco 
industry were first felt as soon as these formerly closed markets opened, with the rapid 
influx of cigarette imports and advertising, which was previously unknown in the 
region.  Later, as part of the rapid and large scale privatisation of state assets, most of 
the newly independent states privatised their tobacco industries and the trans-national 
tobacco companies (TTCs) established a local manufacturing presence. We estimate 
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that between 1991 and the end of 2000, the TTCs invested over US$2.7 billion in 10 
countries of the FSU and tripled cigarette production capacity in their newly acquired 
factories (Chaloupka and Laixuthai 1996).  Evidence from the industry’s previous entry 
to Asia shows that these changes are likely to have a significant upward impact on 
cigarette consumption (Bettcher et al. 2001). 
Current smoking prevalence 
In response to these and other major health and social issues faced in the region, 
a major study on living conditions, lifestyle and health (LLH) was commissioned as part 
of the European Union’s Copernicus programme (Institute for Advanced Studies 
2003).10 This involved surveys in eight of the fifteen newly independent states - 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.  
Here we present the data on smoking prevalence. We aim to assess age and gender 
specific prevalence for each of the eight countries surveyed. Given the negative health 
impact of starting early we examine the age of first smoking. The number of cigarettes 
smoked per day and time to first cigarette are measured as indicators of dependence and 
used to assess the proportion of smokers with moderate to severe nicotine dependency, 
an indication of their ability to quit.  
In total, 18,428 individuals were surveyed. Response rates varied between 71% 
and 88% among countries (calculated on the basis of the total number of households for 
which an eligible person could be identified). Item non-response rates were generally 
very low, for example 0.03% for current smoking, 0.05% for frequency of alcohol 
consumption, 0.5% for education level and 0.1% for self-perceived health. 
Rates of male smoking are high. In many of the countries surveyed almost 80% 
of men have ever smoked, the average for the eight countries surveyed reaching 68.9% 
(see Figure 1). The prevalence of current smoking is lowest in Moldova (43.3%) and 
Kyrgyzstan (51.0%) and highest in Kazakhstan (65.3%), Armenia (61.8%) and Russia 
(60.4%). Current smoking rates in Russia could not be distinguished from those in 
Kazakhstan, Armenia or Belarus but were significantly higher than in Moldova, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia (p<0.01, data not shown). 
Rates in women are far lower (p-value for gender comparisons <0.001 in all 
countries) and somewhat more variable, ranging from 2.4% to 15.5% with the lowest 
rates seen in Armenia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan and the highest in Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine. Logistic regression analysis showed that current smoking among women in 
Russia was significantly more prevalent than in all other countries (p<0.01) although 
adjusting for age removed the difference between Russia and Belarus (data not shown). 
 
                                                 
10 The LLH Project is funded by the European Community under the FP5 horizontal programme 
“Confirming the International Role of Community Research” (INCO2-Copernicus; Contract 
No: ICA2-2000-10031, Project No: ICA2-1999-10074). However, the European Community 
cannot accept any responsibility for any information provided or views expressed. 
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Figure 1.  Levels of current and ever smoking by gender 
 
The relationship between smoking and age varies by gender. In men, with the 
exception of Moldova, current smoking prevalence varies little between the ages of 18 
and 59 but then declines more markedly in the over 60s (see Figure 2a). The decline in 
current smoking with increasing age is accounted for by an increase in the proportion of 
ex- and never-smokers, which could be due to differential survival. In women, the 
overall trend is for both current and ex- smoking to decrease with increasing age with 
very low smoking rates observed in the oldest age group (ever smoking rates vary 
between 0.8% to 3.9%). However, closer inspection suggests that the countries can be 
divided into two groups. In the first (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan), rates of 
current and ever smoking imply that initiation of smoking has increased rapidly between 
generations and especially in the youngest age group (see Figure 2b). In the second 
group (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova) the trends with age are less clear 
cut and do not reach significance (except when comparing the oldest and youngest age 
groups in Moldova). 
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Figure 2a.  Current male smoking prevalence by age group 
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Figure 2b.  Current female smoking prevalence by age group 
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Discussion 
These surveys of over 18,000 individuals provide important new data on the 
prevalence of smoking in eight countries that represent more than four-fifths of the 
population of the former Soviet Union. For some of these countries they provide the 
first accurate, country-wide data on smoking prevalence and for the other countries, 
update previous surveys. Importantly they provide some of the first truly comparative 
data for countries of the FSU other than the Baltic states (Puska et al. 2003).  Response 
rates were relatively high and the samples were broadly representative of their study 
populations, indicating the generalizability of the findings. 
The study confirms that male smoking rates in this region are among the highest 
in the world with rates over 50% seen in all countries surveyed except Moldova and 
reaching 60% or more in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Russia.  Elsewhere in Europe rates 
over 50% are only seen in Turkey (51%) and Slovakia (56%) and worldwide less than 
20 countries are reported as having rates over 60% (Corrao et al. 2000).  In men the 
lower prevalence of current smokers and higher prevalence of never and ex-smokers in 
those over 60 is likely to reflect the disproportionate number of premature deaths among 
current smokers compared with never and ex-smokers, although there is also known to 
be a cohort effect in the FSU with those who were teenagers between 1945 and 1953 
carrying forward a lower rate of smoking as cigarettes, like other consumer goods, were 
in short supply in the period of post-war austerity under Stalin (Shkolnikov et al. 1999), 
with long-lasting consequences for mortality (Ezzati and Lopez 2003). 
Compared with male smoking patterns, smoking in women is far less common, 
varies more between countries and has a different age-specific pattern. Although ever 
smoking rates are under 4% in the over 60s in all eight countries, in the four countries 
with the highest female smoking rates (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine), 
smoking is now significantly more common in the younger generations with risk ratios 
between the youngest and oldest age-groups of 12.2 to 37.3 compared with 1 to 5.5 in 
the other four countries. 
Data for Russia as whole suggest that prevalence in men has risen from 
approximately 40% to 50% in the 1970s and 1980s to around 60% in the 1990s with 
little change since, whilst in women rates have risen from around 10% in the early 
1990s to 15% now. Pre-transition data on women are confined to Moscow or other areas 
and whilst not directly comparable suggest that rates have been rising since the 1970s 
but most notably through the 1990s (Molarius et al 2001).  Similarly in Ukraine 
historical data for Kiev show a steady rise in smoking among women from the mid 
1970s to 1990s while male smoking rates barely changed, hovering around 50%. More 
recent national data suggest male smoking then rose slightly to reach approximately 
57% by the turn of the century (Alcohol and Drug Information Center Ukraine 2002), 
suggesting that our rate of 52.5% could represent a downturn although further data will 
be needed to confirm this. In women, the only nationally comparative data is our 
previous survey which found a rate of 10% in 2000. Although other surveys found rates 
of 14% in 2000 and 2001, the difference is likely to be accounted for by their slightly 
younger age sample. 
Between gender and inter-country differences in smoking prevalence are 
reflected in other smoking habits.  Men are more likely than women to start smoking 
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when young, smoke more heavily and be nicotine dependent.  Two groupings of 
countries appear to emerge from the between country comparisons - Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine on one hand and Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Moldova on the other. In addition to having higher female smoking rates and more 
pronounced age specific trends, the former group tend to have lower ages of smoking 
uptake (particularly when compared with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova) and more 
marked gender differences in the number of cigarettes smoked per day and levels of 
nicotine dependency.  
The between country differences observed in this study suggest that smoking 
patterns in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan are more traditional than those 
in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. This could be explained by the differing 
penetration of the transnational tobacco industry in these countries (Alcohol and Drug 
Information Center Ukraine 2002).  The Moldovan industry remains a state owned 
monopoly and although the Georgian and Armenian industries were privatised, this 
occurred late (post 1997) and none of the major TTCs invested directly. Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine by contrast saw major investments from most of the major tobacco 
companies in the early 1990s onwards. Belarus which remains a state owned monopoly 
and Kyrgyzstan, where the German manufacturer Reemtsma invested would therefore 
appear to be exceptions. In Belarus however, the state manufacturer has only a 40% 
market share, with the rest made up largely of illegal imports. The importance the TTCs 
attach to this illegal market is illustrated in the fact that, despite having little official 
market share, British American Tobacco (BAT) and Philip Morris have the highest 
outdoor advertising expenditure and the ninth and tenth highest television advertising 
expenditures of all companies in Belarus. As in Ukraine and Russia, tobacco is the 
product most heavily advertised outdoors and in Belarus the fourth most advertised 
product on television (there are now restrictions on television advertising in Ukraine and 
Russia).  It is clear therefore that with continuing (if so far fruitless) discussion of a 
possible reunification with Russia, the TTCs treat Belarus as an important extension of 
the Russian market.  In addition Kyrgyzstan also differs from the other countries with 
TTC investments in a number of respects – the investment came later (1998) and gave 
Reemtsma a manufacturing monopoly. However, Kyrgyzstan also differs from Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia in a number of other respects – its lower level of 
development and industrialisation and its larger rural and Muslim populations. Further 
work is therefore needed to explore potential explanations for these between country 
differences. But whatever reasons emerge, the rising rates of female smoking and lower 
age of uptake with its implications for higher levels of dependency are cause for 
concern in all these countries.  
Meanwhile the survey findings, combined with data on disease burden, confirm 
that smoking in men is well established while it is a relatively new phenomenon in 
women. The long-standing high smoking rates in men continue unabated. Amongst 
women, smoking in Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Moldova remains relatively 
uncommon and does not appear to have increased significantly as judged by rates in 
younger compared with older generations or by comparisons with previous data. By 
contrast female smoking in Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia are higher, have 
increased from previous surveys and the age specific rates suggest an ongoing rise in 
younger generations.  It is unlikely to be a coincidence that the higher rates are observed 
in countries with the most active TTC presence. Concerted and urgent efforts to 
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improve tobacco control must be made throughout the FSU to curtail current smoking 
patterns and prevent the rise in female smoking where it has not already been seen.  
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Crime and Violence In Russia: 
Facts and Lessons from Data Analysis 
Yuri Andrienko 
Center for Economic and Finanical Research (CEFIR), Moscow 
 
Crime across the world  
 Crime is a generalized phenomenon.  Newman (1999) estimates that over a five-
year period, two out of every three big-city residents in the world will be victimized by 
crime at least once.  Most registered crimes are crimes against property; violent crimes 
constitute only 10-15 percent of the total.  In fact, since crimes against property are 
much more often unreported than crimes of violence, violent crime is even less of the 
total.  Registered crime rates are in general higher in industrialized countries, especially 
in the largest cities, than in developing ones. Nevertheless, alternative data sources 
(victim surveys) show that low- and middle-income countries have quite similar crime 
rates for many ordinary types of crime. 
Russia as compared to other countries 
Is crime in Russia worse than would be expected based on global comparisons?  
The answer is ambiguous.  Russia has one of the highest homicide mortality rates in the 
world according to the WHO (see Table 1). Among 74 countries, the Russian homicide 
rate is the forth highest after Columbia, El Salvador, and Brazil. 
Despite the high rate of homicide mortality, Russia is not among the world 
leaders in the total crime rate. This can be shown using officially registered crime rates 
across countries (see Figure 1). 
Registered crime rates are notoriously inaccurate.  Russian surveys of victims 
show that most property related crimes, about three out of four (compared to half in 
Western Europe), are not reported to police.  Most of these crimes are registered when 
the perpetrator (or a suspect) is apprehended.  However, more accurate criminal 
victimization surveys also present a picture of Russia situated somewhere in the middle 
ranks of the global crime league table (see Table 2).  The rate of violent crime (assault, 
threat, rape) in Moscow as well as the rate of property crime (theft, robbery, burglary) is 
very similar to the rates in other transition countries and even in western European 
countries, although much lower than in Latin American countries.  Russian surveys held 
in two large cities and a medium-size town also reveal crime victimization rates that are 
not especially elevated (see Table 3). While the robbery rate and the total crime rate 
(crime against both persons and property) in these cities are somewhat lower than in 
Moscow or similar, the assault rates are considerably higher. In part this may be the 
legacy of the Soviet period when criminals were expelled from the largest cities and 
therefore, crime rates were higher in the secondary cities of the Soviet Union than in the 
major urban centers (Shelley, 1980). 
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Table 1. Homicide mortality rate (per 100,000 population) 
 Country Year Rate 
1 Colombia 1995 62 
2 El Salvador 1993 56 
3 Brazil 1995 23 
4 Russia 1998 22 
5 Albania 1998 21 
…      
  Lithuania 1999 8 
  USA 1998 7 
  Finland 1998 2 
  Germany 1999 1 
Source: WHO World Report on Violence and Health, 2002. 
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Source: The Sixth UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems , WDI (2001).  
Figure 1:  Total recorded crime rate, 1994 (per 100 population).  Source: Data from the 
Sixth UN Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, 
presented in World Development Indicators 2001. 
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Table 2.  Share of population victimized by crime, percent. 
 Country/city Total crime Robbery Assault 
1 Buenos Aires (Argentina) 61 6 2 
2 Bogotá (Columbia) 55 12 3 
3 Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) 44 12 3 
…      
  Johannesburg (South Africa) 38 5 5 
  Budapest (Hungary) 32 2 1 
  Moscow (Russia) 26 2 1 
  Sweden 25 1 1 
  USA 21 1 1 
  Austria 19 0 1 
  Baku (Azerbaijan) 8 2 0 
Source: Data from International Criminal Victimization Surveys presented in Human 
Development Report 2002. 
 
Table 3.  Share of population victimized by crime, percent. 
Total crime Robbery Assault 
S. Petersburg 26 2.0 3.0 
Volgograd 18 2.5 2.6 
Borovichi (Novgorod region) 21 1.0 3.0 
Source: Civil Control 2001. 
The criminal justice system 
 Russia is heavily policed and judged.  Unofficial data indicate that the number of 
police per capita is higher than in other industrialized countries; moreover, international 
data for 88 countries show that number of judges is the highest (UN 6th and 7th Surveys 
of Crime Trends Operation of Criminal Justice Systems, available online at 
www.un.org).  Russian police still claim the artificially high clearance rate (75%) 
familiar from Soviet times. This arises because, as mentioned above, many crimes are 
registered only when a suspect or the perpetrator has been identified.   
About 60 million persons have been sentenced by the Russian criminal justice 
system over the last 30 years.  Even allowing for repeat offenders, this is a remarkably 
high rate of judicial intervention.  More than a third of 30-year males have criminal 
records, a figure similar to black population in USA.  The prison population rate in 
Russia, 0.6% of population, is, along with the US rate, the highest in the world. There 
are other similarities between the two countries, as well. Both have a very severe penal 
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code and punish convicted offenders with lengthy sentences. In both countries 
recidivism of released prisoners is high and often offenders are sent back to prison for a 
crime more serious than the one responsible for their last spell in prison.  In both 
countries the incarcerated population disproportionately represents the lowest strata of 
society. 
Temporal and spatial trends 
In line with the general world-wide trend, the Russian crime rate has gradually 
increased since the 1960s.  However, there was a spectacular rise during the economic 
crisis accompanying the transition (Pridemore, 2001). The homicide rate increased three 
times, with especially high jumps (1989, 1992, and 1999) corresponding to years when 
especially significant political and economic changes took place (see Figure 2).    
Homicide and homicide attempts and the homicide mortality rate all declined during the 
Gorbachev anti-alcohol campaign.  Figure 2 illustrates how closely homicide dynamics 
parallel alcohol abuse as indexed by alcohol poisoning mortality. 
The geographical distribution of violence in Russia shows stable pattern – 
homicide rates increase from south to north and from west to east with maximum values 
in the coldest areas. The gradient of violence coincides with the gradient of winter frost, 
with a correlation between the homicide rate and winter temperature of -0.5. The 
presence of criminals released from labor camps (prisons) in the coldest regions may 
account for some of this.  However, the high rates of alcohol abuse and social exclusion 
in the coldest regions, isolation and the stresses of life, in these difficult regions appear 
to combine to raise the homicide rate.  
Homicide and mortality from homicide in Russia, 
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Figure 2: Homicides and homicide attempts, homicide mortality, and alcohol poisoning 
mortality (per 100,000 population). Source:  Homicides and homicide attempts: 
Ministry of Interior; Homicide and alcohol poisoning mortality:  Goskomstat; data from 
Luneev 1999. 
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Figure 3:  Homicide rate (per 100,000 population, by region, 2000). 
Victims and offenders 
The age pattern of homicide victims (and offenders) in Russia is quite different 
from that is observed in Western European and most other industrialized countries, with 
the most vulnerable age group not 15 to 30 but 30 to 45.  This pattern is, however, 
observed in a number of other transition economies.  
 
Table 4. Homicide mortality rate by age, per 100,000 population 
  15-29 30-44 45-59 
Brazil, males 81 62 39 
Brazil, females 7 6 3 
Russia, males 38 62 50 
Russia, females 11 14 14 
USA, males 24 12 7 
USA, females 5 4 2 
Germany, males 1 1 1 
Germany, females 1 1 1 
Source: WHO World report on violence and health, 2002. 
 
In 1995 30 percent of assault and homicide victims were relatives, acquaintances 
and neighbors of the perpetrator. About half of violent offenders did not have a 
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permanent source of income and more than third part had not been working in more 
than three years. More than half had a mental anomaly. About half of all violent crimes 
were impulsive, i.e. not premeditated. However, during the 1990s the share of 
premeditated homicides in total homicides rose (Dolgova 2001).  In almost half of 
premeditated homicides, financial gain is either the main or one of the motives (Luneev 
1997). Contract killing, mostly concentrated in largest cities, industrial centers and 
ports, is a new phenomenon.  However, organized group and contract killings constitute 
a small proportion of all homicides in spite the impression left by crime reporting in the 
mass media. 
As suggested by Figure 2 above, there is very close relation between alcohol and 
violence. About 80 percent of detected murderers and 60 percent of homicide victims 
consumed alcohol immediately before the crime. (Nemtsov 2003).  Drug use, by 
contrast, seems to be an insignificant correlate of homicide, with the share of homicides 
committed by drug users only 2 percent in the mid-1990s (Dolgova, 2001).  While most 
Russian homicides are still committed with knives and axes (as in Soviet times), guns 
are increasingly involved. 
Statistical analysis of Russian and international criminal statistics 
In this section, a number of econometric results (collected together in Andrienko 
2003) are summarized. 
USSR aggregate data analysis  
Regression in first differences (to eliminate non-stationarity) on annual data 
reveals strong linear relationships between the homicide rate and (i) life expectancy and 
(ii) alcohol consumption: 
)2.0()3.0(
75.0,3.00.3 2 =+∆×−=∆ RExpectancyLifeHomicide
   
and 
)2.0()005.0(
75.0,4.005.0 2 =+∆×=∆ RpoisoningAlcoholHomicide
 
(number of observations is 33, standard errors are reported in parenthesis).   When 
general living conditions, as indexed by life expectancy, worsen, the homicide death 
rate increases.   Similarly when alcohol abuse, as indexed by the alcohol poisoning 
mortality rate, increases, homicide increases. 
Multivariate time series analysis suggests that the homicide rate is higher when 
(i) criminal convictions decline, (ii) alcohol consumption grows, (iii) more prison 
inmates are released, and (iv) income increases.  These results are summarized in Table 
5.  They are affected by possible endogeneity of regressors, and therefore should be 
interpreted with caution. 
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Table 5. Homicide time-series analysis 
  Homicide rate Homicide mortality 
Homicide t-1 0.34*** 0.47*** 
Conviction (no imprisonment) t-2 -0.017*** -0.28*** 
Conviction (no imprisonment) t-3 0.009*** 0.28*** 
Conviction (imprisonment) t   -0.15** 
Conviction (imprisonment) t-1 -0.007***   
Release t-1 0.004*** 0.12*** 
National income t 2.30*** 28.5** 
Alcohol poisoning mortality t 0.006** 0.20*** 
Const -0.68*** -8.41** 
No. obs 24 23 
R2 adj 0.92 0.87 
** 5 percent level of confidence, *** 1 percent. 
t means current year, t-1 last year. 
 
International aggregate data analysis 
Using a pooled sample of 52 countries and 275 observations during the 1990s, 
the change in the homicide rate is found to be negatively correlated with life expectancy 
with a coefficient of -1; meaning 1 additional year in average life leads to 1 less 
homicide per 100,000 population. The implied elasticity is a whopping -7.  In addition, 
change in average income, measured by GDP per capita (PPP adjusted in constant 
dollars), also has a significantly negative coefficient. 
)16()1.1()2.0(
36.0,92)(1.20.1 2 =+∆×−∆×−=∆ RGDPLogExpectancyLifeHomicide
 
The last equation has been estimated with country specific effects, thus controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity across the countries. Again, standard errors are reported in 
parenthesis.  Note, that alcohol consumption in this model was not found to have a 
statistically significant coefficient and was therefore excluded from the model. 
Russian regional data analysis. 
Finally, multivariate regression analysis of panel data corresponding to 77 
Russian regions during period 1992-2000 indicates (see Table 6) that the homicide rate 
is higher when: 
• last year’s  homicide rate was higher (i.e., there is time persistence),  
• the clearance rate (share of solved homicides) is lower,  
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• life expectancy is lower,  
• socio-political conflict is higher,  
• alcohol consumption is higher,  
• real income is lower, and  
• the unemployment rate is lower.   
The latter is a perverse result; the other coefficients are in accordance with theory and 
common sense. 
 
Table 6. Homicide mortality regression 
Homicide, lag 0.21*** 
Clearance rate -0.14*** 
Life expectancy -1.66*** 
Socio-political conflict 0.11** 
Alcohol poisoning 0.03* 
Real income -0.43** 
Unemployment -0.29*** 
Const 0.29*** 
No. obs. 606 (77 regions) 
 
Other results (Andrienko and Shelley 2004) suggest that  
• when conflict in Chechnya is higher, homicide rate is higher, especially in close 
regions (conflict spillover effect), 
• regions with on average better educated people have less violence, 
• better climate (higher temperature) “causes” less homicides, 
• the higher is ethnic polarization, the more homicides are, 
• when there are more drug users, then homicide rate is higher, 
• the higher income growth, the less violence, 
• income disparity leads to more crime and violence but this result is not very 
significant. 
Concluding remarks 
Crime and violence are topics deserving attention in current Russia, although 
their scale is exaggerated in popular opinion. International comparisons show that crime 
rates, including violent crime rates as indexed by homicide mortality, while high, are 
not out of line with international experience.  However, the nature of violence in Russia 
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is different; it is generated within household and neighborhood, typically in deprived or 
isolated regions of the country (rather than the urban core) and very often in a context of 
alcohol abuse.   
Concerning different unfavorable and negative socio-economic and 
demographic processes the Russian Federation faces during transition period and even 
before that under command political regime we may argue that general quality of life 
has important impact.  
Possible general conclusion which can be done from this and similar work is that 
crime, violence, and alcohol abuse are basically results of poor life and in part adverse 
initial conditions for life (such as geographical position and climate).  Even more than 
in other settings, crime in Russia appears to be tied to social exclusion and the common 
response to it, i.e. alcohol abuse. 
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Homelessness 
Svetlana Stephenson 
London Metropolitan University 
Homelessness in the 1990s  
With the start of economic reforms, the figure of the bomzh - a homeless person 
in dirty clothes and with unkempt looks, begging near metro stations, at churches, or 
lying on benches in parks or train stations - has become omnipresent in Russian cities 
and towns. The bomzh as a social type has become the predominant representative of 
the homeless population, with vagrants disappearing from social categorisations and 
from popular mythology, and “non-street” homeless people (those who stay with 
friends, relatives or in rented accommodation) remaining almost completely invisible.  
The labor market, which both produced and sustained mobile homeless migrants 
in the Soviet period no longer exists. Great communist construction sites are closed.  
Shabashnichestvo, which played an important role in compensating for the 
inefficiencies of the Soviet planned economy, is not needed under market conditions. 
Unemployment in the rural areas, and migration to Russia of qualified people from the 
ex-Soviet republics, many of whom live in compact settlements in rural Russia, mean 
that homeless workers cannot easily find jobs outside cities. In interviews homeless 
people described the new conditions of employment in rural areas in the following way. 
Employers come to the train stations, choose the homeless people whom they consider 
fit for work, take them to their farms and give work for several days. For this they 
provide food and shelter, and - rarely - small wages. Migration in search of seasonal 
work is becoming a thing of the past. In some of the regions of Russia (e.g. the North 
Caucasus, Kalmyk republic and Siberia) the search for work in distant villages is 
becoming quite dangerous. There have been many reports of people being put into 
guarded camps and used as slaves. In the south of Russia (for example in the Rostov 
and Krasnodar regions) the homeless are harassed by Cossacks, who try to evict them 
from the territories under their control. 
With the itinerant way of life hardly possible, and with jobs in the formal 
economy either lacking or inaccessible because of institutional discrimination (which 
will be discussed below), people try to make a living in the urban informal economy. 
Some find new opportunities in this economy, and some are left to fight for physical 
survival. 
The Russian Statistical Agency estimates the size of the informal economy at 
25% of total GDP. This figure, however, does not include such shadow activities as 
illicit street-level economic activities (e.g. begging, busking, window-cleaning), nor 
does it include more openly proscribed occupations such as the drugs trade or 
prostitution, which have also become an important part of the informal economy. Many 
employees, particularly in construction and the service sector, have adopted the practice 
of employing adults without official contracts. This is particularly widespread in the 
service sector, where employees are often paid cash at the end of the working day. A 
recent OECD report says that workers in the unregulated labor market tend to be 
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younger, new entrants, migrants and, to a lesser extent, workers released from large-
scale state enterprises. Relatively high labor turnover and a high risk of unemployment 
are common in this sector (OECD, 2001, 67-68). Research shows that among 
individuals who try to find a living at the lowest end of this market and who are 
particularly prone to homelessness are people with very low financial resources and low 
qualifications, who have lost support from relatives and friends, alcoholics, ex-prisoners 
or orphans from children’s homes (Afanasiev et al., 1995, Stephenson, 1997).  
Although underemployment rather than open unemployment has been a 
particular feature of the Russian transition (OECD, 2001), some categories of workers 
were disproportionately affected by unemployment. Market reforms have produced a 
sharp differentiation between the positions of skilled and low-skilled workers at 
enterprises, with welfare provisions, which used to support the low skilled, cut or 
abolished (Kozina and Borisov, 1996, Zaslavskii, 2001). Soviet enterprises had many 
so-called 'reserve' workers on their staff, who had few, if any, qualifications, and who 
were used in auxiliary work as manual labor. As Kozina  and Borisov point out, “In the 
past this category of workers caused the most trouble through high labor turnover, 
drunkenness, theft and so on. However, this surplus was deliberately used by the 
enterprise management in many ways. For example it could be used as a means of social 
control over other workers: instead of dismissing workers, they could be transferred to 
less skilled, and thus less well paid, work on a temporary or permanent basis. Under the 
new conditions the enterprise obviously first rid itself of this group of workers, and 
following the first wave of redundancies the category of reserve workers had almost 
disappeared" (Kozina and Borisov, 1996, 147). Being made unemployed and no longer 
“fixed” to the enterprise-based social system, these ex-workers became vulnerable to 
homelessness, particularly if they attempt migration to another town or region.   
Among the factors leading to homelessness is displacement linked with the 
closing down of workers’ hostels; elimination or reduction of other institutional 
housing: mental hospitals, state orphanages, reformatories for alcoholics. The high cost 
of renting in the private sector in relation to wages is also responsible for homelessness, 
particularly in the case of divorced men, who may not be able to afford to rent housing 
after a family break-up. Loss of housing in property frauds has been another factor, 
particularly in 1991-1997, with many of the victims being elderly people or alcoholics. 
Release from penitentiaries continues to be among the major factors leading to 
homelessness (although there are no more criminal sanctions for “vagrancy and 
parasitic way of life”). This is a result of the very high rate of incarceration in Russia 
(Russia had 970,000 people in detention facilities at the end of 2001). Often ex-
prisoners lose their housing while in detention or are unable to get registered at their 
previous residence. The latter can be the result of a variety of circumstances such as 
administrative obstacles or unwillingness of their relatives and (former) spouses to 
register them etc. Some do not get an internal passport on release, which makes it even 
more difficult to find housing and jobs. The share of ex-prisoners in the homeless 
population remains high, fluctuating with mass amnesties. From 1995 to 1999 from 20-
30% of homeless people who were clients of Medecins sans Frontiers (MSF) in 
Moscow were ex-prisoners. In 2000, when there was a Russia-wide amnesty, the share 
of ex-prisoners among the Moscow homeless increased to 30% (see Table 1). In 
St.Petersburg, 50% of people who came to Nochlezhka (a non-governmental 
organization that supports homeless people) in 2001 were ex-prisoners. (Na dne, 2002). 
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Street homeless children are another significant group among those who have no 
secure access to housing and have to engage in survival strategies in the informal and 
shadow markets. The phenomenon of street children did not exist in the Soviet Union 
on a mass scale, with the exception of the periods following the revolution, the civil war 
and the Second World War. Any runaway children were quickly picked up by the 
militia and returned to their families or placed in residential care.  Recent research has 
shown that street children come predominantly from families who have lost stable 
employment and have experienced a deterioration of living standards and an increase in 
social isolation. A high proportion come from single-parent and reconstituted families 
(Stephenson, 2001, ILO\IPEC, 2000, 2001a, 2001b). Among the individuals and 
families most affected are low-skilled manual workers, or people with prior problems 
with the law and/or alcohol or drug addiction. There is a high incidence of family 
violence, neglect and abuse in the families of such children. The majority of the street 
children are not homeless, and spend at least some nights in a week at home. But there 
are also children who either live permanently on the streets or have a limited and risky 
access to housing. Some of them are runaways, others have homeless parent or parents. 
Among the homeless, these children are often called, and call themselves,  "small 
bomzhis", as opposed to "big (adult) bomzhis". They identify with the stigmatized social 
group of adults and share their fate. The 1920s term “besprizorniki", which refers to 
homeless children as a special social group, was not used at all by old or young 
homeless people in my interviews. 
When the children run away from home, or start their homeless existence 
together with the homeless parents, the majority of them experience the street as a very 
dangerous place. In our survey of 123 street children in Moscow, conducted in 1998-
2000, 73% of the respondents reported having been afraid of being on the street. Fear of 
violence is the most frequent of fears, and there are particular groups of people who 
children deal with in the streets – militia officers, adult homeless people, drunks, drug 
addicts – who children named specifically in answering the open-ended question about 
their fears.  
 Fears do not necessarily translate into particular experiences, although 20% of 
our respondents reported violence and  23.8 % mentioned negative experience with 
militia as the main problems of life on the streets. It is worth noting, that among these 
fears and experienced problems the issues of getting enough food, finding a place to 
sleep or satisfying the needs in communication or fun do not come out as the most 
urgent (although practical problems with washing or clothes seem to be, in the current 
Moscow context of the absence of facilities, quite difficult for the children to resolve). 
Street life involves dangerous and illicit practices. The majority of children 
reported that during their life in the streets they were involved in stealing and/or 
begging. 70.1% consumed alcohol. 87.3% smoked, 39.7% sniffed glue, and 26.3% 
consumed drugs. 49.6% had experienced sexual relations, which began either before, or 
during the street life.  
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Table 1.  The social-demographic composition of MSF clients (in per cent)  
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
       
Reasons for homelessness       
Ex-prisoner 25 25 26 22 19 30 
Loss of  housing 21 20 19 19 22 25 
Family problems 15 16 15 16 13 14 
Loss of a job  16 19 16 24 11 14 
Personal choice 3 6 6 5 7 4 
Refugee (forced migrant) 5 3 3 3 2 1 
Psychological problems 1 0 0 1 1 2 
Other  12 9 11 3 6 5 
Not homeless 2 2 3 7 18 0 
       
Gender       
Men 86 86 83 85 85 86 
Women 14 14 17 15 15 14 
       
Education       
Primary 5 4 2 2 2 2 
Incomplete secondary 5 23 18 17 14 13 
Secondary 62 43 49 53 52 56 
Vocational 19 21 21 18 2 20 
Higher 8 9 9 9 9 8 
No education 0 0 1 0 1 1 
       
Previous occupation       
Worker 79 78 78 85 78 72 
Employee 9 14 14 11 13 16 
Agricultural worker 2 3 2 2 2 2 
Military serviceman 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Others 6 4 3 1 5 8 
Does not know 2 0 2 0 1 2 
       
Age       
15-24 years 8 9 8 7 7 4 
25-34 23 24 22 22 19 17 
34-54 35 33 34 35 33 30 
45-54 22 22 24 24 3 34 
55-64 10 9 9 10 9 13 
>65 years 2 2 2 2 2 2 
       
Length of homelessness       
Less than 1 month 5 18 26 31 9 5 
1-6 months 42 50 24 18 14 12 
7-12 months 13 7 10 9 9 8 
1-5 years 30 20 30 27 36 42 
6-10 years 5 3 5 6 11 21 
11-20 years 2 1 1 2 2 5 
More than 20 years 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Not homeless 2 2 3 8 18 5 
       
Source of income       
Begging 48 54 53 52 46 41 
Temporary work 39 40 40 42 41 46 
Pension 3 3 4 3 3 3 
Permanent job 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Other 8 2 2 1 9 8 
Source:  Adapted from Gutov and Nikiforov, 2002. 
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The share of homeless children drawn into professional prostitution or having to 
sell sex from time to time seems to be quite substantial, although we cannot give any 
reliable statistic estimates. In our sample 7 out of 35 girls interviewed admitted being 
involved in prostitution during their life in the streets. According to many accounts, 
boys are also involved in prostitution, but only one of our male respondents admitted 
this. 
Social and demographic characteristics of homeless people in Moscow 
and St. Petersburg 
To this day there is no reliable information on the numbers of homeless people 
in Russia and their social and demographic characteristics, and published research on 
the causes of homelessness and profiles of homeless people is scarce. It is hardly 
possible to define and count homeless people as a group. There are so many gradations 
and degrees of homelessness (from living in insecure accommodation, staying with 
relatives and friends to being on the streets), that it is practically impossible to draw any 
border around them. 
At the same time there are pragmatic reasons for making some approximation of 
the numbers of homeless people and getting a feel for the dynamics of homelessness, if 
only to be able to influence policy-makers. The first opportunity to get data on the 
numbers and composition of homeless people across Russia (which could then form the 
basis for later comparisons if the same survey methodology is used) will be provided by 
the all-Russian population census conducted in October 2002. In the absence of this data 
(which is yet to be released), charities, which keep a database of their clients or conduct 
ad-hoc interviews, remain the main source of quantitative information. According to the 
MSF, there are currently over 100,000 homeless persons living in Moscow and 50,000 
in St. Petersburg. These estimates relate to homeless people defined very broadly, as 
individuals who have no registration at their place of residence. Street homelessness is 
estimated as being around 8,000 people in St.Petersburg (Nochlezhka) and 15,000 in 
Moscow (MSF). While there is no reliable data on the trends in the numbers of 
homeless people, the numbers of people detained in militia reception centres, according 
to the Ministry of Interior (MVD), have remained more or less the same over the last 
several years, with a peak being achieved in 1993-1997.  
MSF and Nochlezhka datasets are barely comparable, as these organizations 
have different clients. MSF’s clients are predominantly street homeless people in 
Moscow, while Nochlezhka works with a wider range of people without residency 
rights in St.Petersburg. MSF’s main function is to provide medical help to homeless 
people, and its clients are those homeless people who have no access to free medical 
services and cannot afford to pay for them. Thus the MSF’s database contains 
information on the most deprived homeless people, possibly skewed towards older ages. 
Nochlezhka registers people who have no official residency rights in St.Petersburg. Its 
client base is therefore much broader than that of the MSF, and includes people who 
stay with friends and relatives, rent housing and have jobs. These datasets have some 
serious shortcomings, including a lack of longitudinal information on homeless 
individuals, a possibility of duplication of individual registrations - when one person 
can be registered each time they come to the organization – and very broad 
categorisations of the causes for homelessness used in the questionnaires. But it is clear 
from these two datasets that there are important characteristics of homeless people in 
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Moscow and St.Petersburg that make them very different from such populations in 
Western Europe, which tend to be younger, with higher levels of illiteracy or broken 
education, lower skill levels, and with a rising proportion of illegal migrants and 
refugees (Council of Europe, 1993, Avramov, 1999, Engbersen et al, 1999, Oude 
Engberink, 2000).  Apart from the fact that most homeless people in St.Petersburg and 
Moscow are Russian citizens, their levels of education and skills are relatively high 
(although less than those of the general population), and they tend to be older 
(excluding the population of street children, who are not catered for by the MSF and 
Nochlezhka).  
Economic migration is among the most frequent causes of homelessness in 
Moscow. In 2001 of all the people who came to the Moscow office of the MSF for 
medical and other help, 47% had migrated to the capital from other Russian regions, 
17% were from Moscow, 20% were from Moscow region, and 16% arrived from other 
CIS states (mainly Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan). The majority of them 
were Russian citizens. In St.Petersburg, and, judging from episodic and occasional 
research, in other towns of Russia where migration is not so high, homeless people are 
predominantly local residents. According to the data from St. Petersburg’s Nochlezhka, 
among its clients, 83% have lived in the city for more than 10 years, and 63% were born 
in the city. 95% are ethnic Russians (Karlinskii, 2002). 
Most homeless people have completed secondary education. 12% of 
Nochlezhka’s clients in 2001 had completed, or partially completed, higher education 
and, according to MSF data, in 2001 7% of homeless persons had a university 
education. The gender composition of homeless people in Russia is not much different 
from other countries – men predominate.  Homeless women may be more invisible, as 
women tend to be more immersed in social networks. In Moscow most homeless people 
registered by the MSF (about 85-90%) are men. This share has remained more or less 
stable throughout the 1990s. Yet in St.Petersburg there is evidence of a growing 
proportion of women (from 30% in 1999 to 42% in 2001) (Na dne, 2002).  Most of 
homeless people in St.Petersburg are single or divorced (Afanasiev et al, 1995). While 
there is no comparable quantitative data for Moscow, my interviews with homeless 
people and charity and militia workers in Moscow indicate that this is the case there as 
well.  
There are some indications that the economic upturn which Russia has 
experienced since rouble devaluation in 1998 was associated with a slowing down of 
the influx into homelessness. MSF data shows that the proportion of people who had 
been homeless for 6 months or less, which had been increasing gradually up to 1998, 
dropped in 1999-2000. Another important change, possibly also associated with a better 
economic situation, has been a decrease in the share of people who cite begging as their 
main source of income. While in 1998 begging was claimed as the main occupation by 
48-52% of MSF clients, by 2001 this figure had gone down to 22%, and at the same 
time the percentage of people who had casual jobs increased from 42% to 51%. The 
proportion of those who have permanent jobs or pensions has not changed much. In 
2001 2% had pensions and 1% - permanent jobs  (MSF-USA, 2002).  
At the same time there has been an increase in long-term homelessness. In 
Moscow the percentage of people who stay on the streets from one to five years 
increased from 30% in 1995 to 42% in 2000, and from six to ten years – from 5 to 21%. 
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There is growing proportion of older people in the homeless population. In 1995 35% of 
the homeless clients of the MSF were aged between 35 and 44, but by 2000 this number 
had decreased, and the age group 45-54 had expanded up to 34% (see Table 1).  
Although only very tentative conclusions can be drawn from these data, it seems 
that the homeless populations of Moscow and St.Petersburg do not significantly differ 
in their social origins from the “mainstream” populations, and do not form any kind of  
“hereditary” underclass. But their inclusion into society is extremely difficult, especially 
given a lack of state assistance and very limited opportunities to join the formal labor 
market. While no data exists on the scale of “graduation” of street homeless children 
into the adult homeless population, qualitative interviews with homeless adults, children 
and charity workers confirm that this process in under way.  
Health of the homeless population 
Health problems of homeless people are severe, and the spread of TB and STD 
among them is particularly worrying (Figure 1). The key issue remains proliferation of 
TB in the penitentiary system, where a significant proportion of homeless people come 
from, lack of access to health services. Health problems of homeless people in Moscow 
are aggravated by obstacles to getting hostel accommodation (if they are not ex-
Moscow residents.) Also, a lack of sheltered housing projects means that homeless 
people, who do not want to stay in hostels with their harsh regime and everyday risk of 
violence, are left to live on the streets. 
The health problems of street children are also acute. In our survey 42% of 
children reported problems with health. The most frequent complains were colds and 
respiratory infections, problems with digestive system and sexually transmitted 
diseases. According to the data of the reception centre for juvenile delinquents, about 
12% of the children who were brought there had to be sent to general hospitals, and 
about 8% to STD clinics.  
Street children have much better chances than adult homeless people to get into 
hospitals, although hospitals sometimes refuse to take them in. However, the key 
problem is what to do with a child after he or she is released from hospital, so that they 
do not end up back on the streets. Existing shelters are only allowed to keep a child for 
six months, and in this period documents are prepared to send him or her to a children’s 
home. Non-resident homeless children, picked up on the street, are deported to their 
families, which often means that they run away again. 
No data is currently available on the mental health of street and homeless 
children and how this differs from the mental health of the mainstream children’s 
population.  International research shows that street youth tend to have a high incidence 
of mental illness (Craig et al., 1996). Mental health problems may be a factor, which 
contributes to children running away, and special support services need to be developed 
for families where children run away repeatedly. Development of foster families 
systems which is underway in Moscow and in Samara region; establishment of special 
adoption centres (now existing in 15 Russian regions) need to be accompanied by 
programs  aimed at improving children’s mental health. Also, a special attention needs 
to be paid at the use of psychiatry in children’s homes.  In a December 1998 special 
report, “Abandoned to the State: Cruelty and Neglect in Russian Orphanages”, the 
human rights non-governmental organization (NGO) Human Rights Watch exposed the 
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severe lack of facilities for rehabilitation or socialisation of children in such institutions 
and large-scale practices of repressive psychiatry used by the staff (Human Rights 
Watch, 1998). More than 200,000 children run away each year from the state homes, 
from schools for delinquent children and homes for children with mental and nervous 
conditions (NAN, 1996).  
Staying in a night shelter, which is possible up to 30 days within one year, gives 
a person the right to a temporary registration and thus access to municipal polyclinics, 
pensions and other benefits. Yet the shelters, as well as centres of social adaptation 
(where they can stay up to six months) and cheap social hotels, are accessible strictly to 
homeless persons who come from Moscow and, since 2000, ex-inhabitants of the city. 
According to the MSF only about a third of the homeless people in Moscow meet these 
criteria. Access is also restricted by the requirement to pass medical check-ups and be 
disinfected. No “emergency” night shelters exist. A major new centre for medical and 
social assistance to the homeless is currently being constructed in Moscow near to the 
Kursk train station. Unlike other municipal services, it will be open to non-Muscovites 
as well as Muscovites.   These are specialist clinics for TB or venereal disease, which do 
not turn homeless people away as they attempt to prevent the spread of these diseases to 
“normal” people. 
 
Figure 1: Heath of the Moscow homeless 
 
Source: MSF 
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HIV/AIDS 
V. L. Fuller 
AIDS Foundation East-West (AFEW), Moscow 
Introduction 
UNAIDS Director Peter Piot stated, during the XIV International Conference on 
AIDS in Barcelona, Spain in 2002, that Russia is ‘experiencing the most rapidly 
growing epidemic in history and yet one of the most under-addressed in terms of 
response’.  This note describes the evolution of the epidemic, summarizes research 
regarding the main high-risk groups, and elicits policy-relevant conclusions. 
Since the first HIV/AIDS cases were reported in 1981, more than 20 million 
people have died as a result of AIDS.  Currently there are more than 42 million people 
living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) globally (UNAIDS/WHO 2002).  While Sub-Saharan 
Africa is undoubtedly the hardest hit in terms of sheer numbers and prevalence, 
whereby some countries such as Botswana are experiencing adult prevalence rates as 
high as 38.8%, emerging and explosively expanding epidemics have been documented 
in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, most notably in the Russian Federation (RF), 
Ukraine and some Central Asian Republics were 1.2 million cases have been reported 
(ibid.).  The RF, Ukraine and Estonia share the dubious distinction of experiencing the 
fast-growing epidemics both currently and historically. 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia have encountered HIV/AIDS relatively late 
compared with other regions (see Table 1).  According to UNAIDS, most regions 
experienced the beginnings of widespread infection as early as the late 1970s through 
the early 1980s.  The Eastern European and Central Asian epidemics, however, began in 
the early to mid-1990s with explosive growth rates beginning in the late 1990s to 
present.  The first registered cases appeared under the Soviet regime in the mid-1980s 
(see Table 2), but were largely considered anomalies, and thought to be problems of the 
‘decadent West’, whereby those at risk included ‘homosexuals, bisexuals, prostitutes, 
drug addicts, those who led “disorderly” sexual lives, and most importantly, black 
Africans’ (Powell 2000).  Prior to 1994, cases were concentrated among men who have 
sex with men (MSM) and foreign residents.  Current thinking still reflects Soviet 
policies whereby those who have resided abroad for a certain length of time, as well as 
foreign residents or visitors expecting to stay in the RF for more than three months are 
required to submit an HIV sero-negative certificate when applying for entry visas or 
upon entry at national borders. 
In 1986 the first case among a Soviet citizen was registered among an individual 
who contracted the virus in Africa, and then transmitted it to 15 soldiers through 
homosexual relations (Grisin and Wallaner 2002).  Further infections occurred 
periodically with small ‘outbreaks’ attributed to the use of contaminated equipment and 
the reuse of syringes and/or needles in hospital and clinical settings.  In the RF, 
HIV/AIDS cases are now registered in all 89 regions (see Table 3), with 10 regions 
reporting prevalence rates twice the national average of 170 cases per 100 000 
population.  At the time of writing (1 September 2003), officially registered cases have 
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reached 249 918, climbing from the 10 993 reported cases at the end of 1998 
(UNAIDS/WHO 2002).  The full extent of the epidemic in the RF and neighboring 
countries is not only unknown but recognized as under-estimated (Rhodes et al. 2002a).  
Given that the above figures represent officially reported cases only, many experts—
both Russian and international—estimate that the real numbers are much higher.  Most 
experts agree that there are at least 1 million PLWHA in the RF (Feschbach 2003, 
Transatlantic Partners Against AIDS 2003). 
 
TABLE 1: 
REGIONAL COMPARISON OF HIV/AIDS EPIDEMICS BY REGION 
31 DECEMBER 2002 
(adopted from UNAIDS/WHO11) 
Region 
Year of 
Start of 
Epidemic 
# Adults 
LWHA 
Adult 
Prevalence 
Rate 
% of Adult 
Women 
among 
LWHA 
Main Mode of 
Transmission 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
late 1970s / 
early 1980s 
29.4 million 8.8% 58% Heterosexual 
N Africa & 
Middle East 
late 1980s 550 000 0.3% 55% Heterosexual, 
IDU 
S & SE Asia late 1980s 6.0 million 0.6% 36% Heterosexual, 
IDU 
E Asia & 
Pacific 
late 1980s 1.2 million 0.1% 36% IDU, 
Heterosexual, 
MSM 
Latin 
America 
late 1970s / 
early 1980s 
1.5 million 0.6% 30% MSM, IDU, 
Heterosexual 
Caribbean late 1970s / 
early 1980s 
440 000 2.4% 50% Heterosexual, 
MSM 
E Europe & 
Central Asia 
early 1990s 1.2 million 0.6% 27% IDU 
W. Europe late 1970s / 
early 1980s 
570 000 0.3% 25% MSM, IDU 
N America late 1970s / 
early 1980s 
980 000 0.6% 20% MSM, IDU, 
Heterosexual 
Australia & 
New Zealand 
late 1970s / 
early 1980s 
15 000 0.1% 7% MSM 
Total  42 million 1.2% 50%  
 
 
                                                 
11 Ibid., UNAIDS/WHO, 2002.   
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TABLE 2: 
OFFICIALLY REGISTERED HIV CASES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
1 JANUARY 1987 THROUGH 1 SEPTEMBER 2003 
(based on data from the Russian Federal AIDS Centre) 
Year 
New 
Registered 
Cases 
Cumulative 
Registered 
Cases 
Number of 
deaths 
among 
PLWHA 
Number of 
PLWHA 
Prevalence per 
100 000 
Annual 
Incidence 
per 100 000
Prevalence 
Increase Index
Annual 
Incidence 
Increase Index
% of Total 
Infections 
1987 24 24  24 0.0 - - - -
1988 47 71  71 0.0 0.0 - -
1989 268 339  339 0.2 0.2 - 5.7 -
1990 103 442  442 0.3 0.1 1.3 0.4 -
1991 84 526  526 0.4 0.1 1.2 0.8 -
1992 89 615  615 0.4 0.1 1.2 1.1 -
1993 110 725  725 0.5 0.1 1.2 1.2 -
1994 165 890  890 0.6 0.1 1.2 1.5 -
1995 200 1 090 169 921 0.6 0.1 1.0 1.2 0.4
1996 1 525 2 615 219 2 396 1.6 1.0 2.6 7.6 0.6
1997 4 366 6 981 282 6 699 4.6 3.0 2.8 2.9 1.7
1998 4 058 11 039 370 10 669 7.3 2.8 1.6 0.9 1.6
1999 19 953 30 992 549 30 443 20.8 13.6 2.9 4.9 8.0
2000 59 257 90 249 975 89 274 61.5 40.8 2.9 3.0 23.7
2001 88 422 178 671 2 095 176 576 122.3 61.3 2.0 1.5 35.4
2002 50 378 229 049 3 164 225 885 156.9 35.0 1.3 0.6 20.2
2003 20 869 249 918 3 452 246 466 171.2 - 1.1 - 8.4
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TABLE 3: 
OFFICIALLY REGISTERED HIV CASES BY REGION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
1 JANUARY 1987 THROUGH 4 AUGUST 2003 
REGIONS SORTED BY REGISTERED NUMBER OF HIV CASES 
(based on data from the Russian Federal AIDS Centre) 
 
Rank Region 
(State Statistics 
Committee data) 
Registration 
date (Fed AIDS 
Centre or MSF-
H/AFEW data) 
Cumulative 
Registered 
HIV Cases
 4 Aug 2003
# of 
Deaths 
among 
PLWHA 
Registered 
# of 
PLWHA 
Prevalence 
per 100 000  
4 Aug 2003 
  Russian Federation 143 954 400 1987 248 005 3 452 244 553 170 
1 Moscow Oblast 6 409 700 until 1996 20 944 48 20 896 326 
2 St. Petersburg 4 596 200 1987* 20 788 160 20 628 449 
3 Sverdlovsk Oblast 4 544 900 1991* 20 770 439 20 331 447 
4 Samara Oblast 3 258 700 1987* 18 109 87 18 022 553 
5 Moscow (city of) 8 539 200 until 1995 15 248 162 15 086 177 
6 Irkutsk Oblast 2 712 900 until 1996 15 113 84 15 029 554 
7 Chelyabinsk Oblast 3 628 700 1990* 12 146 40 12 106 334 
8 Orenburg Oblast 2 199 400 1996 10 748 6 10 742 488 
9 Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Oblast 1 423 800 until 1996 7 711 215 7 496 526 
10 Leningrad Oblast 1 649 600 until 1996 6 203 9 6 194 375 
  Total for above 10 regions 38 963 100 NA 147 780 1 250 146 530 423 
11 Tyumen Oblast 3 272 200 until 1996 5 993 219 5 774 176 
12 Kemerovo Oblast 2 940 500 1992* 5 611 118 5 493 187 
13 Ulyanovsk Oblast 1 439 600 until 1996 5 520 196 5 324 370 
14 Saratov Oblast 2 676 400 until 1996 5 508 12 5 496 205 
15 Republic of Tatarstan 3 768 200 1989* 5 416 62 5 354 142 
16 Krasnoyarsk Krai 3 015 300 1989* 4 923 69 4 854 161 
17 Perm Oblast 2 923 700 until 1996 4 677 1 4 676 160 
18 Primorsky Krai 2 124 700 1989* 4 444 16 4 428 208 
19 Kaliningrad Oblast 943 200 1988* 4 171 57 4 114 436 
20 Krasnodar Krai 4 987 600 1989* 4 098 10 4 088 82 
21 Tver Oblast 1 552 300 until 1996 3 671 4 3 667 236 
22 Volgograd Oblast 2 636 500 1987* 3546 69 3 477 132 
23 Republic of Bashkortostan 4 090 600 until 1996 3 470 121 3 349 82 
24 Altai Krai 2 621 000 until 1996 2 881 100 2 781 106 
25 Tula Oblast 1 690 000 until 1996 2 806 121 2 685 159 
26 Nizhegorodsky Oblast 3 598 300 until 1996 2 724 89 2 635 73 
27 Rostov Oblast 4 286 200 1989* 2 646 143 2 503 58 
28 Ivanovo Oblast 1 191 200 until 1996 2 110 4 2 106 177 
29 Republic of Udmurt  1 616 200 1998 1 939 16 1 923 119 
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Rank Region 
(State Statistics 
Committee data) 
Registration 
date (Fed AIDS 
Centre or MSF-
H/AFEW data) 
Cumulative 
Registered 
HIV Cases
 4 Aug 2003
# of 
Deaths 
among 
PLWHA 
Registered 
# of 
PLWHA 
Prevalence 
per 100 000  
4 Aug 2003 
30 Republic of Buryatia 1 019 400 1990* 1 852 109 1 743 171 
31 Homeless NA NA 1 510 17 1 493 NA 
32 Ryazan Oblast 1 255 000 1991* 1 490 77 1 413 113 
33 Kurgan Oblast 1 074 400 1997 1226 7 1 219 113 
34 Chita Oblast 1 237 200 1996 1 211 4 1 207 98 
35 Vladimir Oblast 1 573 900 until 1996 1175 2 1 173 75 
36 Murmansk Oblast 977 600 1990* 1 153 8 1 145 117 
37 Yamalo-Nenetsky Autonomous Oblast 508 900 until 1996 822 29 793 156 
38 Kaluga Oblast 1 058 900 1989* 783 37 746 70 
39 Yaroslavl Oblast 1 386 300 until 1996 680 21 659 48 
40 Penza Oblast 1 504 100 1989* 677 32 645 43 
41 Tomsk Oblast 1 060 800 1996 667 30 637 60 
42 Orel Oblast 883 500 1987* 638 39 599 68 
43 Bryansk Oblast 1 410 300 1989* 618 11 607 43 
44 Novosibirsk Oblast 2 717 400 1989* 609 12 597 22 
45 Kostroma Oblast 766 400 until 1996 608 16 592 77 
46 Vologda Oblast 1 301 100 1995* 591 12 579 45 
47 Khabarovsk Krai 1 485 800 1992* 560 5 555 37 
48 Novgorod Oblast 710 900 until 1996 499 3 496 70 
49 Republic of Komi 1 117 200 until 1996 441 12 429 38 
50 Republic of Chuvash  1 346 300 1992* 409 19 390 29 
51 Republic of Ingushetia 466 300 1999 396 10 386 83 
52 Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 982 900 1997 343 10 333 34 
53 Republic of Mary El 750 300 1997 342 7 335 45 
54 Chechnya 624 600 until 1996 319 5 314 50 
55 Smolensk Oblast 1 098 300 until 1996 309 18 291 26 
56 Republic of Dagestan 2 179 500 until 1996 300 24 276 13 
57 Republic of North Ossetia 678 200 1997 297 13 284 42 
58 Republic of Mordovia 910 000 1997 294 6 288 32 
59 Tambov Oblast 1 240 700 until 1996 289 9 280 23 
60 Stavropol Krai 2 642 600 1987* 279 27 252 10 
61 Belgorod Oblast 1 498 000 until 1996 262 15 247 16 
62 Voronezh Oblast 2 414 700 until 1996 234 11 223 9 
63 Omsk Oblast 2 127 000 1996 207 1 206 10 
64 Republic Karelia 756 400 1994* 193 0 193 26 
65 Pskov Oblast 778 000 until 1996 177 9 168 22 
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Rank Region 
(State Statistics 
Committee data) 
Registration 
date (Fed AIDS 
Centre or MSF-
H/AFEW data) 
Cumulative 
Registered 
HIV Cases
 4 Aug 2003
# of 
Deaths 
among 
PLWHA 
Registered 
# of 
PLWHA 
Prevalence 
per 100 000  
4 Aug 2003 
66 Kursk Oblast 1 284 500 1997 155 0 155 12 
67 Astrakhan Oblast 1 008 700 until 1996 145 14 131 13 
68 Republic of Kalmykia 305 600 1988* 143 61 82 27 
69 Kirovsk Oblast 1 560 000 until 1996 139 8 131 8 
70 Republic of Kabardino-Balkar  782 000 until 1996 137 4 133 17 
71 
Ust Ordynsky Buryatsky Autonomous 
Oblast 142 500 1999 113 1 112 79 
72 Arkhangelsk Oblast 1 428 900 1992* 105 6 99 7 
73 Republic of Adygea 444 900 1996 102 0 102 23 
74 Republic of Khakassia 575 400 1997 92 2 90 16 
75 Amursk Oblast 982 200 until 1996 90 1 89 9 
76 Lipetsk Oblast 1 228 900 1993* 80 3 77 6 
77 Sakhalin Oblast 584 700 1993* 72 1 71 12 
78 Kamchatka Oblast 380 200 1996 43 0 43 11 
79 Taimyr Autonomous Oblast 44 300 1998 40 1 39 88 
80 Republic of Altai 204 900 1996 33 1 32 16 
81 Magadan Oblast 229 200 1996 31 1 30 13 
82 Republic of Karachaevo-Cherkes  428 600 1999 31 2 29 7 
83 Republic of Tyva 310 300 until 1996 14 1 13 4 
84 Komi-Permyak Autonomous Oblast 147 800 2000 13 0 13 9 
85 Jewish Autonomous Oblast 194 600 1999 11 0 11 6 
86 Chukotsky Autonomous Oblast 73 800 1998 5 0 5 7 
87 Aginsky Buryatsky Autonomous Oblast 79 600 2003 4 0 4 5 
88 Koryak Autonomous Oblast 28 500 until 1996 3 1 2 7 
89 Evenki Autonomous Oblast 18 200 2001 2 0 2 11 
  Total: 248 005 1987 248 005 3 452 244 553 170 
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Vulnerable Groups 
Globally, prevention efforts are designed to reach specific segments of 
populations, addressing various behavioral changes which reduce the potential to 
contract and/or transmit HIV/AIDS.  The epidemic in the RF has been primarily isolated 
among injecting drug users (IDUs), with as many as 90% of all cases during the early 
growth of the epidemic attributed to the sharing of injection equipment such as needles 
and/or syringes (Russian Federal AIDS Centre 2002).  This, however, reflects those 
cases where the route of transmission has been determined and/or reported, and reflects 
only those cases which have been registered (see Table 4).  Prevention efforts within the 
region have addressed multiple risk factors and attempt to reach particular groups 
perceived to be most at risk for HIV, including IDUs, sex workers, young persons, 
prisoners, and more recently women living with HIV/AIDS (WLWHA) and pregnant 
women.  The following sections describe characteristics of specific vulnerable groups in 
the RF and some of the particular contextual aspects prevention and education efforts 
must take into account to successfully slow the burgeoning epidemic. 
 
TABLE 4: 
OFFICIALLY REGISTERED HIV CASES BY SELECT GROUPS IN THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
31 DECEMBER 2002 
(based on data from the Russian Federal AIDS Centre12) 
Route of 
Transmission 
# of Registered 
Cases13 
Prevalence per 100 
000 Population14 
Percent of all 
Registered Cases15 
IDUs 75 127 3 111.0 32.8% 
Gay and Lesbian 118 368.8 0.005% 
STI Patients 11 566 201.6 5% 
Pregnant Women 7 088 114.7 3.1% 
Incarcerated Persons 37 484 1 019.2 16.4% 
Total 229 049 156.916  
 
                                                 
12 Russian Federal AIDS Centre, HIV Infection Information Bulletin, 25 (2003), Moscow:  
Russian Federal AIDS Centre. 
13  Figures here represent cases reported based on antibody testing, and are provided from 1 
January 1994 through 31 December 2002. 
14 Figures here represent the prevalence provided at the end of 2002 only, and is based on the 
population undergoing HIV testing.   
15  Figures here are based upon cumulative registered cases as of 31 December 2002. 
16  This figure is based on the population of the RF according to official statistics, and is based 
on calculations from the Epidemiology Department of AIDS Foundation East-West (AFEW) 
using data from the Russian Federal AIDS Centre, 31 December 2002. 
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Injecting Drug Users (IDUs) 
Injecting drug use has been the primary route of transmission identified among 
those officially registered as living with HIV/AIDS in the RF, and is the result of 
sharing injecting equipment.  The exact extent of drug use is difficult to determine 
accurately regardless of context or country.  In the RF, however, most officials and 
international experts perceive drug use, particularly injecting drug use, on the rise in the 
post-Soviet transition period with currently registered figures suggesting roughly 
450,000 drug users (Rhodes et al. 2002a), although one Russian Interior Ministry 
official stated in 2002 that the number of drug users stood between 3 and 4 million – 20 
times the official 1992 figure (Walsh 2002).  Drug users in the region tend to be young 
(most studies indicate initial injection at 18 to 20 years old), male, lacking a legal source 
of income, to have been imprisoned for at least one night, to live in major regional cities 
(although recent evidence points to increasing diffusion to rural areas) and to be less 
likely to use condoms consistently compared with other groups (Rhodes et al. 2002b). 
A synthesis of 63 rapid assessment reports conducted between 1998 and 2000, 
found that between 9% and 95% of IDUs had shared equipment, with between 40% and 
70% of most urban-dwelling IDUs reporting sharing (frost et al. 2000).  Throughout the 
region, and in a relatively short amount of time, numerous studies have suggested that 
HIV prevalence exceeds 50% among IDUs (Rhodes et al. 2002).  International evidence 
indicates that once prevalence reaches 10 to 20% among a particular segment of the 
population, the epidemic tends to self-perpetuate itself whereby even moderate risk 
behaviors lead to substantial rates of infection. 
Further compounding the HIV/AIDS situation, as well as other infectious 
disease epidemics in the country such as hepatitis B and C viral strains, draconian laws 
related to narcotic possession and trafficking drive ‘at-risk’ groups further underground 
and impede prevention efforts as well as the promotion of health-seeking behaviors 
which could slow the pace of growth of the HIV epidemic among IDUs.  For example, 
individuals identified as drug-dependent are often forced into compulsory treatment in 
prison-like facilities run by the police.  Legislation governing prison sentencing for the 
possession of what officials deem ‘large quantities’ – that is, up to 0.005 grams of 
heroin or 0.05 grams of hashish or marijuana (amounts insufficient for a single dose) – 
recommend 2 to 7 year sentences for individuals who buy, possess, transport and/or 
store a ‘large’ quantity of illegal drugs.  Needle sharing and HIV infection are rampant 
in the Russian prison system. 
The prevalence of IDU transmission is giving rise to a mis-placed complacency 
among experts, many of whom assert that the epidemic is ‘isolated’ among IDUs.  
When the route of transmission is known or determined, injecting drug use prevails.  
However, given the overlaps between multiple risk factors—that is, drug use, the so-
called ‘sexual revolution’ enjoyed by young people in the post-Soviet era, limited use of 
condoms and/or safer sex practices across all sectors of society—it is realistic to 
postulate that transmission route figures are distorted.  Many domestic and international 
experts believe that heterosexual transmission is rising at a rate higher than that reported 
in official statistics. 
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Sex Workers 
In the post-Soviet era, a ‘sexual revolution’ has taken place in tandem with the 
rapid social, political and economic transitions.  Changing sexual patterns have been 
accompanied by unstable if not uncertain employment, forcing many young girls and 
women to enter into occasional or formal sex work to supplement meager incomes 
(Konings 1996).  Given the stigma associated with sex work, as well as the risk of 
arrest, many sex workers are reluctant to seek medical testing and/or services for 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS.  Related to the rise in 
formal sex work is the increasingly reported phenomenon is f the exchange of  sexual 
‘gifts’ for remuneration – be it monetary, material or otherwise among women in the 
RF.  In one such study among female detainees, 47.5 percent of those surveyed had 
exchanged sex for money or other commodities while only 20 percent of these self-
identified as sex workers (Shakarishvilli et al. 2002). 
Sex work in the RF is highly varied in structure depending upon the context in 
which services are solicited, and in terms of geographic and neighborhood location.  
However, based on existing descriptive studies, sex work can be categorized along 
roughly three tiers.  The ‘lowest’ tier involves individuals who work alone and generally 
are street-based or work in railway stations.  This group is characterized by frequent 
migration, is more likely to inject drugs, and rarely if ever use condoms.  Thus, rates of 
STIs and HIV tend to be greatest amongst street-based sex workers.  Access to 
treatment services is generally low, and levels of risk behavior, such as unsafe injecting 
behavior and sexual risk, tend to be highest.  The second group of sex workers includes 
those who work in groups primarily in saunas, apartments or on the street.  This group 
is characterized by an increasing level of professionalism, is more ‘closed’ to the public 
eye depending upon the particular work venue.  Anecdotal evidence points to prevalent 
drug use, although injecting is less common.  With an increased level of access to STI 
and general health services, primarily through privately financed clinical services, 
treatment for STIs is generally greater than among individual street-based sex workers 
although somewhat limited for those who migrate from another region.  Finally, ‘elite’ 
sex workers tend to provide services through hotels, are unlikely to be IDUs, and have 
relatively good access to health services although they tend to be the hardest group to 
access through prevention and/or outreach activities. 
Sex worker populations tend to be transient, and often may not have access to 
health care because they lack the prerequisite residency documents.  Many sex workers 
report waiting until returning to their homes to seek publicly financed (i.e., free) testing, 
treatment, or services for STIs, which if present, increase their risk of contracting HIV.  
Figures related to the prevalence of HIV among this particular vulnerable group are at 
best under-estimates.  In Moscow alone, some estimates suggest that as many as 15% of 
sex workers are HIV positive. 
Moscow has the largest concentration of sex workers in the RF, and most are 
street-based.  Among street-based sex workers, a high proportion were identified as 
homeless, with 52% of women surveyed stating that they exchanged sex for money, and 
19% of male sex workers surveyed acknowledging the exchange of sex for drugs 
(Shakarishvilli et al. 2002).  Drug use and sex work are often discussed as dual risks, 
although determining which pre-dates the other is often difficult at best.  Across the RF, 
most studies suggest that between 15% and 50% of female IDUs are involved in sex 
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work (Dehne and Kobyshcha 2000, Rhodes et al. 2002b).  Disturbingly high rates of 
HIV infection have been found amongst St. Petersburg and Togliatti IDUs who 
regularly engage in sex work, whereby 57% of IDU sex workers were found to be HIV 
positive compared to 17% of non-IDU sex worker (Lowndes et al. 2002).  Some argue 
that 4 of every 5 HIV positive women in the RF were involved in both sex work and 
drug use (Smolskaya et al. 2000). 
Condom use among sex workers is highly variable across both study sites and 
type of sex work.  Experts agree that street-based sex workers are in a more vulnerable 
position with their clients and are often unable to negotiate condom use.  One study 
(Nashkoev 2002) reported that 60% of Moscow respondents stated that their clients 
refused to wear a condom, while another study (Losevo and Nashkoev  1999) reported 
that clients would pay more for services provided without a condom. 
Prisoners  
The RF ranks second in the world only to the US in terms of the number and 
proportion of the population incarcerated, with an annual turnover of roughly 5 million 
individuals.  The Russian penal system is characterized by depleted financial and human 
resources, over-crowding and unsanitary conditions, and increasing prevalence of 
tuberculosis (TB), HIV/AIDS, and drug use. 
As with any particular vulnerable group, considerable over-lap exists and clear 
demarcation is near impossible.  Any discussion of incarcerated persons in the RF must 
also examine the inter-relationship between drug use and those imprisoned on drug-
related crimes.  Given that drug use is on the rise in the RF (see above), there has also 
been an increase in the number of IDUs within the Russian penal system.  Similar to the 
situation with IDUs in the RF, sharing of injection equipment is widespread within the 
Russian prison system, with sharing reported by between 22% and 65% of inmates 
(Frost et al. 2001).  One report from Tuymen oblast found that roughly one-third of 
young persons initiated drug use while incarcerated (UNDCP/WHO 2001).  
Furthermore, inmates often engage in risky sexual behavior given that condoms are 
rarely available to them. 
In a lecture delivered at King’s College, University of London in November 
2002, Deputy Minister of Justice of the RF Yuri Kalinin acknowledged that 
approximately 20% of all registered inmates were HIV positive.  Furthermore, he 
recognized the need for more sustained efforts to improve the medical treatment of 
incarcerated persons, particularly with regards to the high incidence of TB in the 
Russian penal system, whereby approximately 1 in 10 inmates suffers from TB, of 
whom 30% suffer from multi-drug resistant (MDR) TB (Schwalbe 2002).  Co-infection 
with HIV and TB are particularly disturbing.  Those with HIV are more susceptible to 
TB as their immune systems weaken.  Likewise, TB may facilitate the rapid progression 
of HIV to AIDS.  Given the likelihood of co-infection with HIV and MDR-TB, 
prisoners once released into society carry both back to their communities. 
Young Persons 
One of the more insidious aspects of the HIV pandemic is its devastating impact 
on young persons.  The epidemic in the RF is particularly felt among those under the 
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age of 30.  Through 2002, more than 80% of all registered cases had occurred among 
18- to 25-year olds (Yates 2002).  This undoubtedly has serious implications for the 
future of the Russian population, already characterized by excess adult mortality and 
population decline.  The ‘sexual revolution’ enjoyed by Russian youth has translated 
into increasing sexual activity with a greater number of partners and initiation of sexual 
activity at a younger age (Chervyakov and Kon 2000). 
Knowledge regarding perceived risk of HIV and STIs influences safer sexual 
behaviors, such as condom use, delayed initiation of sexual careers, and the number of 
different partners over time.  Knowledge regarding known routes of transmission in the 
RF among youth appears to be inadequate.  In a St. Petersburg survey among youth, 
respondents cited that HIV could be transmitted through kissing (48%), through 
mosquito bites (56%), and through sharing cigarettes (29%).  Among them, unprotected 
vaginal sex predominated.  Furthermore, these same adolescents on average indicated 
having 3 to 4 different sexual partners during their relatively short sexual careers.  
Likewise, in a Moscow survey (Frost and van de Braak 2001), young people believed it 
was possible to contract HIV through kissing or saliva (30%), that STIs were 
transmitted through saliva (64%), and that HIV could be ‘caught’ from toilet seats 
(12%). 
As discussed by Andriouchina elsewhere in this report, STIs have increased 
during the transition period, particularly syphilis among young persons.  The presence 
of STIs not only indicates low levels of condom use, but also fosters the spread of HIV.  
In a climate that perceives discussions of sexuality and sexual health generally taboo, 
youth-friendly family planning and sexual health education are rarely available.  
Prevention efforts are further impeded by a relative lack of appropriate, targeted 
information materials on safer sex behaviors.  Sexual health education lectures, classes 
or seminars are rarely available in the Russian school system, for example, in a 1997 
survey, only 22% of 16-year-old students reported receiving any form of sex education 
(Chervyakov and Kon 2000).  In one survey among youths regarding the dangers of 
HIV/AIDS and drug use, including risks associated with the transmission of HIV, less 
than 2% of young persons (17 and 18 years) surveyed had a ‘satisfactory knowledge’ 
regarding the nature of drug use and AIDS (ibid., Kramer 2000).  For young people, 
particularly students, condoms may be prohibitively expensive.  Whilst condoms are 
widely available in street kiosks and pharmacies, the cost of high-quality condoms (that 
is, imported, Western brands) may limit a young person’s ability to purchase and use 
them. 
Given that much of the public attention on the epidemic in the mass media has 
been devoted to IDUs and more recently sex work, there is a common misconception 
that HIV is transmitted solely through injecting drug use or ‘prostitution’.  This is 
particularly dangerous given that if an individual does not inject or engage formally in 
sex work , they do not perceive any personal risk of contracting HIV.  In one study 
(AIDS Foundation East-West 2001), knowledge among youth of how HIV was 
transmitted was relatively high, but the perceived risk of becoming infected was 
surprisingly low.  Thus, safer sexual practices may not be thought of as necessary 
among non-injecting youth. 
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Mother to child transmission 
By the end of 2002, 58% of all women living with HIV/AIDS (WLWHA) were 
between 20 and 30 years (see Figure 1).  Thus, MTCT will increasingly affect Russia’s 
children.  The registered number of children living with HIV/AIDS (CLWHA) in the 
RF as of 1 September 2003 stood at 7 589 (Russian Federal AIDS Centre 2003).  
Among these, 6 301 children were born to HIV positive mothers, growing from the 6 
born in 1996 (see Figure 2). 
FIGURE 1: 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF WLWHA IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2002 
(based on data from the Russian Federal AIDS Centre) 
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FIGURE 2: 
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All children born to HIV positive mothers in the RF are assumed to have a 
preliminary diagnosis of HIV, which is later withdrawn in the majority of children by 
the age of 3 once they test sero-negative.  According to data from the Russian Federal 
AIDS Centre, a diagnosis of HIV is confirmed on average in 19.5% of children.  This 
figure is considerably lower in regions where antiretroviral (ARV) therapy as a 
prevention method for perinatal transmission is used and/or available.   The rates of 
infection in these regions average 9.5%. 
There may be significant under-reporting of the number of CLWHA given that 
potentially infected women belonging to the most vulnerable groups–that is, IDU and 
sex worker populations–may not attend antenatal services.  In the RF, 25 to 40% of all 
HIV-positive women who delivered a baby did not register the pregnancy and did not 
seek prenatal care (Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation 2002).  In such cases, 
HIV/AIDS is detected only during delivery, a time when vertical transmission is highly 
likely.  If pregnant WLWHA do not present prior to delivery, prevention efforts may be 
hindered. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that medical professionals are not well trained nor 
do they have an understanding of the latest medical innovations for treating pregnant 
WLWHA.  Therefore, prevention of MTCT efforts need to address the needs not only of 
parents-to-be, but also health care professionals who may provide services to them. 
Policy response 
Significant opportunities were missed during the early stages of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in Russia: 
• High level political acknowledgement of the epidemic occurred far too late, 
with President Vladimir Putin first publicly mentioning the subject only in his 
Annual Address to the Russian Federal Assembly in May 2003. 
• In the early stages of the epidemic, scarce resources were expended on 
ineffective large-scale HIV antibody screening programs, with nearly 20 
million tests performed annually (Medvedev 2000, Pokrovsky 1994).  Mass 
screening of vulnerable groups such as IDUs stigmatized the disease and 
drove those most at risk away from testing centers.  , as well as giving rise to 
an “It can’t happen to me” attitude among the public.  Counseling services 
were largely unavailable.   
• The Ministry of Health’s AIDS program was vertical and highly centralized; 
links with education, sexually transmitted infections, prisons, etc. were not 
exploited. 
• Sociological and behavioral research and programs were rare and mostly 
conducted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
While the policy situation has improved markedly, Russian legislation still 
impedes prevention efforts among those most vulnerable to HIV.  Despite the fact that 
international best practice and regional studies within the RF repeatedly demonstrate the 
effectiveness of harm reduction (HR) activities among IDUs, existing legislation at 
times prohibits these activities.  Local Russian HR activities, funded by international 
donor organizations, provide clean needles and syringes in exchange for used drug 
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paraphernalia, educate and advocate for safer injecting practices, while at the same time 
seek to reduce the demand for drugs, and advocate for legislative change towards the 
use of methadone as a therapeutic substitute for heroin.  Some of these efforts are 
hampered by policy makers and law enforcement officials who see the distribution of 
clean needles and syringes as promoting drug use and activities that are deemed illegal 
under existing legislation rather than offering ways in which to reach an already hard-
to-reach population.  This points to the need to provide justification through the 
evaluation of existing prevention activities to high-ranking Russian officials of the 
applicability of international practices to the Russian context. 
There has been somewhat more success with efforts to curb the co-epidemics of 
TB and HIV/AIDS within the prison system.    During the last several years, AFEW as 
well as other domestic and international NGOs have been involved in reforms 
implemented jointly with the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health, and local-level 
administrators from select prison colonies and pre-trial detention centres.  In the words 
of Deputy Minister of Justice Yuri Kalinin, ‘the introduction of HIV/AIDS prevention 
programs in Russia’s penal institutions enables us to supply our staff and prisoners with 
reliable and effective information on this problem, including methods of ‘risk 
reduction’, and to provide support for those already identified as HIV positive.  With 
acknowledgement from one of the highest-ranking members of the Ministry of Justice, 
pilot programs in the prison system have been scaled-up to additional facilities 
throughout the country.  This is one small success, but also illustrates the importance of 
demonstrating effectiveness to decision-makers.  Thus, rather than focusing on the 
classic dichotomy in the global pandemic as ‘North-South’, East-West models need to 
be created and expanded to meet the needs of the Russian Federation. 
Prevention efforts focused on behavioral change have been funded mostly by 
foreign sources and carried out on local levels.  These local initiatives are not only 
under-financed, but because they rely mostly on international donor programs, efforts 
are focused on outputs rather than outcomes to satisfy donor requirements.  Given that 
the Russian public has yet to acknowledge or even understand the effectiveness of such 
policies being imported from abroad and adapted to local contexts, and may not be able 
to access English-language materials documenting their effectiveness, evaluation in the 
Russian context is key to not only understanding effectiveness once adapted, but also to 
gain the level of support and commitment of the government.  This requires further 
investment – both from domestic and international counterparts.  Furthermore, this 
effectiveness must be accessible to those working with vulnerable groups as well as 
with local, regional and national level policy and decision-makers in order to increase 
action, change legislation and secure funding necessary for meeting the growing needs 
for the Russian population. 
Further deterioration of the HIV / AIDS situation can be avoided only by 
increased financial and political commitment from the Russian government as well as 
increased resources from international donors.  The stark fact is that the HIV/AIDS 
policy response in the RF stands at a critical point.  Voluntary counseling and testing 
(VCT) and treatment, school-based education programs, sentinel surveillance, HR 
activities for those most vulnerable, and mass media campaigns have not been 
accomplished on a level anywhere near commensurate with the scale and pace of the 
epidemic.  Russian HR programs are estimated to reach only 11% of those at risk; only 
16% of those who need it have access to STI treatment; AIDS awareness programs 
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reach only 19% of those at risk, and VCT services are available to only 28% (Global 
HIV Prevention Working Group 2003). 
Despite these daunting statistics, the outlook is not entirely negative.  The RF 
has the opportunity to learn from the experience of countries that have dealt with the 
epidemic much earlier.  Strengths of the Soviet past, including one of the world’s 
highest literacy rates, an ideology which views health as a human right, a relatively 
well-developed health infrastructure, and what was once one of the most accessible 
primary health care systems in the world, provide exceptional springboards from which 
to broaden prevention, treatment, care and support efforts.  However, the window of 
opportunity is rapidly closing to prevent a massive explosion of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in the Russian Federation. 
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Reproductive Health 
Elena Andriouchina 
Institute for Socio-economic Studies of Population 
Russian Academy of Sciences 
The salient aspects of the current reproductive health situation in Russia are a 
significant drop of fertility and an alarming deterioration in mother and child health.  
Fertility decline 
As illustrated in Table 1, since the pre- transition years in Russia the number of 
births per 1,000 has mainly declined. Despite of increases in 1994, 2000 and 2001, over 
the period 1986 - 2001 the total crude birth rate was reduced by almost half (from 17.2 
to 9.1 per 1,000). Thus, having been at roughly replacement level (ca. 2.1) in 1985 -
1986, the total fertility rate in Russia was estimated to be less than 1.3 in 2001 (Table 
2).  
 
Table 1.  The Number of Births. Russia. 1985-2001 
Births, 
persons 
Births, 
per 1,000 population 
 
Years
Total Urban 
population 
 
Rural 
population 
Total Urban 
population 
Rural 
population 
1985 2375147 1666673 708474 16,6 16,1 17,8 
1986 2485915 1749905 736010 17,2 16,7 18,6 
1987 2499974 1769032 730942 17,2 16,6 18,6 
1988 2348494 1662029 686465 16,0 15,4 17,6 
1989 2160559 1520741 639818 14,6 14,0 16,4 
1990 1988858 1386247 602611 13,4 12,7 15,5 
1991 1794626 1230516 564110 12,1 11,2 14,5 
1992 1587644 1068304 519340 10,7 9,8 13,2 
1993 1378983 930530 448453 9,4 8,6 11,5 
1994 1408159 960413 447746 9,6 8,9 11,4 
1995 1363806 933460 430346 9,3 8,6 10,9 
1996 1304638 897898 406740 8,9 8,3 10,4 
1997 1259943 870213 389730 8,6 8,1 10,0 
1998 1283292 887669 395623 8,8 8,3 10,2 
1999 1214689 842640 372049 8,3 7,9 9,6 
2000 1266800 886908 379892 8,7 8,4 9,8 
2001 1311604 928642 382962 9,1 8,8 9,9 
Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. 2002. 
55-57 p. 
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Table 2.  Total fertility rate. Russia. 1985-2001 
 
Years  
 
Total population   
 
Urban population 
 
Rural population 
1985-1986  2,111 1,874 3,003 
1986-1987  2,194 1,947 3,162 
1988    2,130 1,896 3,057 
1989    2,007 1,826 2,630 
1990    1,887 1,701 2,526 
1991    1,732 1,540 2,384 
1992    1,552 1,362 2,177 
1993    1,385 1,215 1,935 
1994 1,400 1,249 1,892 
1995 1,344 1,207 1,788 
1996 1,281 1,158 1,677 
1997 1,230 1,118 1,586 
1998 1,242 1,133 1,580 
1999 1,171 1,072 1,479 
2000 1,214 1,125 1,487 
2001 1,249 1,173 1,481 
Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat of the Russian Federation. 2002. p. 
94. 
Fertility decline depends on a number of general and specific factors. In the 
West, it has much reflected increasing participation of women in the labor force, 
preference for leisure and consumption goods as opposed to children, the decline of the 
old-age security motive as old-age pension systems have developed, etc.  The Russian 
fertility decline, by contrast, is related mostly to economic transition, and in this respect, 
bears some resemblance to the very low fertility experienced in Europe and the United 
States during the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
Deteriorating reproductive health indicators 
Despite the measures being taken in order to improve the health care system for 
pregnant women and children in Russia, during the transition process there has been 
deterioration in most indicators of mothers’ and child health, especially at the beginning 
and mid 1990’s. The situation in this sphere is still alarming.  Pregnancy and delivery 
pathology became one of the primary factors aggravating the unfavorable fertility trends 
in Russia during the transition. The incidence of delivery complications has steadily 
grown to the point where only one third of all deliveries could be considered normal 
(Figure 1). As compared to 1992, in 2002 the share of normal deliveries in the Russia 
Federation diminished from 45.3% to 31.7%. The most common complication was 
anemia, which grew from 65.1 per 1000 deliveries in 1990 to 272.7 per 1,000 in 2001.  
According to Ministry of Health data for the period 1990-2002, the frequency of anemia 
among pregnant women (Figure 2) increased from 12.8% to 42.8%, diseases of the 
circulatory system from 5.1% to 10.2%, diseases of the urogenital system from 5.9% to 
19.4%, late toxicosis from 8.9% to 20.2%.  Outcomes of a study (Russia, 1998-2000) 
show an established perception of pregnancy as rather pathological as normal 
physiological phenomenon. 26.9 percent of women surveyed regarded the chances that 
their pregnancy would be complicated as “high” and another 31.6 percent regarded 
pregnancy complications as “quite possible” (Katkova I.P. et al. 2002). 
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Figure 1.  Number of normal deliveries (% in hospitals). Russia, 1992-2002. 
Source: Official statistical materials of the Ministry of Health Care of the Russian 
Federation 
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Figure 2.  Health of pregnant women (%). Russia, 1990-2002. 
Source: Official statistical materials of the Ministry of Health Care of the Russian 
Federation 
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Pathological pregnancies are accompanied by high risk of infant death or 
children disability. During the transition, Russia experienced a sharp deterioration in the 
health of the newborn (Rimashevskaya N.M et al. 2000). For instance, according to data 
of the Ministry of Health Care of the Russian Federation (Figure 3), in 1992 only one 
out of five infants was born sick or fell sick soon after birth, while in 2002 the figure 
was even worse than one out of two (or 5908.2 per 10,000 live births).  The rate of 
congenital malformations of the newborn was 293.4 per 100,000 in 1999 as compared 
to 187.5 per 100,000 in 1991 and that of haemolytic diseases, 93.2 per 100,000 and 61.l 
per 100,000.  
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Figure 3.  Morbidity of the newborn (the number of those falling sick and/or born sick) 
per 10,000 born. Russia 1991-2002. 
Source: Official statistical materials of the Ministry of Health Care of the Russian 
Federation 
 
Infant and under-5 mortality rate, despite some improvement during the 
transition, still remain unacceptably high.  The infant mortality rate in Russia, 13.3 per 
1,000 in 2002 (according to the Ministry of Health data), is two to three times higher 
than the rate in highly developed countries (6.4 per 1000 in the US and Italy, 5.7 per 
1000 in the UK, 5.7 per 1000 in Germany, 4.1 per 1000 in Japan, etc.).  At the 
beginning of the 2002, two thirds of infant deaths were due to causes related to the 
situations typical of the perinatal period as well as due to congenital malformations; 
three-fourths occurred within the first 6 days after birth.  There was a shift in the 
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structure of causes of infant death between 1985 and 1999: conditions of the perinatal 
period and congenital malformations rose from 55.0% to 64.0%, trauma and poisonings 
rose from 4.4% to 6.6%, and other causes declined (notably respiratory conditions from 
23.0% to 12.0% and infectious and parasitic diseases from 12.0% to 7.0%).  In general, 
deaths from infectious and parasitic causes, as well as from trauma and poisonings, are 
higher in rural than urban districts; deaths from perinatal conditions, by contrast, are 
higher in urban regions.  In should be noted that infant deaths of from congenital 
malformations and conditions of the perinatal period, which increased their share, are 
due to exogenous conditions, i.e., fetal development, genotype, and maternal health 
(Katkova I.P. et al.  2001).   
Worsening reproductive health has not translated into rising maternal mortality. 
According to the Ministry of Health data maternal mortality fell from 54.0 in 1985 to 
33.6 in 2002 (per 100,000 live births).  However, the maternal mortality in Russia 
remains very high relative to other countries.  
According to the Ministry of Health data the main cause of maternal mortality 
(21.1 percent), followed by toxicosis (17.8 percent), hemorrhage during pregnancy or 
birth (16.5 percent), ectopic pregnancy (5.5 percent) and sepsis during birth (3.8 
percent).  Abortion-related deaths, 68 percent of them resulting from abortions outside 
medical institutions, comprise about one-fifth of maternal deaths).   
In 1990 the number of abortions in Russia per 1,000 women of reproductive age 
was 114.0, by 1996 this had been reduced to 69.3, and by 2001, it was only 47.6.  
However, since the number of births also declined over the period, the ratio of abortions 
to live births (according to the Ministry of Health data) decreased only slightly from 
195.3 in 1990 to 142.2 in 2001 (by 27.2%).  In addition to accounting for a substantial 
share of maternal mortality, abortion is a leading cause of secondary sterility 
(Rimashevskaya N.M et al. 2001). 
According to official statistics data of the Ministry of Health Care of the Russian 
Federation on the state of health of women within the structure of morbidity, there is a 
prevalence of respiratory diseases (19%), cardiovascular diseases (19%) and diseases of 
the digestion system (17%). There is a trend toward a growth of malignant diseases. The 
major factors are malignant tumors of the reproductive system (per 100,000 of the 
female population), such as cancer of the breast (57.7), of the uterus (18.8), of the cervix 
of the uterus (15.8) and of the ovary (14.8). 
In the context of the general decline in the population reproductive health, high 
morbidity in cancer of reproductive system (breast cancer makes up over half of cases) 
is especially worrying.  Over 1980-2000 years morbidity in breast cancer rose from 
187.7 cases to 458.4 cases (per 100,000 female population). At the same time the 
cervical cancer rate declined from 276.2 in 1980 to 219.0 in 2000. The disparity 
provides indirect evidence that primary breast cancer is being more effectively detected. 
Although lethality within the first year after diagnosing breast cancer grew slightly, 
from 10 percent in 1985 to 11.7 percent in 2000,  that of cervical cancer declined from 
23.4 percent to 20.4 percent, respectively.  Both remain at high levels by international 
comparison.  This is mainly due to the fact, that in 38-39 percent of cases, these diseases 
are diagnosed only at the 3rd or 4th stage. The 5-year survival rate after a diagnosis of 
cervical cancer is higher than that of breast cancer (79.6 percent vs. 53.9 percent).  
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Implementation of the special federal state program on oncology has contributed to this 
improvement.   
During recent years there has been an increase of women's diseases such as 
endometriosis (29.8 percent) and female sterility (5.2 percent).  At present more than 15 
percent of the marriages suffer from sterility, and the female sterility accounts for 50 to 
60 percent of the cases. According to the Health Ministry, in 2000 in Russia the rate of 
female infertility was 381.7 cases per 100,000 female population aged 18-49. The 
number of sterile women diagnosed for the first time markedly increased from 41900 in 
1990 to 49800 in 2000. These figures reflect only those women who present for medical 
care, i.e. those who wish to conceive but cannot; however, the figures still help us to 
assess the scale of the problem.  
Adolescent girls have fared particularly badly in recent years.  In 1991-1999, the 
number of menstrual disorders increased 19 times among small girls, 4.8 times among 
teenage girls and 4.2 times among adult women. Inflammatory diseases of the 
reproductive system increased a staggering 6.7 times among teenage girls in 1991-99 
(as opposed to only 1.4 times in adult women); these diseases affect not only 
reproductive function, but also the state of the immune system as a whole and have 
particularly unfavorable consequences if suffered during the teenage period.  The main 
causes of this explosion of inflammatory diseases are precocious sexual activity, a high 
number of sexual partners, and failure to obtain timely medical care.  An in-depth 
analysis of reproductive rights programs aimed at youth carried out in the city of 
Taganrog in 1998-2000 found that current medico-social and educational programs, as 
well as the present network of health institutions, are poorly oriented towards 
adolescents’ reproductive health care needs (Katkova et al. 1999 а, Andriushina et al. 
2000). 
As has been widely reported, there was a dramatic rise in sexually transmitted 
infections in the Russian Federation during the first half of nineties.  The incidence of 
syphilis increased 15-60 fold, from 5-15 per 100,000 of population in 1990 to 200-500 
per 100,000 population by 1996, with proportionally larger increases occurring among 
young women. The incidence of congenital syphilis has doubled since 1996, reflecting 
an increase in the prevalence of untreated syphilis among young women. During recent 
years the number of notified cases of syphilis, as an indicator of other STIs, decreased 
significantly but remains at a high level. The prevalence of STIs among young people 
has increased dramatically. Thus, between 1991 and 1997 the rate of first diagnoses of 
syphilis among girls aged 0-14 increased by a factor of 70; among girls aged 15-17, the 
increase was by a factor of 40.  In 1997 about 0.8 percent of the children under 14 years, 
6.0 percent of the young people aged 15-17, and 9.2 percent of the young people at the 
age of 18-19 years had syphilis.  Syphilis is of special concern in particular because of 
the role it plays in encouraging transmission of the HIV infection.  In recent years, 
HIV/AIDS transmission has been on the rise, especially among intravenous drug users, 
commercial sex workers and youth, leading to one of the most precarious epidemics in 
Eastern Europe. At the beginning of August 2003 248,005 cumulative cases of HIV 
were reported in Russia. In its response to a 2001 United Nations inquiry, the 
Government indicated that it viewed AIDS as an area of major concern. 
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Policy response 
Reproductive health policies are enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation, in the Foundations of the Russian Federation Legislation on the Citizens 
Health Protection (approved in 1993), in other legislation directly or indirectly affecting 
the reproductive health services, in political decisions, taken by the Government. These 
policies are in agreement with the basic objectives set out at the International 
Conferences on Population and Development (ICPD, ICPD+5).  However, active 
reproductive health policy is a relatively new area for the Russian legislative and 
executive bodies, governmental and non-governmental organizations.  The Conception 
for Demographic Development of the Russian Federation (up to 2015) and the 
Conception for the Reproductive Health Protection of the Russian Federation (2000-
2004) recently adopted by the Government call for improving reproductive health and 
increasing healthy life expectancy alongside reinforcing the institution of family. 
A draft law on reproductive health protection was discussed in the State Duma; 
however, due to political sensitivity, the law was rejected.  In recent years legislative 
activity has been intensified at both federal and regional levels. Russian lawmakers 
passed a federal law on HIV/AIDS. In the absence of special federal legal regulations, 
several Russian regions (such as Ivanovo), adopted special laws on protection of the 
reproductive health and reproductive rights.    
Even in the absence of a comprehensive federal law, a number of national and 
regional programs in the field of reproductive health have been launched, aimed at 
improvement of health of the entire population and specific sub-groups (“Safe 
Maternity”, “Disabled Children”, “HIV/AIDS Prevention”, etc.).    
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General 
Possible cases of suicide are divided into two basic categories in the cause-of-
death statistics. If there is certainty that the case is an intentional suicide, it is classified 
accordingly (categories E950-959 in the ICD-9 international classification, X60-X84 in 
the ICD-10, and 173 in the old, Soviet list of causes of death). Alternatively, suicide 
may be suspected, but if other possibilities cannot be excluded, then the death is 
classified as being of an ”uncertain intention” (categories E980-989 in ICD-9, Y10-Y34 
in ICD-10, and 175 in the Soviet list). 
According to WHO estimates, some 800,000 suicides are committed annually 
around the world. Of these, at least a fourth occur in China. In fact, a large part of the 
Eurasian continent consists of high-suicide areas. In the Americas, in Oceania, and in 
Africa suicide rates are generally lower. Suicide usually ranks higher in statistics 
comparing Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL) than its share of total mortality because 
suicide victims are younger than most other deceased.  Suicide attempts, estimated to be 
between 10 and 20 times more numerous than completed suicides, and half of which 
may result in medical attention being received, also produce a cost in terms of 
individual suffering, the sometimes incurable physical consequences, and the days spent 
in medical care. 
The WHO counts a suicide rate of more than 20 per 100,000 as being “high.” 
Rates between 10 and 20 fall in the intermediate class, while those under 10 are 
regarded as being low. If the global estimate is true, the global rate would be between 
13 and 14 cases per 100,000 annually. The Western European average is of 
approximately the same magnitude, while the rates are higher in the East.  
As early as the 19th century, investigators of suicide mortality observed its relative 
stability. Sudden movements are exceptions; even during conditions of a general 
increase, such as occurred in Western Europe during the 19th century (Cavan 1928) or 
decrease, the development is likely to stretch over a number of years.  In Western 
Europe, the suicide trend has mainly been an upward one ever since the 19th century: 
after the dramatic increases in the 19th-early 20th century, the pace slowed down, 
however. Even the post-war increases have generally turned into decreases in the 1980s-
1990s.  
Demographically, suicide mortality seems to follow few rules. It is most common 
for men to commit suicide more often than women, but even this “rule” has its 
exceptions in, e.g., rural parts of China. In the more usual, male-dominated cases, the 
“sex quota” of suicide can vary from two men to each woman (Denmark, Holland) to 
four and more (Russia, some other NIS countries, parts of South America).  
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Regarding age patterns, it is most common to find suicide increasing slowly with 
age from 15 and upwards, and then increasing rapidly from somewhere between 65 and 
75 years of age. However, this pattern is not the only one observed. There are countries 
(Sweden, Russia) where the highest rates tend to occur in middle age (45-55 years) and 
then decline. In some countries (Poland, the UK) the peak may come even earlier, 
between 25 and 34 years of age; in yet others, the youngest groups have the highest 
suicide rates. 
The father of sociological suicide research, Emile Durkheim (1992/1897), thought 
that the levels of suicide mortality in a social unit were determined by a few basic 
properties of that unit, namely the prevailing degree of egoism (individual-centered 
social practices indicating the disintegration of collectivity) and anomie (defective 
regulation of society). However, even their opposites, altruism (extreme group 
consciousness) and fatalism (totalitarian regulation), were thought to lead to more 
suicide.  
Durkheim’s theory remains the most popular of those used in suicide 
epidemiology (Mäkinen 1997a). Other theories have highlighted, among other things, 
the effects of social modernization (Halbwachs 1930) and social disintegration (Cavan 
1928). More complex models may operate with several variables, such as Mäkinen's 
(op.cit.) division of cultural, social, political, “international”, diffusion, and availability 
factors in shaping the levels of suicide mortality. The large-scale theories are somewhat 
difficult to assess, partly because they are not always easily interpretable (Durkheim, 
e.g., has been criticized for the vagueness of his concepts) and, more importantly, 
because their complexity may render them impractical for use. 
In the medical-epidemiological literature especially, it is not uncommon to find 
attempts to establish causal links between suicide mortality and different variables such 
as, e.g., alcohol consumption (Norström 1995), unemployment (Norström 1988), 
economic conjunctures (Pierce 1971), social mobility, etc. Few definite conclusions can 
be drawn from these studies, the mixed results of which seem to be influenced by the 
different socio-cultural contexts in which they take place. A good example is Mäkinen's 
(1997b) attempt to replicate the study by Sainsbury, Jenkins, and Levey (1980) - 
practically nothing remained of the postulated "social correlates of suicide" from the 
earlier study, which comprised 15 social variables in 18 Western European countries. 
It must also be added that the prominence of explanations based upon some kind 
of mental illness leading to suicide (depression being almost invariably mentioned as its 
first and foremost cause) is somewhat surprisingly not matched by investigations at the 
collective level. The reason for this may be, apart from the difficulties and variations in 
defining "depression", that social groups (such as women or young persons) with a 
known higher prevalence of depression also happen to be those with lower rates of 
suicide. Here, the discrepancy between the most popular cause at the individual level 
and its seeming failure to explain suicide at the collective level has, among other things, 
spawned thoughts of redefining the concept of depression.  
The bulk of the suicide-preventive work is embedded in the everyday work of 
psychiatrists, psychologists, doctors, nurses, school nurses, priests and others in direct 
contact with people. This kind of prevention most often consists of just listening to the 
suicidal person's grievances, and sometimes of more practical measures, in extreme 
cases even the administration of anti-depressive (or other) medication and/or care in a 
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closed ward. A more outward-oriented form of this activity are the telephone (now even 
Internet) helplines, which offer their services to those in need.   Another kind of suicide-
preventative strategy consists of making the means of suicide more or less unavailable, 
or at least reducing their lethality. In this category we find attempts at reducing the 
toxicity of common drugs and household gas, controlling the availability of guns, 
surrounding high places with nets or fences, etc. Common to all these is that they make 
suicides more difficult to perform.  Special attention must be paid to the new generation 
of antidepressive medicines, which has been postulated, e.g., to have reduced the 
Swedish suicide rate by half. Despite uncertainty regarding the exact causalities and 
mechanisms involved, it is possible (even if in my opinion not yet proved) that these 
medicines have a considerable suicide-preventive potential. 
Concentrated efforts to assemble all these and other measures in one large 
strategy have emerged in the 1990s in parts of Western Europe in the form of national 
suicide-preventive "programs". Although they are still in a trial-and-error phase, these 
programs represent a new approach combining the empirical facts provided by medical, 
behavioral, and technical sciences with the coercive powers of state authorities. 
Russian Suicide: A Historical Perspective 
The Historical Development of Russian Suicide Mortality Levels 
There are sporadic statistical data on Russian suicides since the beginning of the 
19th century. However, a rudimentary system for the collection of vital statistics was 
only effective from the 1860s. Despite its shortcomings, the data were probably 
reasonably correct (i.e. of the right magnitude) in peace times. War and unrest have, 
however, repeatedly hindered its function. Moreover, under the Soviet system all 
comprehensive collection of suicide mortality data was hindered between the end-1920s 
and the end-1950s. After that they remained secret until 1989.    
The level of Russian suicide mortality up until World War I was low by any 
standards (1-3 cases per 100,000), nor could any special trends be discerned until the 
first decade of the 20th century. At that time, suicide rates in European Russia climbed 
by 60% between 1903-10, and continued to do so right up until the threshold of World 
War I, during which the production of statistics was interrupted. After the war, the 
levels increased further, reaching 6/100,000 in the mid-1920s. 
Little can be said about what happened in the next 30 years, but Russian suicide 
rates did actually increase threefold some time during that period, rising to an 
internationally significant level in the 1960s. However, suicide mortality continued its 
relentless rise during the whole ”stagnation” period. 1984 was the peak year, as Russian 
suicide rate reached a high of 38.0 per 100,000.  
During the next three years, however, suicide rates decreased dramatically in a 
manner which has few if any precedents: from 38.0 they sank by nearly 40% to 23.1 in 
1986, a drop corresponding to 20,700 saved lives annually. Later research is divided 
about whether and in what proportions this development should be attributed to the 
Gorbacev anti-alcohol campaign or to the generally more hopeful atmosphere of the 
Perestroika period. 
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Whatever the cause of the remarkable decline in suicide, it did not last long. From 
1987-88, suicide rates started inching upwards, and then suddenly leapt by 62% 
between 1989 and 1994.  Russia is nt alone in having seen a dramatic increase in suicide 
during the economic transition: three former Soviet republics, Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, also had suicide mortality rates of 40/100,000 or higher in the 1990s.  
Country ranks in suicide mortality tend to be stable, but Russia is an exception.  
Its suicide mortality before 1900 was very low even in international terms. However, by 
1960 Russia ranked fairly high in the international statistics, and by 1984 it was in the 
second place in the world ranking of suicide mortality according to WHO statistics. 
After the brief respite in the mid-1980s, Russia now again belongs to the most affected 
countries. There are few examples of such dramatic changes in rank position, despite 
the long time periods involved. 
Suicide Research in Russia 
Russia has a tradition of suicide research which compares favorably with any 
European country. Scores of Russian scientists from many different specialities took 
part in the all-European discussion about the causes of the rising suicide rates during the 
19th century, and its Russian offshoots. Hundreds of scientific articles about suicide 
were written by Russians even before World War I. Among the writers were world-
famous names such as Ivan Pavlov (1999), Vladimir Bekhterev (1912), and Pitirim 
Sorokin (2002). This tradition was revived by the school of ”moral statistics” in the 
1920s, with M.N. Gernet as the leading name. At that time the scientific aspirations 
seemed to develop very favorably indeed, but the ideology of the ”revolutionary” 
government put an end to all critical discussion about society. Suicide became instead a 
despicable practice of the ”enemies of the people” (Rittersporn 1997). 
This situation began to change gradually from the beginning of the 1960s. A sign 
of this was the inclusion of several articles about suicide in the Great Medical 
Encyclopedia in 1963. There, suicide was depicted as a personal psychiatric 
disturbance, an interpretation which was to last, with some modification, for the rest of 
the Soviet period. Suicide research was henceforth permitted, if not actively supported. 
In 1970, the All-Soviet Suicidological Center17, headed by the psychiatrist Aina 
Ambrumova, was established in connection with the Scientific Research Institute for 
Psychiatry of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. However, research was 
politically hampered by a) a lack of data materials at the collective level or, at any rate, 
the rights to their publication, and b) the limits directly and indirectly imposed by the 
government on any research that sought to relate suicide mortality to the form of 
societal organization. This said, a small number of active researchers nevertheless began 
to appear during the 1970s-1980s.  
Russian Suicide Mortality Today 
Especially since there is a tendency to assign suicide deaths to other causes, the 
validity of sucide statistics is always an issue.  As mentioned above, the collection of 
Russian mortality statistics was not entirely unified until the ZAGS (Zapis Aktov 
                                                 
17 Now Federal Scientific-Methodological Center of Suicidology (Federalnyi Nauchno-
Metodicheskii Tsentr Suitsidologii). 
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Grazhdanskogo Sostoyaniya18) system was introduced in 1922. The transition to the 
new system did not, however, seem to be accompanied by any large changes in the 
frequency of suicide or its distribution (Mäkinen 2004a).   In the "black box" interlude 
beween the end-1920s and the end-1950s, suicide figures were mixed with homicides 
and accidents so as to render them inaccessible unless initial death certificates could be 
found. Since the end-1950s, however, suicides were recorded, although the results were 
not published but kept "for authorized use" (dlya sluzhebnaya polzovaniya). After the 
fall of the Soviet Union, the mortality statistics from 1965-1989 have been "corrected" 
in a cooperative project between Russian and French demographers (Meslé et al. 1996). 
However, there has not been much criticism of the published statistics, on the contrary, 
several authors (O’Carroll 1989, Wasserman & Värnik 1998) have voiced their opinions 
in favor of their basic validity.   
After 1994, suicide rates declined somewhat until 1998, and have risen again 
(2001: 39.7/100,000) since then. Russia has again become one of the world leaders in 
suicide mortality. The current suicide mortality rate corresponds to approx. 57,000 
deceased persons annually. There are currently no signs of a decrease from this high 
level. 
Suicide is one of the most important causes of death, after ischemic heart diseases 
and cerebro-vascular diseases19. Due to the generally very high levels of mortality in 
contemporary Russia, the share of suicide mortality amongst all-cause mortality (2.7% 
of all deaths in 1999) is not extremely high, however, it is estimated that suicide lowers 
the life expectancy of Russians by more than half a year. Its share of responsibility for 
the ”explosion of unhealth” in the beginning of the 1990s was considerable; according 
to Notzon et al. (1998), suicide was then responsible for 5.2% of the total increase in 
mortality.  
Not all groups in Russian society are equally touched by the problem of suicide. 
One large difference is found between men and women – there were 5.4 male suicides 
for each female suicide in 1997. The difference between sexes is at its largest among the 
35-44 year olds (7.9 men for each woman in 2001) and least among the oldest (3.2 
among the 75-84 year olds)20. 
Among the age groups, those under 15 are largely protected. However, Russian 
suicide rates increase steeply from the young age groups (men 15-24 yrs: 61.4; 25-34: 
88.121), and reach their peak in the middle age, where a staggering rate of 105.7 per 
100,000 males between 45 and 54 years of age was recorded in 2001 (see Table 1).  
Voitsekhovich and Redko (1994) have sought to build ”portraits” of suicides by 
means of ”ideal types” created with the help of factor analysis. The male ”ideal type” in 
their  material (from Kuban) was a divorced, lonely, unemployed man between 20 and 
59 years of age with alcohol problems and, possibly, some criminality in his 
background. The corresponding female type was an old woman with mental health 
problems not caused by alcohol.  
                                                 
18 Registry of Acts of Civil Status. 
19 I.e. when neoplasms are differentiated according to their location. 
20 These rates are standardized for sex and age (in five-year age groups) by WHO.  
21 Year 2001 – the rates are standardized for sex and age (in five-year age groups) by WHO.  
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Divorced and widowed persons are at a clearly greater risk for suicide than are 
the married. Furthermore, there are in Russia, as elsewhere, groups such as chronic 
alcoholics, drug addicts, or people suffering from grave mental illnesses, whose suicide 
rates are estimated to widely exceed the average. The estimates of the share of the 
mentally ill among Russian suicides vary widely, however, just as they do elsewhere. 
 
Table 1.  Suicide mortality rates (per 100,000 population) by sex and age, Russia, 2001  
Age Males Females 
0-14   2.2  0.7 
15-24  61.3  9.5 
25-34  88.1 11.2 
35-44  93.1 11.6 
45-54 105.7 13.8 
55-64  91.1 14.3 
65-74  96.6 17.3 
75-84  81.4 25.3 
Source: WHO  
 
Geographically, there is a gradient between north and east (high rates) and south 
and west (lower rates).  This paralels the gradient for homicide describer by Andrienko 
elsewhere in this Report. 
A main focus of research has been on the causes of the violent eruption of 
suicide in the 1989-94 period, and the explanatory attempts have mostly concentrated 
on the high and increasing levels of suicide in Russia.  The main hypotheses here are 
those of alcohol consumption (Ambrumova & Postovalova 1991; Wasserman, Värnik & 
Eklund 1994; Nemtsov 2003), and the ”political atmosphere” factor (Watson 1995, 
Värnik 1997).   There are, however, many other types of explanation: increasing suicide 
has been connected to growing socio-economic inequalities (Gilinskii in Yunatskevich 
& Gilinskii 1999), unemployment (Orlova 1998), and poverty (Zharikov et al. 1997), 
the changes in norms and values, incl. the loss of previous models and ideals (op.cit.; 
Orlova 1998), broken social relations (Orlova 1997), and the quality of medical services 
(Orlova 1997). 
Transition alone, in the sense of a change from a socialist to a market-based 
economic system, can hardly be held responsible for the explosion in suicide, even if it 
may have acted as a trigger in some environments.  In a study of 27 Eastern European 
countries in 1984-94, it was shown that only eight of them (Russia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Slovenia) had major problems of 
increasing suicide mortality after economic transition and democratization had begun. 
Interestingly, all of these countries also had the same ”profile” of suicide mortality, 
characterized by a high suicide rate, high sex quota and a tendency towards a middle-
age peak in suicide (Mäkinen 2000), which suggests cultural similarities. Controlling 
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for other variables, suicide was not significantly correlated with economic hardship22, 
while it was significantly associated with alcohol consumption, social control, political 
democratization (negative correlation) and total mortality.  
According to WHO statistics, Russia occupied in 1999 the second place in Europe 
(and the world) after Lithuania in suicide mortality (see Table 2). The growth of suicide 
in Russia since 1989 can only be matched by the Baltic countries of Estonia (+60% 
1989-94), Latvia (+58%), and Lithuania (+69%), and is as such striking.  
 
Table 2: Age-standardized suicide mortality rates (per 100,000 population), ten 
European countries with highest suicide rates, 2001 (or nearest year) 
Country 
 
Suicide rate 
Lithuania  43.7 
Russia 37.9 
Belarus 32.4 
Latvia 28.6 
Ukraine 28.2 
Estonia 28.1 
Hungary 26.6 
Slovenia 26.5 
Finland 22.0 
Belgium 19.6 
Source: WHO. 
 
Parasuicides (”suicide attempts”), suicide thoughts etc., which are often studied 
as indicators of suicide, cannot necessarily be counted as ”preparatory phases” for 
suicide but constitute phenomena in their own right. The populations of persons 
completing and attempting suicides are demographically very different.  Not much is 
known of the general levels of attempted suicide in Russia. The only comparative 
project in the area, the WHO/EURO Multicenter Study on Parasuicide, which has been 
running since the end of the 1980s and currently includes 25 centers in Europe, 
providing materials for detailed studies and in-depth comparisons, does not yet have any 
Russian participants. 
A general guess can, however, be based on the suicide methods used: it is not 
uncommon to find higher levels of parasuicide in countries where less lethal methods 
(such as medication) are commonly used in suicide. Conversely, where the popular 
                                                 
22 This is not undisputed: Brainerd (2001) found significant effects of both changes in GNP per 
capita and unemployment on male suicide in her study of 22 transition countries in 1988-98. 
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methods of suicide are more lethal (such as hanging or shooting), the relation between 
attempted and completed suicide should be different. Following this logic, we might 
guess that the number of attempted suicides in Russia, although certainly large, is not as 
high in relation to completed suicides as it is in many European countries. Ambrumova 
(1994), while acknowledging the limitations of the data, mentions a quota of 7-10 
parasuicides for each suicide..   
Attempts at Suicide Prevention in Russia 
In the current Russian health crisis, suicide has largely been left in the shadow of 
the more important causes of death.   Even if suicide is discussed in special contexts 
such as, e.g., the Armed Forces, prisoners, and the rescue workers in Chernobyl, it is 
less often mentioned in the more general discussions of mortality.  Here, its voluntary 
nature may contribute to its being set aside. While the experts are naturally both 
conscious and engaged with the problem of suicide mortality, it has yet to become an 
issue in the public consciousness. 
As yet, there has been no defined, centrally-led policy of suicide prevention in 
Russia. Preventive efforts are mainly confined to acts undertaken by care personnel in 
the course of their everyday duties in clinics, hospitals, schools, etc. The effectiveness 
of these may be hampered by the fact that Russians traditionally do not seek psychiatric 
care lightly - a heritage of the Soviet period, when the structure of psychiatric care was 
heavily oriented towards hospitalization and the treatment of severe mental illness. 
Local initiatives include special telephone hotlines23. They have existed since the 
1970s in Moscow, organized by the All-Soviet Suicidological Center, the work of 
which continues with individual-psychological crisis help with special “anti-suicidal” 
psychotherapeutic techniques24.  
Russian suicide research is recovering from its long sleep. In addition to the 
existing research center (and other researchers) in Moscow, there are research groups or 
researchers in St. Petersburg (the Sociological Institute of the RAS), Novosibirsk, 
Krasnodar, and other cities. A couple of book titles on suicide have appeared each year 
(although their quality has varied), and the first suicidology textbook (Yunatskevich & 
Gilinskii 1999) was published in 1999.      Research is still hampered by the general lack 
of resources, but also by the scarce and sporadic publication of suicide mortality data, 
which otherwise must be bought from the Central Statistical Office (Goskomstat). The 
information contained on the death certificates has been limited to sex, age, and place of 
domicile.  The research, so far scattered and based mainly on individual efforts, 
comprises both psychiatric and social efforts of understanding the nature of suicide and 
dealing with the individual in the risk zone for suicide. Although it does not yet 
correspond to the needs, if tradition is any guide, suicidology will in time flourish again 
on Russian soil. 
                                                 
23 Telefony doveriya – “telephones of trust”. 
24 See Ambrumova 1994. 
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Introduction 
Following the break up of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced a rise in 
mortality unprecedented in the peacetime history of industrial nations. In just three 
years, from 1991 to 1994, life expectancy at birth fell six years for males (to 57.6) and 
three years for females (to 71.2). Widespread ill health, especially for males, must 
underlie these low life expectancies.  Despite a partial recovery, Russian males by 2001 
had a life expectancy at birth of only 59 years, less than males born in Nepal or 
Bangladesh, and only slightly better than those born in the Sudan or Guyana. (See 
Table 1). 
Striking as these statistics are, it is important to place them in context.  In terms 
of male life expectancy at birth, it is true that Russia now ranks with low-income 
developing countries.  In other respects, however, Russian mortality does not at all 
resemble that of a low-income country. Russia's life expectancy for females, at 72 years, 
is relatively high. Its rate of infant mortality is low, at 18 per thousand births, as is the 
rate of adult (age 15-60) mortality for females. The adult mortality rate for males, 
though, is strikingly high: a fifteen year-old Russian boy faces a 42 percent probability 
of dying before the age of 60. (see Table 1 once again.) This suggests that Russia's high 
rates of mortality stem, not so much from poverty or poor health services, but rather 
from the behavior of its adult citizens. Further evidence is that increases in mortality 
after 1990 were concentrated in adults of working age, especially males, and not 
children or the elderly, as would be expected were deaths to rise as a result of increases 
in poverty or a breakdown in the health care system. Moreover, the urban and wealthy 
regions of Russia, which experienced the greatest increases in average income, have 
also suffered the greatest declines in life expectancy (Walberg et al. 1998). 
It is important also to note that Russia's record of high adult male mortality 
predates its transition from socialism to a market economy. In 1960, Russia's male life 
expectancy of 63 years was similar to that of middle-income developing countries like 
Hong Kong, Jamaica, Cuba and Uruguay. (see Table 1 once again.) Over the next four 
decades, life expectancy for males in Russia stagnated, whereas in each of these four 
developing countries it increased steadily to more than 70 years (to an impressive 77 
years in the case of Hong Kong). In 1990, prior to the mortality crisis, the life 
expectancy of Russian males was close to those in Vietnam, Vanuatu, Iran and the 
Dominican Republic, countries with very low incomes and much greater poverty than 
Russia. 
Russia's remarkable, short-lived rise in life expectancy in the 1980s has received 
considerable attention. It began in 1985 and lasted through 1987, with male life 
expectancy increasing by more than two full years, and female life expectancy by more 
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than a year (see Table 2).  This coincided with Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign, and 
the decreased mortality is widely assumed to be the result of reduced consumption of 
alcohol.  
 
Table 1.  Life expectancy and mortality, selected countries, 1960-2001. 
 
Country Life Expectancy  Adult Mortality   Infant 
  (years at birth) (per 1,000)     Mortality 
  Male Female     Male   Female   (per 1,000) 
   
----------------------------------1960------------------- 
Hong Kong 62.5 69.8  301 148  41 
Jamaica 62.5 66.3  251 196  56 
Cuba  62.6 65.9  297 234  35 
RUSSIA 63.3 71.5  N/A N/A  N/A 
Uruguay 64.9 71.1  187 105  48 
 
----------------------------------1970------------------- 
China  61.0 62.5  249 180  69 
Venezuela 62.6 67.8  231 158  47 
RUSSIA 63.0 73.5  278 102  N/A 
Bahamas 63.2 67.7  231 181  38 
Paraguay 63.5 67.7  211 157  57 
 
----------------------------------1980-------------------- 
Tunisia 61.4 63.5  232 214  72 
Thailand 61.5 65.8  280 210  45 
RUSSIA 61.5 73.0  341 120  22 
Fiji  62.0 66.2  209 152  34 
Colombia 62.9 68.6  237 162  40 
 
----------------------------------1990-------------------- 
Vietnam 62.8 66.8  215 153  36 
Vanuatu 62.9 66.1  288 241  52 
RUSSIA 63.8 74.3  298 107  17 
Iran  63.9 65.4  170 174  54 
Dom. Rep. 64.0 68.0  157 109  53 
 
----------------------------------2001-------------------- 
Sudan  56.5 59.4  341 291  65 
Guyana 58.4 67.1  299 209  54 
RUSSIA 59.4 72.1  424 153  18 
Nepal  59.6 59.1  314 314  66 
Bangladesh 61.1 62.2  262 252  51  
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003 (CD-ROM), except for the 
Russian life expectancy figures for 1960 and 1970, which are from Cornia and Panicciá 
(2000, table 1.1, p. 6). 
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Table 2.  Life expectancy in Russia, 1980-2001. (years at birth) 
 
Year  Male  Female 
 
1980  61.5  73.0  
1981   N/A   N/A  
1982  62.8  73.5  
1983   N/A   N/A  
1984   N/A   N/A  
1985  63.8  74.0  
1986   N/A   N/A  
1987  65.0  74.6  
1988  64.8  74.4  
1989  64.4  74.4  
1990  63.8  74.3  
1991  63.5  74.3  
1992  62.0  73.8  
1993  58.9  71.9  
1994  57.3  71.1  
1995  58.3  71.7  
1996  59.6  72.7  
1997  60.9  72.8  
1998  61.3  72.9  
1999  59.9  72.4  
2000  59.0  72.0  
2001  59.4  72.1   
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, CD-ROM. 
 
Is increased drinking the whole story? 
This may well be part of the explanation, but it cannot be the entire story, for 
three reasons. First, although it is true that legal sales of alcohol fell sharply, illegal 
production, sales and consumption of samogon (home-distilled vodka) increased--no 
one knows by how much, but some (e.g. Sergeyev, 1998, p. 75) argue convincingly that 
the increase in illegal supply was so great that total (legal plus illegal) alcohol 
consumption did not fall very much, if at all.  Second, female mortality fell along with 
that of males, even though women are known to drink very little alcohol in Russia.  
Third, mortality rates fell for a broad array of causes of death, not only alcohol 
poisoning, accidents, suicides, and homicides, but also respiratory diseases, diseases of 
the digestive system, tuberculosis and cardiovascular diseases where the link to alcohol 
abuse is not as strong (Shkolnikov et al., 1998, p. 2003). 
An alternative explanation for the sudden rise in life expectancy is that it was a 
product of glasnost and perestroika, not the anti-alcohol campaign. Men may have 
continued to drink, but they drank away from work and with a different purpose because 
all citizens, men and women alike, came to have hope for a better future. This, in 
essence, is the view of David Satter, a keen observer of Russia who acquired impressive 
knowledge of the country as Moscow correspondent for the Financial Times in 1976-
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1982, and for the Wall Street Journal in 1982-1988. Satter, in a recent book, does not 
even mention the anti-alcohol campaign or decreased alcohol consumption as a possible 
explanation for improved mortality in the 1980s: 
 "When Gorbachev came to power and initiated his policies of 
glasnost and perestroika, the death rate fell by 40 percent. Even though 
the economic situation was difficult, with shortages and long lines, there 
was an emotional surge in response to the advent of freedom of speech 
and the opening of borders." (Satter, 2003, p. 255) 
Though speculative, Satter's intuition that increased optimism could have 
affected mortality is supported by empirical research.  Longitudinal studies of 2428 men 
aged 42 to 60 in Finland (Everson et al., 1996) and 795 men and women aged 64 to 79 
years in San Antonio, Texas (Stern, Dhanda and Hazuda, 2001) revealed that persons 
who felt hopeless, and held negative beliefs about the future were significantly more at 
risk of death from all causes, independent of depression, perceived health, prevalent 
disease, and social support.  Another study (Scheier et al., 1999) showed that, compared 
to pessimistic patients, optimistic patients in Pittsburgh experienced better recovery 
after coronary artery bypass graft surgery, independent of self-esteem, depression, 
neuroticism and traditional risk factors. 
If increased optimism caused mortality to fall in the 1980s, then widespread 
hopelessness may well account for its rise in the 1990s. To quote David Satter once 
again: 
 "The absence of legal safeguards during the privatization process 
led to an increased level of conflict in Russia and destroyed the 
possibility of introducing elements of moral idealism in post-communist 
society.  For many people who had been raised under the Communist 
system, the resulting spiritual void was intolerable. It led to a sharply 
higher murder rate, a spiralling suicide rate, and an epidemic of heart 
attacks and strokes." (2003, p. 203) 
At the same time, government removed all restrictions on the sale of alcohol, 
cheap vodka flooded the country, and deaths by alcohol poisoning increased sharply, so, 
some argue, the increased deaths were simply the result of increased abuse of alcohol. 
While containing much truth, this reasoning does not go far enough.  Why was there 
increasing abuse of alcohol?  Could it have resulted from increased hopelessness, a 
feeling that life was no longer worth living?  After all, is not excess or inappropriate 
consumption of alcohol, to the point of placing one's life at risk, a form of suicide?  If 
alcohol were not easily available, might not those who have lost all hope for the future 
find some other means to end their life? 
Analysis of the effect of feelings of hopelessness on drinking habits, health and 
mortality would seem to be a promising area for research in Russia, but the subject for 
the most part has been ignored.  An exception is a 1998 survey of 1009 households in 
Taganrog, a medium-sized industrial city situated 1000 kilometres south of Moscow 
(Carlson, 2001).  In this follow-up to an earlier, 1993/94 survey, the researchers 
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included a question on hopelessness25 (lack of control over one's life) and found it to be 
an important determinant of self-rated ill health and heavy drinking, but not smoking. 
Surprisingly, there was no relationship between either of the two risk factors they 
studied (drinking and smoking) and perceived ill health.26 Logistic regressions 
controlled for effects of education, social networks and economic circumstances. 
The difference between hopelessness and stress 
Hopelessness bears some similarity to 'psychosocial stress', which a number of 
scholars (Shapiro, 1995; Walberg et al., 1998; Cornia and Panicciá, 2000) have come to 
identify as the leading explanation for decreased life expectancy in Russia.  The two 
phenomena differ, however, in that hopelessness is always bad for physical and mental 
health, whereas stress can be beneficial.  To have workers in a constant state of 
relaxation is bad for income and productivity, and "some minimal amount of stress may 
be necessary for an individual to exhibit optimal performance" (Kaplan, Sallis and 
Patterson, 1993, p. 126).  If society truly wanted to reduce stress by any means, there 
would be no examinations at schools or universities. 
Students of the Russian health crisis tend to focus on negative effects of stress.  
Walberg et al. (1998), for example, construct a model in which the pace of economic 
change (measured by turnover of the labor force) produces psychosocial stress, which 
affects behavior, which increases the incidence of ill health and death in the 
population.27  The researchers do not measure psychosocial stress, or changes in 
behavior, such as consumption of alcohol, but they do examine 1990-1994 changes in 
                                                 
25  The actual survey question was: "Some people feel they have completely free choice and 
control over their lives, and other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what 
happens to them. Please use the scale to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you 
feel you have over the way your life turns out. None at all (1)...A great deal (10)". (Carlson, 
2001, p. 816) This seems to capture the essence of 'hopelessness', even though the word itself 
was not used. Everson et al. (1996) assessed hopelessness by agreement or disagreement, on a 
scale of one to five, with each of two statements: "I feel that it is impossible to reach the goals I 
would like to strive for" and "The future to me seems hopeless, and I can't believe that things 
are changing for the better." Stern, Dhanda and Hazuda (2001) classified as hopeless all who 
answered "no" to the question "Are you hopeful about the future?".  
26  Another surprising finding was a sharp decrease from 1993/94 to 1998 in the proportion of 
respondents in Taganrog reporting 'heavy' drinking (defined as more than half a liter of 40% 
alcohol per week), from 29.2% to 13.8% in the case of males, and from 2.5% to 0.9% in the 
case of females. Declines were evident across all age groups. See Carlson, 2001, table 3, p. 809. 
It is unfortunate that this survey, like others we have seen, gathered data only on the quantity of 
alcohol consumed, and not the frequency of its consumption. Daily consumption of, say, 75 ml 
of vodka (.525 liters in a week) is very different from consuming half a liter each Saturday 
night, and different again from consuming a liter of vodka in a single binge each fortnight, 
though average weekly consumption is the same in each instance. Information on binge drinkers 
is needed, but their identification requires inclusion of a question on frequency of drinking as 
well as the quantity consumed per week or per month. 
27 The full model is more complex.  Psychosocial stress also affects health indirectly through its 
effect on the crime rate, and there is feedback from ill health to psychosocial stress. See 
Walberg et al., 1998, figure 4, p. 316. 
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life expectancies in 52 regions of European Russia, and find them to be positively 
related to the pace of economic change.  The policy implication is that economic change 
is bad for health. Residents of rural, remote and less developed regions of Russia are 
better off than "urban areas that have been exposed most to social and economic 
transition and which, while experiencing the greatest increases in average income, have 
become the most unequal and have also had the greatest increases in crime" (Walberg, 
et al., 1998, p. 316). 
By this reasoning, optimal economic policy would avoid stress by freezing the 
structure and techniques of production so that there is no movement of labor from one 
activity to another. This cannot be correct, any more than it would be correct to reduce 
stress in schools by abolishing exams. All change produces stress, but change is very 
useful if it results in greater wealth, a higher standard of living and the means to attain 
better health. Stress is inevitable in a dynamic society. What is not inevitable is 
widespread failure to cope with stress. Individuals react to stress better if they are 
optimistic about the future than if they feel hopeless, with no control over their lives. 
They will be more optimistic about the future if they are confident that their jobs and 
income depend on effort and skills rather than personal connections, on "what you 
know" rather than "who you know". Governments can help by establishing the rule of 
law and by eliminating corruption at all levels. They can help further by providing 
income support, and help with retraining and relocation for workers who lose their job 
due to circumstances beyond their control. 
Students of human behavior are able to avoid the conclusion that all change is 
bad while retaining the assumption that stress is always bad simply by redefining the 
word 'stress' to exclude those situations that an individual can handle without too much 
discomfort. Lazurus and Folkman (1984) provide what Kaplan, Sallis and Patterson 
(1993, p. 105) describe as "the best definition to date" of stress, namely that it is "a 
particular relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the 
person as taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering his or her well-
being." Subjective appraisal of the situation by each affected individual is crucial to the 
definition. The same event, say, loss of employment with no immediate prospects of 
getting another job, limited savings to draw on, and limited support from friends and 
family, would be classified as stress for a person that feels hopeless, but not for a person 
full of optimism. 
Shapiro (1995, p. 168), using a similar definition of stress, explains that "it is not 
just pressure (the deadline to finish a conference paper, for example) which produces 
stress in this sense.  It is the absence of strategies for coping with pressures and needs 
for adaptation.  This may arise because individuals are ill-equipped to cope, or it may 
arise because the social and economic situation is so chaotic that reliable strategies are 
difficult to choose. I think in Russia we find both."  She then makes the very relevant 
and useful observation "those who feel they are the masters of their fate can cope best 
under the same inherently stressful situation."  Precisely.  We are in complete 
agreement. Nonetheless, focusing on the reasons for hopelessness, on ways to provide 
individuals with the tools needed to cope with stress, is more useful than focusing on 
avoidance of the stressful situation itself.  How can public policy contribute to making 
more people feel that they are "masters of their fate", in control of their own lives?  The 
search for answers to this question should be high on our research agenda. 
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Social norms and lifestyles 
If an important part of the ill health and high mortality of the Russian people can 
be attributed to their inability to cope with the stress of the transition to a market 
economy, an even larger part is a result of their unhealthy lifestyles, which include high 
consumption of alcohol and cigarettes, diets high in fat and low in fruits and vegetables, 
and lack of exercise (Cockerham 2000).  This lifestyle is more characteristic of men 
than women, and is reflected in the fact that Russian women are healthier than men and 
live, on average, 13 years longer.  There is no evidence that lifestyles are becoming 
more healthy.  On the contrary, young women, persuaded by mass advertising, are 
beginning to take up the traditionally male habit of smoking cigarettes.28 And, as 
described by Fuller elsewhere in this Report, the small, but growing number of young 
abusers of injectable drugs, has the most serious implications for the spread of 
HIV/AIDS (Veeken, 1998; Walgate, 2002). 
Occasionally individuals choose lifestyles based exclusively on narrow self-
interest.  Most often, however, lifestyles are determined largely by peer pressure and by 
unwritten social norms (Elster 1989).  Within the Russian family, for example, "there is 
almost an unspoken social compact: the man gets 50 per cent more meat, while the 
woman (with much less body weight) actually eats more fruit and almost as many 
vegetables" (Shapiro 1995, p. 161).  This social norm, intended to favor the male 
breadwinner, inadvertently benefits the woman, who consumes less fat.  
Drinking, even more than eating, is a social activity subject to clear social 
norms. Except for a modest amount of wine or beer consumed with meals, people of all 
ages and all cultures rarely drink alone.  Researchers in Vancouver, Canada discovered 
long ago that the primary determinant of a beer parlor patron's consumption of was the 
number of friends in his or her drinking group (Cutler and Storm 1975).  Manufacturers 
of alcoholic beverages are very much aware of this, so emphasise socialization in ads in 
an effort to promote this particular social norm (Lee, 1997).  In Russia, "group norms 
and interpersonal dynamics more or less force the choice to drink, if the man wishes to 
belong and freely participate in the company of his friends, which in essence amounts to 
not having a choice at all" (Cockerham 2000, p. 1322). 
Policy response 
Social norms are not carved in stone; for better or worse, they can and do change 
over time.  Tobacco companies know this and, at the very moment, are successfully 
changing the norm in Russia against smoking by females.  Governments should do as 
much, for social rather than commercial purposes.  To promote healthier lifestyles, they 
could prohibit the advertising of tobacco products, tax them to increase their price to 
consumers, and, using the proceeds of the tax, mount an educational campaign in 
schools, on radio and television explaining the harm that smokers inflict on themselves 
and on others. 
                                                 
28  Statistics from the 1993/94 and 1998 Taganrog household surveys (Carlson, 2001, table 4, p. 
809) are disturbing. The proportion of adult females who smoke increased from 7.1% to 10.2% 
as a result of younger women picking up the habit. Female smokers increased from 13.7% to 
21.8% in the 19-29 year age group, and from 9.8% to 19.6% in the 30-39 year age group. 
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Hong Kong in 1974-1986 was able to reverse a deeply entrenched social norm, 
tolerance of corruption (Hauk and Saez-Marti 2002).  After suffering centuries of 
corruption and experiencing many failed attempts to fight it, Hong Kong launched in 
1974 a new Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC).  ICAC succeeded by 
mounting a massive, 12-year educational program in the schools while simultaneously 
increasing penalties for corrupt behavior.29  Before ICAC, only a minority of residents 
of Hong Kong recognized corruption as a social problem; after ICAC, a large majority 
of the population became intolerant of corruption.  In 1977 only 32 percent of residents 
of the colony thought that tipping government employees for prompt service was 
morally wrong; this proportion rose to 72 percent in 1986.  By 1998, 85 percent of 
young people (aged 15-24) surveyed said they would not tolerate corruption in 
government or private business.  The social norm for the current generation is 
intolerance of corruption, whereas the norm for their parents was complete tolerance.  
Laws against corruption are now effective because they reflect widely held social 
norms. 
Given sufficient will, it should be possible for Russia to launch a similar 
campaign to combat the problems of abuse of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs, or even 
to attack corruption.  It is necessary, however, that any program last many years and that 
it include education as well as increased penalties or prices for targeted practices and 
products.  President Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign failed because it was short-lived 
and because it ignored education.  It began in May of 1985 and was very unpopular, so 
was gradually phased out and was completely over by October of 1988.  Moreover, the 
campaign was prohibitive in nature, increasing prices, imposing penalties and restricting 
the output of vodka, but did nothing to educate the population and change social norms. 
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4.  Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
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Policy recommendations 
 The presentations made in this workshop give rise to a number of general 
recommendations, such as improving data availability and sharing and moving from a 
reactive focus on health care to a proactive one on health.  The dearth of studies treating 
the economic impacts of health problems and on the cost-effectiveness of possible 
interventions was striking.  There is clearly a need to train more economists in the area 
of health, more health specialists in economics, and for more medical demographers.  In 
the absence of such studies, any set of policy recommendations is likely to be a wish 
list, rather than a prioritized set of options presented to policy makers.  On the bright 
side, this is often the case in public health policy making, and a systematic catalogue of 
desirable actions is not without value. 
Moreover, as Judith Shapiro argued in her presentation, cost effectiveness is not 
necessarily the best approach to identifying attractive interventions. Even cost-effective 
interventions often require start-up investment costs that are daunting in the context of 
economic crisis (e.g., provision of a universal basic care package) or offend interest 
groups who exercise veto power in the context of political fracture (e.g., policies to 
address alcohol or the terrible health impacts of the Russian penal code and system).  
What is needed, Dr. Shapiro appears to be saying, are interventions that are cost 
effective, offend almost no one, and offer multiple economic and non-economic 
advantages. 
As is natural during economic transition, there has been a great deal of debate 
and controversy in Russia over the roles of the public and private sectors in health care.  
This debate is well developed in the international public health and health economics 
literatures, where the basic tradeoff is seen to be between crowding-out private medical 
care and protecting the poor against catastrophic medical expenditure (often for 
treatments that would be affordable to the middle class).  While not meaning to 
trivialize this debate, Russian policy makers need to realize that no amount of spending, 
and no optimal split between private and public, can deliver good health if the adverse 
health behaviors documented in this workshop are not addressed. 
In the same spirit, bad health behaviors will not improve if the underlying 
determinants, including the psychological ones, remain the same.  Population health 
reflects social hopes and fears in the same way that individual health reflects 
psychological well-being. If increased optimism caused mortality to fall in the 1980s, 
then widespread hopelessness may well account for its rise in the 1990s. Hopelessness 
bears some similarity to psychological stress, which some have identified as the leading 
explanation for decreased life expectancy in Russia.  Stress is inevitable in a dynamic 
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society, but not the deadly stress that comes from feeling that one is at the mercy of 
external, often capricious, forces.  Individuals will be more optimistic about the future if 
they are confident that their jobs depend on their effort and skills rather than personal 
connections.  Government can help by establishing the rule law, by eliminating 
corruption, and by giving the average Russian citizen the feeling that he, the citizen, 
ultimately controls the future. 
In the following paragraphs, we propose some policy recommendations that 
follow from the papers presented and discussions undertaken at the workshop 
1.  Go beyond acknowledging alcohol abuse – do something about it. 
In 1994 alcohol was responsible (directly or indirectly) for 32.6 percent of all 
deaths in Russia.  Currently, Between 400,000 and 700,000 people die prematurely each 
year due to alcohol. This was not always the case. The 1985 anti-alcohol campaign 
saved something like one million Russian lives.  But that ill-fated campaign failed to 
secure a sustained reduction in alcohol consumption because it was imposed from 
above.  In 1998, an increase in alcohol consumption began and with it a rise in the 
number of deaths, proving once again the close relationship between general mortality 
(particularly, it appears, ischemic heart disease) and alcohol consumption in Russia. 
The roots of rampant alcohol abuse in Russia are both psychological and 
economic.  Among the former are the paternalistic tradition in Russian culture, the 
dearth of social activities and pursuits not involving drinking, and living from one day 
to the next at the end of which is only enjoyment of the bottle.  The most obvious 
economic contribution to the high level of alcohol consumption is the low cost of liquor 
(including easy access), as well as the reluctance of policy makers to tackle a sector that 
is a major source of revenue to the state. 
The broad lesson of the failed Gorbachev crackdown was that interventions to 
reduce alcohol abuse require an integrated approach and broad public support.  Chances 
of receiving the latter can be improved by targeting interventions, as much as possible, 
at the hard-drinking population rather than the general drinking population.  Thus, for 
example, restrictions on alcohol availability and sale will offend moderate drinkers far 
less than taxes (which do little to deter hard drinkers anyway).  International experience 
(e.g., with anti-drunk driving campaigns) proves that across-the-board campaigns to 
increase awareness of the harm caused by drunkenness reduce public tolerance for 
heavy drinking.  Government policy makers fearing loss of the vodka tax should 
undertake a systematic review of the true costs and benefits of drinking in Russia. 
2.  Implement international best-practice approaches to deal with the exploding 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
HIV/AIDS is not only a health problem in its own right, it also threatens to drain 
the health system of resources badly needed to address other problems.  The epidemic 
of HIV/AIDS in the Russian Federation began slowly in the early to mid-1990s but 
achieved explosive growth rates by the latter part of the decade.  As a result, there are at 
least one million people suffering with AIDS in the Russian Federation. The need to 
care for those infected will place an increasingly heavy burden on the nation’s health 
system.  During the early stages of the epidemic, the disease was primarily isolated 
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among injecting drug users, who accounted for as many as 90 percent of all cases. 
Injecting drug use was the primary route of transmission of HIV/AIDS, because of the 
widespread sharing injecting equipment. Unfortunately, injecting drug use is on the rise 
in the Russian Federation, reaching between 3 and 4 million in 2002.  Draconian laws 
related to narcotic possession have driven at-risk groups further underground, impeding 
prevention efforts.  As many as 15 percent of sex workers are HIV positive.  
Furthermore, four of every five HIV positive women in the Russian Federation were 
involved in both sex work and drug use. Given the risk of arrest, many such sex workers 
are reluctant to seek medical testing and/or services for sexually transmitted infections.  
Youth are at elevated risk of contracting HIV through risky sexual behavior and drug 
use, because of their inadequate knowledge about how to prevent the disease. Efforts to 
educate young people are impeded by a lack of appropriate, targeted materials on safer 
sex behaviors. Furthermore, sexual health education is rarely provided in the Russian 
school system. Finally, many adolescents may consider condoms to be prohibitively 
expensive, thus limiting their use. 
Policymakers and law-enforcement officials should be persuaded of the 
applicability of international practices to the Russian context so that they do not impede 
the distribution of clean needles and syringes. Furthermore, the laws related to narcotic 
possession and trafficking must be revised so as not to further marginalize at-risk 
groups, thus impeding HIV/AIDS prevention efforts. The laws regarding sex workers 
should be administered in such a way as to encourage sex workers to seek medical 
testing and/or services for sexually transmitted infections.  The highest priority should 
be given to Russia’s youth who are at greatest risk of contracting HIV/AIDS. Schools 
should be provided with appropriate, targeted information materials on safer sex 
behaviors and they should be required to use these materials in sexual health education 
lectures, classes or seminars.  Schools should also be encouraged to provide adolescent 
students with condoms when they are requested to do so. 
3.  Make reproductive health a priority sector. 
Through co-factors such as inadequate sexual knowledge and high rates of 
sexually transmitted infections, the HIV/AIDS situation is closely related to the 
situation in reproductive health.  More generally, in the current situation of low fertility, 
poor mother and child health is a problem that Russia cannot afford, especially as 
unhealthy children grow up to be unhealthy adults.  Admittedly, “headline numbers” 
such as the maternal mortality and infant mortality rate have not deteriorated in Russia 
during transition (although they remain unacceptably high).  However, more detailed 
indices of reproductive health have declined spectacularly.  More than two-thirds of all 
pregnancies are now characterized by some complication, most commonly anemia, 
which has more than quadrupled since 1990.  Rates of congenital malformation and 
perinatal morbidity have increased.  While the number of abortions has declined, the 
ratio of abortions to live births has not, a reflection of the low prevalence of family 
planning.  An unacceptably high number of abortions take place outside medical 
facilities giving rise to elevated rates of abortion-related mortality and morbidity 
including secondary sterility. There has been an explosion in inflammatory diseases of 
the reproductive system among teenaged girls, as well as sexually transmitted infections 
such as syphilis, which offer an ideal transmission route for HIV/AIDS. 
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Not enough pregnant women in Russia are receiving are regular antenatal care 
and information on the importance of nutrition during pregnancy.  The inadequate 
public health approach to family planning is reflected in the high abortion rate.  
Attitudes towards open discussion of sexual matters and the antiquated approach to 
sexual education in the Russian school system need to be changed to address the 
epidemic of adolescent sexually transmitted infections, which offer an ideal 
transmission route for HIV/AIDS.  Condom availability and acceptance could be 
improved by improving quality, subsidizing price, broadening availability, and 
conducting publicity campaigns to promote usage. 
4.  Change attitudes towards smoking and combat the spread of tobacco 
among women 
The smoking rates of males in the Russia countries are amongst the highest in 
the world and show no evidence of decline. Data on the rates of current and ever 
smoking in Russia imply that the prevalence of smoking has increased rapidly between 
generations and especially in the youngest age group. Men are more likely than women 
to start smoking when young, to smoke more heavily, and to be nicotine dependent.  In 
women, smoking is significantly more common among younger compared to older 
generations. The rising rates of female smoking and lower age of uptake with its 
implications for higher levels of dependency are significant cause for concern.  Active 
marketing by transnational tobacco companies is one cause of the problem. 
Reliable data on smoking prevalence are a prerequisite for developing the 
effective policies and programs that are needed to reduce excessive smoking in the 
Russian Federation.  Hence, it is necessary to develop region-wide comparative data on 
the nation’s smoking habits.  Efforts to curtail current smoking patterns and prevent the 
rise in female smoking must include measures to curb the activities of transnational 
tobacco corporations.  Since these activities are successfully changing the norm in 
Russia against smoking by females, the Government should do as much to change social 
norms concerning tobacco use. The Government should prohibit the advertising of 
tobacco products, tax them and use the proceeds to mount anti-tobacco educational 
campaigns in schools, television and on radio. 
5.  Treat suicide and homicide as public health problems  
Suicide is among the most important causes of death in Russia after heart and 
cerebro-vascular diseases. It was responsible for 5.2 percent of the total increase in 
mortality in the 1990s. By 1984, Russia was ranked second in the world in suicide 
mortality. In the late 1980s, the suicide rate started inching upwards once more and then 
suddenly increased by 62 percent between 1989 and 1994. Since then, Russia has 
continued to be a world leader in suicide mortality.  Suicide was once a middle-class 
and upper class phenomenon, it has since become most prevalent among people with 
low social status and those living in rural areas. Males are still most likely to commit 
suicide. In 1997, there were 5.4 male suicides for each female suicide. Similarly, 
divorced and widowed persons are at greater risk for suicide than those who are 
married.  There is a clear link between alcohol abuse and suicide.  
The epidemiology of homicide is similar.  According to the World Health 
Organization (WHO), the Russian homicide rate is the fourth highest in the world. 
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During the transition period the homicide-related mortality rate grew by three times. It 
is now about 20 times that of Western Europe.  Alcohol abuse and unemployment are 
correlates of homicide as they are of suicide. 
Policies to reduce alcohol abuse are an important component of any response to 
suicide and homicide. Policies to reduce homicide mortality should start from the 
realization that inter-personal violence is first a social problem, and only second a 
criminal one. More aggressive policing will address only a small sub-set of the causes 
of lethal violence and must be accompanied by a broader public health approach to the 
problem.  In the area of suicide, international best practice indicates that public suicide 
prevention programs can make a difference. In addition to developing a central strategy 
and initiative concerning suicide prevention work that is supported by local initiatives, it 
is necessary to implement the most result-oriented and cost-effective forms of suicide 
prevention methods. Finally, it is necessary to build a long-term social base for 
supporting suicide prevention activities and research.  
6.  Institute special programs to address health problems of the homeless and 
incarcerated populations 
Among the most urgent health problems in Russia is the health situation of the 
homeless and incarcerated populations.  There are currently over 100,000 homeless 
persons living in Moscow and 50,000 in St. Petersburg, many of them victims of long-
term homelessness.  Most of these are Russian citizens who have completed secondary 
education, however, there is also a large number of “street children.”  Homelessness is 
both an issue of the lack of housing and the break up of normal social relations. Among 
the causes of the former are the closing of workers’ hostels, elimination or reduction of 
other institutional housing, such as mental hospitals, state orphanages, treatment centers 
for alcoholics.  The high cost of housing is also responsible for homelessness, 
particularly in the case of divorced men.  Cities are becoming tougher places for 
homeless people to find shelter. The shelters are only accessible to persons who had 
been residents of the city. Hence, other homeless people are increasingly dependent on 
the resources provided by NGOs,  
A disproportionate number of the homeless are ex-prisoners.  Russia has one of 
the highest incarceration rates in the world.  More than a third of 30-year-old males are 
listed among registered offenders.  Poor prison conditions and the concentration of drug 
users in prisons, often for infractions that would result in little more than a fine in many 
countries, have led to an epidemic of injecting drug use in Russia’s penal institutions.  
These institutions, as a result, are a breeding ground for HIV/AIDS and multi-drug 
resistant tuberculosis. 
The best way to address the health problems of marginalized populations is to 
prevent marginalization in the first place.  It is necessary to deal with the problem of 
homelessness both as an issue of a lack of housing and as an issue of the breakup of 
normal social relations.  Targeted housing subsidies are needed so that poor residents 
who would otherwise be unable to pay rent and owners of flats who might be unable to 
pay building maintenance fees are not evicted.  The shelters in large cities must be made 
accessible to all persons in need, not simply present and former legal residents of the 
city.  It is particularly important to provide shelter for those who have lost both housing 
and family support as a result of imprisonment.  The state must assist in developing a 
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variety of non-criminal youth subcultures that can provide attractive opportunities for 
homeless children and young people so that they will not find themselves dependent on 
handouts from charities or badly paid odd jobs. 
Russian lawmakers must ask themselves if current rates of incarceration are 
really well suited to the problems they are meant to address.  International best practice 
treats minor drug offences as a social and public health problem, not as major crimes 
requiring long-term incarceration.  Regardless of legal reform, urgent programs are 
needed to improve prison health.  5 million prisoners are released annually in Russia, if 
the current situation prevails, many will carry HIV/AIDS and multi-drug resistant 
tuberculosis back to their communities.  
7.  Reform the health-care financing system 
The ultimate problem in Russian health care finance is that not enough is spent 
on health, a legacy of the Soviet system in which health was considered a non-
productive sector, and that what is spent is often spent ineffectively and inequitably.  
The Russian constitution establishes the right of each citizen to health services at public 
health-care institutions free of charge. To give substance to that right, Russia has 
created a mixed general tax revenue/insurance-based health care financing system.  
Constitutional guarantee aside, however, access to free government-financed health-care 
decreased dramatically during the 1990s as a result of the general economic crisis. 
Furthermore, the scale of prevention activities has declined: access to quality health-
care is low: more health services are being provided on a fee-for-service basis, and 
informal payments for services have become commonplace.  The introduction of 
mandatory health insurance is still incomplete. Federal authorities implemented the 
program very poorly and not in full. As a result the mandatory health insurance system 
has not led to a more rational use of available resources. Furthermore, there is not 
enough money coming into the system to pay for the services to which the policyholders 
are entitled. 
The new Government should aggressively pursue health care financing reform.  
The gap between government guaranteed health benefits and available public financial 
resources needs to be closed.  The failures to date of mandatory health insurance system 
need to be assessed and the reform completed in line with modifications found to be 
necessary.  In order to make more efficient use of available resources, the loss-based 
approaches to health-care provider management should be ended. 
Concluding comment 
The proposal for this project stated succinctly “The timing of this conference is 
excellent” and went on to describe how health care reform is emerging as a key Russian 
reform issue.  This has been borne out as the new Putin government has made health 
care reform, along with other social issues such as pension reform, a priority.  This 
reform includes a complete reorganization of Ministries, with health issues being 
merged with pension and social security reforms (family assistance, unemployment 
benefits, disability and long term care, etc.).  This presages a broader and more heuristic 
approach to health in the Russian Federation, an approach less oriented to care and more 
in tune with the needs of the population.   
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Such an approach is entirely consistent with the ideas developed and insights 
gained during the course of the project “Policy Pathways to Health in the Russian 
Federation.”  The new emphasis on health emerging at the highest political level 
provides an excellent opportunity for moving forward policy actions such as those 
described above. However, data problems must be addressed and there is need to build 
capacity in the form of researchers and policy experts able to prioritize health 
interventions. International linkages to learn of best practice elsewhere in the world and 
to exchange insights with those experiencing similar health system transitions elsewhere 
in the region will be especially fruitful at this stage.  Members of the network formed 
through this project are presently discussing ways of addressing these needs and 
considering possibly fruitful future collaboration. 
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Annex 1.  Program 
 
 
"Policy Pathways to Health in the Russian Federation" 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) 
Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg 
 
Wodak Room 
 
September 19-20, 2003 
 
Agenda 
 
   
Friday, 19 September 
   
07:45 
 
 
 
 
Bus leaves from Hotel Prinz Eugen 
Wiedner Gürtel 14, A-1040 Vienna, Austria 
Tel: (+43-1) 505 17 41 
Fax: (+43-1) 505 17 41-19 
to IIASA 
  
08:30-09:00 Welcome L. Hordijk, G. Zieger, L. MacKellar, N. Rimashevskaya 
09:00-09:45 Paper 1 L. MacKellar: "Overview"  
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S. Surinov: "Some aspects of the demographic development of the Russian 
Federation" / N. Rimashevskaya discussant 
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break  
11:00-11:45 Paper 3 D. Leon "Russian mortality since the mid-1980s" / E. Andryuchina discussant 
11:45-12:30 
 
Paper 4 
 
S. Shishkin: "Health Care Financing in the Russian Federation" / D. Horlacher 
discussant 
   
12:30-14:00 Lunch IIASA Schloss Restaurant, Green Coffee Room 
   
14:00-14:45 
 
Paper 5 
 
A. Nemtsov "Alcohol Situation in Russia, 1980-2002" / Y. Andrienko 
discussant 
14:45-15:30 
 
Paper 6 
 
D. Rotman: "Prevalence of Smoking in Eight Countries of the Former Soviet 
Union " / D. Leon discussant 
15:30-16:00 Coffee Break  
16:00-17:30 Panel 1 and floor Panel (J. Shapiro, chair): Policy priorities and plans 
  
   Panel participants: E. Kakorina, A. Nemtsov, N. Rimashevskaya,  
   S. Shishkin, S. Surinov 
  
17:30 Bus leaves from IIASA to Hotel Prinz Eugen 
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Saturday, 20 September 
   
08:15 Bus leaves from Hotel Prinz Eugen to IIASA 
   
09:00-09:45 Paper 7 Y. Andrienko "Crime and Violence in Russia" / L. Willmore discussant 
09:45-10:30 Paper 8 S. Stephenson "Homelessness in Russia" / S. Sourkov discussant 
10:30-11:00 Coffee Break  
11:00-11:45 Paper 9 V. Fuller "HIV/AIDS in Russia" / I. Katkova discussant 
11:45-12:30 
 
Paper 10 
 
I. Mäkinen "Suicide Mortality in Contemporary Russia" / L. MacKellar 
discussant 
   
12:30-14:00 Lunch IIASA Schloss Restaurant, Green Coffee Room 
   
14:00-14:45 
 
Paper 11 
 
C. Haerpfer "The health crisis in Russia and some CIS countries" / J. Shapiro 
discussant 
14:45-15:30 
 
Paper 12 
 
L. Willmore "Health, hopelessness, and social norms in Russia" / I. Mäkinen 
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15:30-16:00 Coffee Break  
16:00-16:45 Paper 13 J. Shapiro: "Setting Health Priorities in Russia", S. Shishkin, discussant 
16:45-17:45 
 
Floor 
 
L. MacKellar, chair: Research priorities and plans, "Where do we go from 
here?", any other business 
   
~ 18:00 Bus leaves from IIASA to Hotel Prinz Eugen 
Evening Social event  
19:30 
 
 
Bus leaves from Hotel Prinz Eugen to Social Event, dinner at:  
Wiener Rathauskeller, Salon Zierer 
Rathausplatz 1, 1010 Vienna 
22:30 Bus leaves from Rathauskeller to the Hotel Prinz Eugen 
  
 
 
 155
Annex 2. List of Participants 
 
 
"Policy Pathways to Health in the Russian Federation" 
IIASA, September 19-20, 2003 
Prof. Yuri V. Andrienko 
Centre for Economic and Financial 
Research (CEFIR) 
Office 720, Nakhimovsky prospect 47 
Moscow 117418 
RUSSIA 
Tel.: +7 095 105 50 02, ext. 215 
Fax: +7 095 105 50 03 
E-mail: YAndrienko@cefir.ru 
Web: http://www.cefir.org 
Dr. Elena Andryuchina 
Institute for Socio-Economic Population 
Studies 
The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) 
Centre for Socio-Economic Researches 
Health & Public Health Services 
Nachimovsky prospect 32 
117218 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Tel.: +7 095 129 04 00 
Fax: +7 095 129 08 01 
E-Mail: ipkat@msk.net.ru  
ipkatf@comtv.ru 
Dr. Olga Antonova 
State Committee of the Russian Federation 
on Statistics (Goskomstat) 
39 Myasnitskaya St. 
103450 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
E-mail: antonova_o@gks.ru 
Dr. Joanne L. Bayer  
Project Leader 
Risk, Modeling and Society Project 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: +43 2236 807 308 
Fax: +43 2236 71313 
E-mail: bayer@iiasa.ac.at 
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at 
 
 
Dr. Vanessa Fuller 
Materials Production Co-ordinator 
Information Materials Development 
Department 
AIDS Foundation East-West (AFEW) 
Chayanova St. 15/5 
125267 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
E-mail: vanessa_fuller@afew.org 
 vanessa_fuller2001@yahoo.com 
 
 
Prof. Christian W. Haerpfer 
CSD-Centre for Strategic Development 
Institute for Advanced Studies 
(Institut für Höhere Studien, IHS) 
Stumpergasse 56 
A-1060 Vienna 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: +43 1 599 92 138 
E-mail: haerpfer@ihs.ac.at 
 
 
 
 
 156
Prof. Leen Hordijk 
Director 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: +43 2236 807 402 
Fax: +43 2236 807 366 
E-mail: hordijk@iiasa.ac.at 
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at 
Prof. David E. Horlacher 
Department of Economics 
Middlebury College 
Middlebury, Vermont 05753 
U.S.A. 
Tel.: +1 802 388 1028 
E-mail: d_horlacher@yahoo.com 
Dr. Ekaterina P. Kakorina 
Head of the Department Medical 
Information 
Deputy Head of the Department of 
Organization and Development of Medical 
Care to Population  
Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation 
Rakhmanovsky per 3 
101431 Moscow 
RUSSIA  
Fax: +7 095 921 78 55 
E-mail: Kakorina@rol.ru 
Prof. Irina Katkova 
Institute for Socio-Economic Population 
Studies 
The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) 
Centre for Socio-Economic Researches 
Health & Public Health Services 
Nachimovsky prospect 32 
117218 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Tel.: +7 095 129 04 00 
Fax: +7 095 129 08 01 
E-Mail: ipkat@msk.net.ru 
ipkatf@comtv.ru 
Dr. David Leon 
Professor of Epidemiology 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine 
Keppel St. 
London WC1E 7HT 
UK 
Tel.: +44 207 927 2252 
Fax: +44-207 580 6897 
E-mail: David.Leon@lshtm.ac.uk 
 
 
Dr. Landis MacKellar 
Risk, Modeling and Society Project 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: +43 2236 807 543 
Fax: +43 2236 71313 
E-mail:  mckellar@iiasa.ac.at  
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at 
and 
Center for Health Economics 
Department of Economics 
City University 
London, UK 
 
 
Dr. Ilkka Henrik Mäkinen 
Associate Professor in Sociology 
Stockholm Centre on Health of Societies in 
Transition (SCOHOST)  
University College of South Stockholm 
141 89 Huddinge 
SWEDEN 
Tel.: +46 8 608 4149 
Fax: +46 8 608 4080 
E-mail: ilkka.makinen@sh.se 
Web: www.sh.se/scohost 
 
 
Dr. Yuri Mshemsky 
Russian Mission Vienna 
Erzherzog Karl Str. 182 
A-1220 Vienna 
AUSTRIA 
Tel: +43 1 282 53 91 
E-mail: y_mshemsky@mail.ru 
 
  
 157
Prof. Alexander Nemtsov, M.D. 
Head of Department 
Moscow Research Institute of Psychiatry 
(MPH RF) 
Poteshnaia str., 3 
107076 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Fax: +7 095 162 10 03 
E-mail: al-nemtsov@mtu-net.ru 
Prof. Natalia M. Rimashevskaya 
Director 
Institute for Socio-Economic Population 
Studies 
The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) 
Centre for Socio-Economic Researches 
Health and Public Health Services 
Nachimovsky prospect 32 
117218 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Tel.: +7 095 129 04 00 
Fax: +7 095 129 08 01 
E-Mail: ipkat@msk.net.ru 
ipkatf@comtv.ru 
Prof. David Rotman 
Director of the Center for Sociological and 
Political Research 
Belarusian State University, and 
Vice Director of the International Research 
Project "Living Conditions, Lyfestyles and 
Health", 2000-2003, Copernicus 
Minsk 
BELARUS 
Tel: +375-17-2272521 
Fax: +375-17-2292879 
E-mail: rotman@bsu.by 
Dr. Serguei Scherbov 
Population Project 
International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis (IIASA) 
Schlossplatz 1 
A-2361 Laxenburg 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: +43 2236 807 584 
Fax: +43 2236 71313 
E-mail: scherbov@iiasa.ac.at 
and 
Österreichische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften (ÖAW) 
(Austrian Academy of Sciences) 
Dr. Ignaz Seipel-Platz 2 
A-1010 Vienna 
Austria 
Tel.: +43 1 51581 7707 
E-mail: sergei.scherbov@oeaw.ac.at 
 
 
Prof. Judith Shapiro 
Professor of Health Economics 
New Economic School, Moscow 
Nakhimovsky Prospekt 47 
Moscow 117428 
RUSSIA 
Tel.: +7 095 129 1700 
Fax: +7 095 129 3722 
E-mail: jshapiro@nes.ru 
 
 
Dr. Sergey Shishkin 
Independent Institute of Social Policy (IISP) 
1st Tverskaia-Iamskaia str. no. 16/23 
Building 1 
125047 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Fax: +7 095 721 14 98 
E-mail: shishkin@socpol.ru 
 
 
Dr. Serguei Sourkov 
Senior Researcher 
Independent Institute of Social Policy (IISP) 
1st Tverskaia-Iamskaia str. no. 16/23 
Building 1 
125047 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Tel/Fax: +7 095 721 1498 
E-mail: sourkov@socpol.ru 
Web: http://www.socpol.ru 
 
 
Dr. Svetlana Stephenson 
Senior Lecturer in Comparative 
Sociology/Social Policy 
Department of Applied Social Studies 
London Metropolitan University 
North Campus 
Ladbroke House 62-66 Highbury grove 
London N5 2AD 
UK 
Tel.: +44 207 133 5030 
Fax: +44 207 753 5763  
E-mail: s.stephenson@londonmet.ac.uk  
 
 158
Dr. Alexander Surinov 
First Deputy Chairman Goskomstat of 
Russia 
State Committee of the Russian Federation 
on Statistics (Goskomstat) 
39 Myasnitskaya St. 
103450 Moscow 
RUSSIA 
Fax: +7 095 928 3360 
E-mail: surinov@gks.ru 
Dr. Larry Willmore 
United Nations (UN) 
United Nations Plaza, Room DC2-2340 
New York, NY 10017 
U.S.A. 
Tel.: +1 212 963 4758 
Fax: +1 212 963 9023 
E-mail: willmore@un.org 
Mag. Gisela Zieger 
Bundesministerium für Bildung, 
Wissenschaft und Kultur 
Abteilung VI/6, Ref. a 
Rosengasse 2 – 6 
A-1014 Vienna 
AUSTRIA 
Tel.: +43 1 53120 7138 
Fax: +43 1 53120 6205 
E-mail: gisela.zieger@bmbwk.gv.at 
 
 
The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
is an interdisciplinary, nongovernmental research institution founded in 1972 by leading
scientific organizations in 12 countries. Situated near Vienna, in the center of Europe,
IIASA has been producing valuable scientific research on economic, technological, and
environmental issues for nearly three decades.
IIASA was one of the first international institutes to systematically study global issues of
environment, technology, and development. IIASA’s Governing Council states that the In-
stitute’s goal is: to conduct international and interdisciplinary scientific studies to provide
timely and relevant information and options, addressing critical issues of global environ-
mental, economic, and social change, for the benefit of the public, the scientific community,
and national and international institutions. Research is organized around three central
themes:
– Energy and Technology;
– Environment and Natural Resources;
– Population and Society.
The Institute now has National Member Organizations in the following countries:
Austria
The Austrian Academy of Sciences
China
National Natural Science
Foundation of China
Czech Republic
The Academy of Sciences of the
Czech Republic
Egypt
Academy of Scientific Research and
Technology (ASRT)
Estonia
Estonian Association for
Systems Analysis
Finland
The Finnish Committee for IIASA
Germany
The Association for the Advancement
of IIASA
Hungary
The Hungarian Committee for Applied
Systems Analysis
Japan
The Japan Committee for IIASA
Netherlands
The Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research (NWO)
Norway
The Research Council of Norway
Poland
The Polish Academy of Sciences
Russian Federation
The Russian Academy of Sciences
Sweden
The Swedish Research Council for
Environment, Agricultural Sciences
and Spatial Planning (FORMAS)
Ukraine
The Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
United States of America
The National Academy of
Sciences
I I A S A
International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis
www.iiasa.ac.at
